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
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National Security
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Proceedings

National Defense
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Washington, DC 20319

Continuity and Change in the Eighties and Beyond

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
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CONTINUITY AND CHANGE IN THE EIGHTIES AND BEYOND.

PROCEEDINGS OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS CONFERENCE



23-25 JULY 1979,
National Defense University

"... we seek not to stifle inevitable change but to influence its course in helpful and constructive ways that enhance our values, our national interests and the cause of peace."

President Jimmy Carter
State of the Union Message
January 23, 1979

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November 1979

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PRESIDENT'S FOREWORD

As we continue to evolve our programs at the National Defense University, we are placing increased stress on generating fresh perspectives and new ideas—the hallmarks of a dynamic university. In our efforts to prepare selected military and civilian professionals for important positions in the formulation and execution of national security policy and the management of resources in support of national security, we believe the outreach to the broader community through the forum of the National Security Affairs Institute exemplifies the wider intellectual exchanges so necessary to our quest.

Each year, the Institute convenes a National Security Affairs Conference which fosters an intense and concentrated examination of several significant national security issues facing the policy planning community. This year, participants focused on the accommodations of the United States to change within a context of relative continuity in values, commitments, and governmental processes.

A major feature of this annual conference is the recognition that wisdom and knowledge reside in no one particular group or discipline. Our participants brought informed, if divergent, views to bear on the issues. We sought no consensus. Indeed, we encouraged lively debate, and assured non-attribution of particular views to individual conferees. As a result, the exchanges were open, frank, and oftentimes controversial. At the end of the workshops, the panel chairmen and *rapporteurs synthesized and summarized* the concerns and initiatives developed by the panels. These summaries, with the papers prepared as frameworks for discussion, record the proceedings of this 1979 Conference.

As in the past, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs joined with us in cosponsoring this Conference. We again must express our thanks to Secretary David E. McGiffert and his staff for the splendid cooperation essential to the success of the Conference. Finally, on behalf of all of us at the National Defense University, I must express the sincerest appreciation to our distinguished participants for making the Sixth National Security Affairs Conference a valuable source of ideas for us all.

R. G. GARD, JR.
Lieutenant General, USA
President

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AN OVERVIEW

Continuity and Change in the Eighties and Beyond

As we approach the end of the decade of the seventies, significant events promise to affect key national security issues into the eighties and beyond. Although a radical change in the United States' strategic outlook is unlikely, we can expect a reshaping of national security policies on a continuing basis as a result of these events and others, as yet unimagined. An important historical strength of the United States has been its ability to accommodate to change within the continuity provided by fundamental values and governmental processes.

As in past years, the 1979 National Security Affairs Conference addressed a significant theme—continuity and change—which provided a framework for addressing a wide range of national security issues. The five conference working groups explored policy issues affected by continuity and change in the areas of: arms control and defense planning (Panel 1); a limited contingency force (Panel 2); the United States and East Asia (Panel 3); mobilization and surge potential (Panel 4); and strategic issues in Latin America and the Caribbean (Panel 5).

In keeping with its policy-oriented purposes, the 1979 Conference brought together a select group of scholars, businessmen, decisionmakers, and observers from both public and private life. The group represented wide-ranging viewpoints, interests, and backgrounds which were brought to bear in exploring policy issues within the five subject areas. This overview introduces and summarizes some of the material contained in the *Proceedings*. We must caution that neither this summary nor the panel reports can adequately capture the intensity, clarity, and thoughtful views of the participants throughout the course of the conference.

PANEL 1. ARMS CONTROL AND DEFENSE PLANNING

One of the most complex issues underlying US-Soviet arms control negotiations over the coming decade involves the nature of the relationship between these negotiations and US defense policies. The working group set out to examine the complex relationship between arms control and defense planning. After examining this general relationship, the panel sought to address it more specifically as it related to SALT and theater nuclear forces (TNF).

The panel generally agreed, with some strong dissents, that defense planning and arms control have proceeded down disconnected, sometimes rival, tracks and that the West appears to be negotiating prior to achieving a full understanding of what is needed as an overall deterrent and defense posture.

The panel failed to reach agreement on the value of SALT II as a military planning tool. Some panelists displayed skepticism on the value of arms control agreements to date and many believed military and political debate on arms control and national security was vitally necessary.

In discussing NATO-European judgments of SALT II, panelists agreed that those governments appeared to see no major reason why SALT II would be disadvantageous. Nonetheless, the attitude of Europeans is not so much an endorsement of SALT as it is a fear of the effect of a "SALT-less" future on detente.

The panelists then directed their attention to the future function and design of

NATO's theater nuclear forces and noted that the United States made a commitment during the SALT II negotiations to discuss Forward Based Systems and cruise missiles in SALT III. The purposeful ambiguity of NATO's TNF employment policy, stemming from divergent views within the Alliance, will pose a serious impediment to defining defensible joint military requirements which are essential to designing a rational arms control position. Although an agreed view of a nuclear land battle is desirable, some panelists were skeptical that NATO-Europe could be persuaded to adopt one after 25 years of disagreement.

The somewhat contentious conclusion of the panel's discussions was the proposition that the United States tends to enter arms control negotiations without having adequately defined its strategic defense goals. The panel questioned: If we don't know what we want or need in terms of a sound defense policy, how can we choose correct arms control bargaining positions?

PANEL 2. POLITICS AND THE LIMITED CONTINGENCY FORCE

Although the NATO region remains the focus for many important national security issues, defense planners cannot ignore that the United States is a global power with worldwide interests. Growing instability in the Persian Gulf and in Africa accents the fact that US national interests may require an intervention capability, if not a commitment. This working group set out to examine, as one response to the problem, the Limited Contingency Force (LCF) planned for the 1980's and other potential alternate response options. As the United States finds itself more involved in global politics and economics, the panel addressed the impact these involvements will have on relations between the United States and the Soviet Union, and between the United States and other existing or emerging power centers. The panel sought to provide ideas for the defense decisionmaker as a basis for design and use of the Limited Contingency Force (LCF).

At the outset of discussion, there was general agreement that some kind of Limited Contingency Force is needed. Disagreement centered around force sizing and appropriate missions. Observing that an important function of designated contingency forces is to affect perceptions, the panel established a listing of perceptions which suggests that the United States may be sending ambiguous signals to allies, adversaries, and aspiring regional powers about our interests, capabilities, and intentions.

The panel noted that the Soviet ability to project power has vastly improved during the past decade and is still growing. Nonetheless, most panel members agreed the United States still retains substantial superiority in some crucial areas such as mobility of ground forces, the range and quality of air forces, and experienced amphibious and sea control forces.

After an examination of possible Soviet deployments in the Persian Gulf and the situation in southern Africa, the panel agreed that the American LCF should not be region- or scenario-specific.

In recommending courses of action, the panelists distinguished three sets of options ranging from relatively low-key, low-budget measures to more expensive, controversial ones which included enhanced capabilities to project US power and military equipment specifically designed with LCF contingencies in mind.

The panelists concluded with a discussion of when and why the United States should make use of the capabilities provided by an LCF. This again led to a consideration of perceptions held abroad and in the United States and the necessity to take actions to affect them.

PANEL 3. BEYOND NORMALIZATION: THE UNITED STATES AND EAST ASIA

During the past year, major changes have occurred which could affect the East Asian balance of power. On 1 January 1979, the United States and China established full diplomatic relations. Japan and China signed a treaty of friendship and cooperation. North and South Korea may resume talks on reunification. These potentially stabilizing events were played out against a backdrop of tension and destabilization in Afghanistan, Cambodia, Iran, and Vietnam. The panel set out to examine the interaction of the United States, USSR, China, and Japan on issues of military security, economic development and trade, and other regional matters. They sought to explore the prospects for maintaining peace and stability in East Asia.

Prompted by the two papers provided for discussion, fundamental disagreement arose among the panelists over the prospects for regional stability and conflict in East Asia. One group argued that normalization of US-Chinese relations had not brought stability and that conflict would continue. Another group argued that regional conflicts would persist at low levels, but without the involvement of the major powers, partly because regional powers would seek to exclude outside intervention and partly because great powers would not see intervention as being in their best interests. The panelists concluded that the future US role in Asia depends on which situation prevails.

In examining the issues salient in the Pacific Basin, the panel devoted considerable attention to the Sino-Soviet dispute and made the point that the United States should be cautious in making policy commitments which assume continued distance between these two powers. Instead, we should be prepared for the possibility of a greater accommodation between these two powers, if not a rapprochement.

Concerning Vietnam, panelists were divided between those who supported ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) cooperation against Vietnam, and those who warned that the Soviet Union might perceive this as an anti-Soviet alliance in Asia. Similarly, in analyzing the Korean situation, two major points of view were expressed. The majority favored continuing the US military presence in South Korea to deter North Korean aggression; others held that the US troop presence lessened US options. The probable future changes in Korean leadership were viewed as possibly leading to some diminution of tensions.

The economic future of Asia was examined at length. The idea was advanced that American military power in Asia is being replaced by American economic power. The role of American business in the economic future of Asia was analyzed *vis a vis* the future economic role of Japan. Sources of increasing concern for American economic power may emerge from the effect of domestic policies, the climate of regulation, the problems of energy and inflation, and the impact of multinational corporations.

In turning their attention to the future of China, the panelists agreed that Americans are beginning to see China more clearly. The current Chinese emphasis on peace and stability in order to effect modernization may continue. At the same time, there are contrary forces at work which could hold back change or accelerate it. The failure of present policies could produce a return to radicalism. These events, whether of continuity or change, will affect future US-Chinese relations. Although divergent views were expressed on the desired extent of the US commitment to China, nearly all participants agreed that the relationship should be based on mutual self-interest rather than on attempts at manipulation to achieve some global outcome.

In concluding the panel discussions, two broad alternative philosophies were advanced. The first addressed the post World War II notion of a desired American military

involvement in continuation of historical roles and as a response to new issues as well. The second suggested a more indirect approach of selective involvement, following debate on each issue. Both views were tempered by the sense that Americans would be reluctant to respond militarily to almost any challenge in Asia.

PANEL 4. MOBILIZATION AND SURGE POTENTIAL

In the nuclear age, there are advocates who maintain that the commitment of scarce resources to a mobilization base or to the design of a surge potential is unwarranted, arguing that strategic nuclear war is inevitably so short that mobilization can make no difference in the outcome. Others maintain that assured destruction capability inhibits nuclear war to the point where limited conventional wars are likely, and require an ability to expand military forces quickly and to sustain such a posture over time. The panel was asked to address these countervailing assumptions and to assess US mobilization and surge potential over the next decade in terms of deterrence, provocation, and war-sustaining capability.

Encountering a definitional problem at the outset, the panel agreed to use the term "defense expansion" to replace both the terms "mobilization" and "surge." The panel then constructed a matrix which covered the types and degrees of defense expansion across a range of effort.

With this agreement, the panel also agreed that planning which was preoccupied with a NATO-first, World War II type scenario became too rigid and potentially unable to cope with multiple, limited, peripheral wars which were the more likely type of conflict during the next decade. The panel then moved to an examination of a range of plausible scenarios in which US defense forces might be involved over the next decade. These scenarios were then plotted against defense expansion requirements, using the matrix developed earlier.

Earlier surge or mobilization planning had focused almost entirely on wartime manpower and materiel; the panel believed that this view of mobilization should be broadened. This would include the impact on industrial capability resulting from a change in treaty obligations or other factors; the impact on allied intentions and abilities; the need for increased attention to industrial manpower requirements; the building of requisite political support; and the need for an emergency funding process.

The panel concluded that an increased reliance on mobilization potential is valid and represents a realistic planning priority for the decade ahead. Panelists made specific recommendations for broadening management support, further investigation and study, and initiating positive actions.

PANEL 5. THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE IN A DECADE OF CHANGE

A stable and secure Western Hemisphere is essential to the national security interest of the United States. The panel was asked to analyze the interests of the United States at stake south of its borders and to examine the forces at work which endanger those interests. The panel evaluated traditional policies for their appropriateness for the next decade and suggested revisions necessary to strengthen the prospects for stability and security.

All members of the panel expressed concern that Latin America has been overlooked by foreign policymakers in recent years. Current activities by Cuba and events in Nicaragua provide the impetus for a renewed interest in Latin America. Additionally, most of the panelists objected to treating Latin America as a homogeneous unit, since there are major differences in security issues affecting various subregions.

Emphasis was placed on the necessity of setting US foreign policy objectives for each country.

The panel identified four major areas of US interest in Latin America: preventing hostile powers from obtaining significant military advantages close to the United States or our major sea lanes; maintaining US access to important regional resources and markets; enlisting Latin American support in strengthening global economic arrangements for trade and finance; and obtaining cooperation in the promotion of fundamental shared values.

In debating policy issues, the panel agreed that the most urgent current concerns are focused on Central America and the Caribbean. The panel argued that pressure exerted 3 or 4 years ago for a broadened regime in Nicaragua might have avoided civil war and the danger of extreme left-wing control. The panel believed that a more intensive effort in support of moderate change should be undertaken in El Salvador, Honduras, and Guatemala. Recognizing the sensitivity of Latin American governments to US intervention, the members thought it desirable to enlist the collaboration of sympathetic Latin American or European governments.

The panel next considered the US relationship with the larger South American countries. They advocated a posture which is similar to the relationship the United States has with the smaller European countries, rather than treating these larger Latin American nations as though they are developing countries. Some panelists recommended implementing policies for rapid economic development and regional or bilateral negotiations on special issues. The panel agreed that multilateral arrangements continue to have an important constructive potential which warrants active US support of such arrangements.

No agreement was reached in the panel's discussions of US policy toward Cuba, except for the need to continue the search for relevant policies. They suggested that the United States include Cuba's external activities in agendas for bargaining with the Soviet Union.

The panel recommended the inclusion of Latin American issues in future National Security Affairs Conferences and in the winter seminars commencing in 1979.

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The remainder of these *Proceedings* report upon the activities of each of the five working panels. Each panel section consists of the summary report and the full texts of the papers prepared to stimulate panel discussions. We must caution that the conference format does not provide for formal minority reports. Our chairmen and rapporteurs have made a determined effort to include dissenting views in the summary reports, but it is possible that some minority opinions are not fully expressed.

The *Proceedings* conclude with the closing remarks of Assistant Secretary of Defense David E. McGiffert. Finally, biographical information on each panelist completes the *Proceedings*.

Panel 1

ARMS CONTROL AND DEFENSE PLANNING

An examination of the range of possible US arms control objectives in the light of their contributions to US defense planning needs. An analysis of past and continuing arms control negotiations in terms of future possibilities. An assessment of the politico-military climate and the overall impact of arms control negotiations on the strategic outlook of the United States.

PANEL 1

Participants

CHAIRMAN: Mr. Colin Gray, Hudson Institute

RAPPORTEURS: COL John C. Keliher, USA, The National War College; LTC Roger N. Fritzel, USAF, National Defense University

AUTHORS: Mr. Richard Burt, New York Times; Mr. Christopher Makins, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace; Mr. Michael Higgins, Assistant to the President, Science Applications, Inc.

PANELISTS: Dr. Barry M. Blechman, Assistant Director for Weapons Evaluation and Control, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency; Dr. Richard E. Darilek, Director, MBFR Task Force, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA); LTG John Elder, United States Army (Retired); Mr. Stephen J. Hadley, Shea and Gardner; Mr. Roger Molander, National Security Council; Mr. Richard Perle, Senate Armed Services Committee; Mr. Andrew J. Pierre, Senior Research Fellow, Council on Foreign Relations; Ms. Joyce Lasky Shub, Legislative Assistant to Senator Biden; Mr. James V. Siena, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for European and NATO Affairs (ISA); Mr. Walter Slocombe, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA); Mr. Leon Sloss, Vice President, SRI International; Dr. John Steinbruner, The Brookings Institution.

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PANEL 1 SUMMARY

Arms Control And Defense Planning

COLIN GRAY, Chairman

JOHN KELIHER, Rapporteur

ROGER FRITZEL, Rapporteur

The mandate of Panel 1 was very broad indeed. But it was not so broad that the agenda for discussion had to be contracted, thereby leading to skating over important areas. Because of the outstanding quality of the papers presented, the panel managed to delve into details to a degree that exceeded expectations. The panel attempted three things:

First, to try to examine the complex relations between arms control and defense planning in general.

Second, to examine those relations with respect to the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks.

Third, to examine those relations with respect to theater nuclear forces.

As one would expect, virtually every important and, indeed, some less important, aspects of the US strategic force posture and doctrine and of NATO's force posture and doctrine in Europe attracted the attention of the panel.

In a very forcefully argued paper, Richard Burt sought, by and large persuasively, to explain the structure of our defense planning and arms control problems. The panel generally agreed that an arms control process such as SALT could not of itself alleviate sources of military instability. The US problem in SALT is that we and the Soviets do not agree on a definition of strategic stability. We and the Soviets do not have a cooperative understanding of what it is we are trying to accomplish by way of a common conceptual framework.

ARMS CONTROL AND SALT II

There was little dissent from the proposition that arms control agreements such as in SALT II are really in the business of registering actual or impending facts. Some members of the panel felt quite strongly that arms control has become a permanent diplomatic institution, even though its true promise of potentiality remains to some considerable degree inadequately understood. In some important ways this really was the central theme of the discussion. With some minor dissenting views, panelists felt that in SALT, and particularly with respect to nuclear forces, the West may be locking itself into a process of negotiation prior to the West really understanding what it needs in the way of a sound defense posture.

This formulation was not controversial with respect to theater nuclear forces. In other words, the panel agreed to an understanding of what theater nuclear forces are about by way of *potential* application. However, the panel felt that we do not understand clearly how we want to apply them. But the panel did have some strong dissenting views with respect to the potential. Some argued that the West does not have what could be termed strong strategic objectives in the context of SALT.

The panel debated briefly the question of how SALT II should be judged, but reached no consensus. Panelists generally did agree, however, that defense planning and arms control negotiations appear to have proceeded down unduly disconnected tracks.

ARMS CONTROL AND DEFENSE PLANNING

The panel did not vote on the merits of SALT II. There was little dissent on Richard Burt's propositions about SALT II: that it essentially registers facts but does little, if anything, to restrain the Soviet military threat; and that it might yet prove to have an inhibiting effect upon our ability to respond to that threat appropriately. The panel went on to discuss the possibility of an inhibiting effect.

The point went essentially unchallenged that SALT II appears to be having a pernicious impact upon, for example, our selection of an MX basing mode—a point which Richard Burt made very forcefully in his paper. No one around the table chose to challenge it.

Without taking an overall position vis-a-vis SALT II, the panel observed, following Richard Burt's paper, that possibly the strongest technical argument for SALT II was the imposition of so-called "fractionation supplements" on the Soviet ballistic missile payload, and also on the US ballistic missile payload. Further, the panel noted a curious paradox in this regard. The administration is claiming the fractionation supplement perception bounds the threat to a land-mobile or land-moveable MX ICBM and will continue to do so. In other words, as we look further into the future, we will probably say the strongest accomplishments of SALT II are these fractionation supplements, and we think they will continue, although we can't figure out quite why; whereas the constraints against ground-launched cruise missiles and sea-launched cruise missiles deployment at ranges in excess of 600 kilometers will cease with the expiration of the protocol.

Panel 1 encountered some disagreement in discussing the position that somehow the cruise missile would run free and our interest in the fractionation supplements, which should work to the US interest, would continue in force. Some members of the panel felt this position was unduly optimistic.

The panel failed to reach agreement over the value of SALT II as a military planning tool. Many, if not most, of the panelists felt there was value in setting upper limits, even very high upper limits, on Soviet strategic capability. Others felt those upper limits were so high as to be essentially meaningless. The limits were applicable to too short a period—only until December 31, 1985—to be valuable.

This issue of the predictability of threat, of setting horizons that can be seen clearly, ran through the panel's discussion of both SALT and the possibility of negotiations on theater nuclear forces. Leaving aside the question of verification, the point was made several times that the predictability of threat is not necessarily a source of comfort to negotiators. For example, if one can predict he is going to be inferior, that person is not greatly reassured by confidence he might have in that prediction.

Overall, the paper by Richard Burt and the discussion which attended the presentation were strongly skeptical of the value of arms control agreements and, in a minor key, the merits of the arms control process *per se*. Panelists noted that it is perhaps unfortunate that the SALT II debates have yet to engage truly fundamental strategic political propositions. In other words, everyone is debating within the context of SALT II. Everyone, so it seems, is in favor of arms control *per se*. Everyone, so it seems, feels compelled to say that he favors arms control and SALT generically, but possibly not this particular treaty.

Overall, Panel 1 concluded that there was some merit in the charge that although SALT registered facts and by and large failed to constrain threats, it did perhaps carry the dangerous premise of inhibiting timely and technically preferred responses to those threats. However, discussion of strategic arms limitations talks in general, and SALT II in particular, was more political than military-technical in character.

ARMS CONTROL AND DEFENSE PLANNING

Several times, the panel discussion focused on an issue raised in Richard Burt's paper concerning the structure of the United States Government and its organization for policy preparation in the arms control field. Mr. Burt suggested that the creation of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency may well have been an error—a minor bureaucratic point. That point was challenged strongly by one or two members of the panel.

The panel considered the argument that it was perhaps unhealthy to have an agency of government whose whole rationale for existence was arms control negotiation. Richard Burt argued that the proliferation of what he termed "mini-actors" in the State and Defense Departments and on the National Security Council staff compelled the actor proper to adopt a more and more doctrinaire arms control position. In addition, and perhaps somewhat more seriously, the bureaucratic strength of the arms control interest may well have driven the military services and the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff into a very defensive mode vis-a-vis arms control. Mr. Burt perceived this as an unhealthy development.

Another point which Richard Burt argued very strongly was that, in the future, the United States should integrate military contributions to its arms control planning and arms control negotiations in a far more cohesive way than managed thus far.

NATO-EUROPEAN PERCEPTIONS OF SALT

Before debating the details of a new theater nuclear force posture and doctrine for NATO, Panel 1 addressed the broad issues of the strategic context of those activities. Specifically, the panel discussed the NATO-European judgments on SALT II. Putting aside individual policy preferences as far as possible, the panel managed to agree, roughly at least, that the NATO-European governments appear to see no major reasons why SALT II should work to their disadvantage. However, there was also at least an appearance of general agreement to the effect that NATO Europe was perhaps not so much endorsing SALT II in its technical details as expressing its distaste for the potentially dangerous unknowns of a future without SALT.

The panel appeared to agree that NATO Europeans were distressed by the current polarization, or apparent polarization, of US opinions on the adequacy of US strategic programs and the merits of the SALT II package. And just possibly our NATO-European allies would welcome a new American consensus, of whatever technical character. In other words, our allies are less interested in the particular outcome of the American defense debate; they are rather more interested in the fact we do reach a consensus in the outcome to that debate. The panel felt that Europe could live with whatever the United States decides is in its best interest.

The panel as a whole did not dissent from Raymond Aron's claim that, although the major European capitals did not much like some of the technical details of SALT II, those capitals were fearful of the unknown implications of Senate rejection of ratification.

In one of the more noteworthy interventions in our discussion, a panelist identified apparent NATO-European attitudes toward SALT II ratification as a rather clear example of Finlandization. In short, much of NATO-Europe wants to see SALT II ratified for fear of the Soviet diplomatic reaction should SALT fail of Senatorial passage. This characterization did not pass unchallenged, as one might imagine, but it was not plausibly refuted.

The panel recognized that a problem for NATO Europe, as for the United States, was what one might term the "ambiguous alternative." What is the alternative to SALT II? The SALT II treaty, warts and all, contributes to, if it doesn't define, a known political

ARMS CONTROL AND DEFENSE PLANNING

environment, while a "SALT-less" future constitutes perhaps a dangerous unknown in the NATO-European perspective. One should recall the fact that NATO Europeans tend to view their security in more of a political fashion than do American defense analysts. This is an almost overarching concern.

ARMS CONTROL AND THE THEATER NUCLEAR FORCE

Discussion of SALT overlaps consideration of both excellent papers presented before Panel 1. Although the second paper, by Michael Higgins and Christopher Makins, was primarily a case study of the arms control defense planning connection with reference to theater nuclear forces, it did not eschew commentary upon the SALT process. The point was made, time and again, that the military assets of the Western alliance need to be considered as a whole. Yet somehow arms control endeavors to date have disaggregated Western military assets to possibly a harmful degree. We tend to distinguish between strategic and theater forces, even though we have a single slate of Western assets. In one of the most detailed discussions, Panel 1 debated the merits of the Higgins-Makins theater nuclear force modernization scheme in the context of a new approach to arms control within the theater.

The second paper, by Michael Higgins and Christopher Makins, addressed the subject that has evaded intellectual control thus far, possibly within the Western alliance as a whole—namely, the design and the functions of NATO's theater nuclear force posture and doctrine. Properly enough the authors started from the premise that the United States is committed, in its negotiating history of SALT II, to discuss in SALT III the so-called forward-based systems, a Soviet characterization, and cruise missiles. It has been close to axiomatic to argue that the purposeful "ambiguity" that attends NATO's theater nuclear force employment policy is more akin to genuine confusion, resting upon divergent interests, than it is to any calculation of likely deterrent effect. That is a somewhat pretentious characterization, but we do tend to refer to the "creatively useful ambiguity in NATO's doctrine." The Soviets should indeed be uncertain in looking at our posture because we ourselves are uncertain as to what we would do.

Nonetheless, Panel 1 agreed that the absence of any dominant theory of theater nuclear force use vis-a-vis the land battle in Europe precluded official derivation of defensible military requirements. In other words, if we lack a theory of theater nuclear force combat, we really cannot design a force posture to match. Where there is intellectual confusion, how does one decide what his military requirements are? To proceed farther down the tracks, how does one decide what his arms control policy should be with respect to those forces? In sum, there is a missing link in the intellectual chain.

Authors Higgins and Makins challenged NATO orthodoxy. They asserted the need for an agreed NATO concept of nuclear employment, and they proceeded to specify the particular character of an arms control connection. It has long been generally accepted that NATO could not enjoy the dubious benefits of an agreed theater nuclear force doctrine. NATO Europeans have resisted generically the idea that new applications might plausibly be restricted to in-theater employment, whereas American officials have tended to seek theater nuclear force options which would maximize the prospect that the American homeland might escape nuclear damage. Messrs. Higgins and Makins pointed to the fact that NATO has no agreed strategy for theater nuclear force employment despite the ocean of ink spilled on the subject. This condition of uncertainty mirrors very well the purposeful ambiguity, or perhaps confusion, which many observers perceive.

Messrs. Higgins and Makins, in their paper, sought to argue that one could, in effect, "have one's cake and eat it as well." This second paper suggested that we identify a

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robust theater nuclear force posture and doctrine and that such confidence was needed if programs for modernization were to proceed. Granted, NATO has long been divided by apparently fundamental differences with respect to theater nuclear forces. For example, American officials and commentators have been concerned to insure that conflict in Europe might be confined to Europe, however, NATO Europeans, following the idea of equality of risk, have sought to insure that there will be little likelihood of a major theater war in Europe remaining strictly a theater war.

The authors drew a sharp distinction between European and American approaches to theater nuclear force issues. This was quite a useful organizing device for discussion. They suggested that NATO needs to proceed down the modernization road both with respect to battlefield engagement systems and with respect to the longer range systems which are the formal subject of concern of NATO's current high-level group.

The panel debated at some length the proposition that many of our postural problems in the theater nuclear force area really stem from the absence of Alliance wide agreements over the proper military roles of theater nuclear forces.

The panel also agreed that absence of an approved strategy flowed from some basic geopolitical differences of interest between the United States and Western Europe. In other words, it is uncertain whether those differences across the Atlantic really are bridgeable. Considerable debate ensued on that subject.

The argument was advanced, in both papers, that NATO's extant, strategic concept of flexible response did not look nearly as robust today as it did when it was formalized in 1967. Panel members seemed to agree that the idea of flexible response was obsolescent.

The Higgins and Makins paper offered the radical suggestion that NATO's theater nuclear forces should be modernized, first, to satisfy the requirements of a strategy of efficient use. In the NATO context this is almost a revolutionary suggestion. NATO does not have an agreed vision of a nuclear land battle, which is one reason, a major reason, why it is extraordinarily difficult for NATO to decide upon its military requirements for theater nuclear forces—unlike the Soviet Union, for example.

The panel noted that there is an apparently enduring tension between American and NATO-European perspectives on the subject of theater nuclear forces. The United States, as some would argue, wishes to endorse a theater nuclear force posture that stands some prospect of containing a conflict within the theater. NATO Europe, on the other hand, wishes a theater nuclear force posture which maximizes the prospect that if actually employed would embroil the superpower homelands in a European war sooner rather than later.

THEATER NUCLEAR FORCE POSTURE

In terms of force posture, this tension is expressed in a preference for short- and medium-range systems as opposed to systems capable of reaching Soviet territory from NATO-European territory. In panel discussions, a degree of apparent consensus was reached on the desirability of NATO having the agreed strategy to which Higgins and Makins referred. But some panelists were more than a little skeptical about why NATO Europe should be persuaded of the merit of such an idea at this particular point, now, in 1979, when it has not been so persuaded over the past 25 years. This issue was addressed at some length.

In a very detailed discussion, the panel considered the proposition that NATO theater nuclear force modernization would make military sense with respect to the

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battlefield and the rear area of the battlefield. The NATO Alliance would have to modernize its longer-range systems and also would have to endorse a theater nuclear force arms control initiative. The point was made repeatedly by some panel members that NATO Europe would endorse military improvements only if those improvements were accompanied by arms control initiatives. The panel spent quite a lot of time exploring just what this agreement might mean and just what allied approaches might be in some detail.

A strong argument was advanced that there should be a new arms control forum tasked with the negotiation of all tactical nuclear weapon issues, short- as well as long-range. In this new arms control forum, we have MBFR and SALT, and also a TAL (Tactical Arms Limitation) framework for discussion of all theater nuclear force issues.

Higgins and Makins made the forceful argument that should East-West negotiations be confined solely to the longer-range theater nuclear delivery systems, the Soviet Union would enjoy almost what one might describe as a structural advantage, given the geography of the opposed Alliance relations in Europe.

Discussion of the arms control negotiability of theater nuclear forces was very extensive. Some members of the panel remained unconvinced that it would be helpful to create another arms control institution, especially at this particular point in time.

The argument was made that SALT III negotiations would require a shorter time for completion if Soviet and NATO longer-range theater nuclear force delivery systems could be negotiated separately. What would be the impact of a theater nuclear force issue on the negotiability of SALT III? Some panelists were persuasive in arguing that if the gray area systems were taken off the SALT III agenda, the life span of the negotiations for SALT III would be reduced by 5 years. But some panelists were not persuaded that we could create another constructive forum in which to handle those problems.

The mutual and balanced force reduction (MBFR) institution received rather rough treatment from the panel. The panel recognized the historical fact that MBFR was created and sustained for reasons of defeating congressional pressure, led by Senator Mansfield, to reduce the US troop presence in Europe. In this connection, MBFR has indeed been very successful. The panel proceeded to recognize that times have changed rather substantially since the early 1970s. The rationale for MBFR, at least in those terms, has evaporated. Nonetheless, no one challenged the apparent fact that MBFR has been valuable for the communication it promoted among NATO members.

Overall, the panel was skeptical rather than hostile to the idea that theater nuclear force issues should be negotiated comprehensively in a new arms control forum. In addition, intellectually, at least, the panel acknowledged merit in the argument that NATO needs somewhat urgently an overarching strategic appreciation of its theater nuclear force requirements. What should the theater nuclear force do for NATO? How do we derive its military requirements? What are the military requirements? What tasks should we give that particular force posture?

The panel argued against a piecemeal approach to tactical nuclear force modernization, one based on no superior vision of military requirements, based on no politically agreed concept of a nuclear land battle. Under a piecemeal approach, we would find it very difficult indeed to design a sound arms control position. The underlying theme throughout the discussion was the relationship between deciding what the structure of our defense posture should be, and then deriving intelligent and responsive arms control options as a consequence.

Finally, in conclusion, one thesis that appeared more often and more persuasively than any other in the panel discussions was the proposition that we tend to enter arms control negotiations without having done our strategy homework. Some disagreement

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with this proposition was heard from officials present, but most felt it to be true with respect to theater nuclear forces and, to some degree, in the MBFR context. The point is, if the United States and its allies don't know what they want or what they need in terms of a sound defense policy, how do they decide upon arms control bargaining positions? For example, if the United States does not know where MX fits into its defense posture, how do we decide what kind of a price we should pay for its constraint?

PANEL 1 PAPER: Defense Policy and Arms Control

Richard Burt

Few concepts have gained greater allegiance from political elites around the world in recent years than arms control, or more specifically, formal diplomatic negotiations aimed at limiting military forces. It is curious, then, that at a time when the two superpowers have finally succeeded in achieving a second strategic arms limitation (SALT II) accord, arms control seems to have fallen into disrepute. In political circles, negotiations and their outcomes have become the subject of intense controversy. In the analytical community, meanwhile, thinking about arms control suffers from an unmistakable malaise.

A DECADE OF EAST-WEST ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS

It is not hard to find explanations for this state of affairs. During the last decade, we have learned that negotiating East-West arms control can be an exhaustive and time-consuming process. Following the conclusion of the first SALT accords in 1972, it was widely assumed that a follow-on agreement would be obtained in a few years at most. Yet SALT II took nearly twice as long to negotiate as its predecessor agreements. And SALT has been obviously the most successful arms control exercise to date. The Vienna force reduction talks, the negotiations on a comprehensive test ban (CTB), and more recent Soviet-American attempts to regulate naval forces in the Indian Ocean and to control conventional arms transfers have yet to produce agreement; and, with the possible exception of the CTB, they are unlikely to do so in the near future.

But while some observers may be disappointed with the pace of arms control, others are distressed with its lack of impact on overall East-West relations. Ten years ago, SALT and other negotiating processes were viewed not only as an instrument for controlling military forces, but also as a foundation block for building a "structure of peace" between the superpowers and their allies. Accordingly, SALT I was described as part of a wider process of Soviet-American detente that promised to reduce competition in a number of arenas, including regional conflicts in the Third World. Soviet actions during the 1973 war in the Middle East, Moscow's intervention in conflicts in Angola and the Horn of Africa and, most recently, its support for Vietnamese military operations in Indochina have all but demolished the notion that arms control and a wider detente were synonymous.

These explanations provide some insight into why arms control is controversial in the West, but they fail to address the more thoughtful and substantive criticism now being directed toward SALT and other negotiating processes. A central reason that arms control is in crisis is that, as Raymond Aron recently pointed out, SALT and other negotiating enterprises have "accompanied and concealed" a tremendous expansion of Soviet military power during the last decade. For example, whatever else SALT has achieved, it has not succeeded in stopping the Soviet Union in the last decade from deploying some 1,000 new land- and sea-based missile launchers and increasing its number of deliverable warheads by threefold. More important, there is now a consensus that with or without SALT II, the Soviet Union will be able to acquire a sufficient number of accurate, high-yield warheads in the early 1980's to threaten the bulk of American land-based missiles. What this development will mean for strategic stability, Moscow's risk-taking propensities, and American resolve are all matters of debate, but there can be little doubt that the creeping vulnerability of the Minuteman force will raise perplexing problems for defense planners during the next decade.

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The growth of Soviet capabilities elsewhere will create other challenges for American defense policy. In the European theater, the continuing modernization of Warsaw Pact ground and air forces threatens to neutralize what gains in Western capabilities may arise out of the long-term defense improvement program. A much more troubling development, however, is the growth—in size and quality—of the Soviet long- and short-range theater nuclear arsenal. Militarily, systems like the SS-20, the SS-21, and the Su-19 not only represent a substantial improvement in existing Soviet capabilities, but they could provide the Soviet Union, for the first time, with a credible capability to suppress the Alliance's in-theater escalation potential. The political implications of this development for the Alliance could thus go beyond a simple concern for an "imbalance" in one category of forces and raise questions about the continued credibility of the American extended deterrent.

The growth of Soviet naval and projection capabilities is another area of concern. Though less impressive than Soviet advances in strategic and theater capabilities, Soviet advances in the ability to project power into distant areas may constitute the most troublesome military challenge during the next decade. Continuing conflict in the Middle East and Persian Gulf, Southern Africa, and Southeast Asia is likely, and Soviet gains in strategic and theater nuclear capabilities could be viewed by future Russian planners as providing an "umbrella" from under which to conduct regional operations. New airlift and sealift capabilities, meanwhile, will provide the Soviet Union with the means with which to carry out these operations.

What is striking is that existing arms control processes seem to have little relevance to these emerging problems. Even more striking, while arms control seems somehow insensitive to a new class of military concerns, it could also reduce the ability of the United States and its allies to respond to these problems through unilateral military initiatives. The 1972 interim agreement on offensive missiles, for example, did little, if anything, to slow down the Soviet Union's attainment of a capacity to threaten the Minuteman force through the deployment of the SS-18 and SS-19 ICBM's (intercontinental ballistic missiles). Yet for better or worse, the Antiballistic Missile (ABM) treaty did foreclose a promising option for solving this problem: the deployment of hard-site ballistic missile defenses. Although both the Ford and the Carter administrations sought to curb the growth of Soviet ICBM capabilities in follow-on negotiations, the SALT II treaty again fails to protect the Minuteman force from becoming vulnerable to preemptive attack.

Yet, as with the ABM treaty, the new accord has already complicated unilateral American efforts to come to grips with the problem by constraining the deployment of a mobile ICBM force. For a start, the protocol attached to the treaty prohibits the deployment of mobile land-based launchers and air-to-surface ballistic missiles through 1981 (a wholly theoretical constraint because the United States would be unable, under almost any circumstance, to field a mobile system until after the protocol expired). A more practical constraint concerns the compatibility of various basing modes for a mobile missile with the verification requirements of the new treaty. The Carter administration has ruled out the most secure (and least expensive) land-based mode—the multiple protective structure (MPS) or "shell game" system—on the ground that it would pose severe monitoring difficulties for future arms control regimes. Regardless of whether this assessment is correct, the administration is now exploring an approach to basing the new MX—the "zippered trench"—that will be more costly, require more land, and is likely to arouse greater local opposition. All of these considerations could lead to delays in deploying a survivable land-based missile or possibly, the cancellation of the system altogether.

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SALT's almost pernicious impact on Minuteman vulnerability is mirrored, in some respects, by its consequences for the changing nuclear balance in the European theater. As in the case of central strategic forces, the new treaty does little to arrest the growth of Soviet medium-range capabilities directed against Western Europe and in some ways the accord actually seems to exacerbate the increasing problems confronting the Alliance in responding to the SS-20, the Backfire, and other systems. Although the administration insists that the inclusion of sea- and ground-launched cruise missiles would not prejudice the ability of the United States to exploit these systems in theater nuclear roles after 1981, the political costs of extracting these systems from further limitation at SALT III are likely to be high.

The problem for the Alliance in agreeing on a program to respond to Moscow's new "Eurostrategic" capabilities has been compounded, moreover, by developments in the mutual and balanced force reduction (MBFR) exercise in Vienna. While cruise missiles (armed with conventional as well as nuclear munitions) are now the subject of bilateral negotiation at SALT, another potential counter to new Soviet medium-range systems, the extended-range Pershing, could be complicated by the so-called "Option Three" proposal at Vienna; this proposal would trade American nuclear warheads and delivery systems (F-4 aircraft and existing Pershing systems) for Soviet tank forces. Thus, while the West faces real and procedural constraints on its freedom of action to modernize nuclear forces in and around Europe, the Soviet Union has retained almost complete freedom of action in building up nuclear forces that are deployed in, or targeted against, Western Europe. The only exceptions are marginal constraints on Backfire, which are aimed mostly at limiting its intercontinental capabilities.

While MBFR is not contributing to a solution to nuclear problems in Central Europe, a negotiating outcome could also conflict with Alliance efforts to stabilize the conventional balance in the region. Not only does the outcome that the West hopes to achieve in the negotiations—"parity" in manpower levels—seem increasingly irrelevant to the challenge of defending central Europe from the type of "Blitzkrieg" threat outlined by Steven Canby and others, but it is also possible that an MBFR agreement could raise some obstacles to the current efforts aimed at improving NATO readiness and staying power, such as building up European reserves and augmenting American reinforcements.

The negotiations on limiting Soviet and American naval forces in the Indian Ocean and regional arms transfers have only been underway for a relatively short period of time. Nevertheless, some of the same problems that have emerged at SALT and MBFR can be seen in these two negotiating enterprises.

In areas around the Indian Ocean, greater regional instability, together with the growing dependence of the West on oil from the Persian Gulf, have forged a strong argument for augmenting the American naval and air presence. Yet an Indian Ocean accord that "stabilized" the presence of superpower navies in the region (and also neglected to control forces around the Indian Ocean littoral) would clearly hamper any serious American effort to plan and prepare for contingencies in the region.

The same is probably true of any accord controlling arms transfers. The fall of the Shah of Iran has demonstrated the limits to which American arms sales can be used as a surrogate for American military power, but in an era when direct military intervention remains an unpopular option for projecting force, arms sales, as the Egyptian-Israeli peace process underscores, continue to be an especially important military and diplomatic instrument. Particularly when the United States lacks the interest and the ability to use surrogates in regional conflicts, agreements that limit American access to local allies are likely to have adverse consequences.

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In sum, the problem with existing arms control exercises is not that they have merely failed to respond to the challenges to American security that are likely to dominate security planning in the 1980's. As we shall see below, it was (and is) a mistake to believe that negotiations by themselves could cope with these problems. The bigger problem is that in many instances, arms control seems increasingly to impede efforts to cope with these challenges through other means.

WHAT ARMS CONTROL CAN DO

It has now become commonplace for analysts and government officials to argue, as did Leslie H. Geib recently, that—

As a result of specialization of narrow mandate, people all too often focus exclusively either on military programs or on arms control while losing sight of the other. Yet neither new forces nor arms control agreements are an end in itself. They are only means to an end, which is to ensure national security.

But recognizing that a sort of analytical and bureaucratic "de-coupling" between arms control and defense planning has occurred is only the first step toward finding a solution to the problems described above. The second, more difficult step is to recognize that the conflicts and inconsistencies that plague arms control and defense planning flow, in the main, from misconceptions about what negotiations can accomplish. Thus, while it is now an article of faith that arms control cannot substitute for an adequate defense posture, American negotiating strategy and conduct in many areas seem to assure that *this is the case*. Indeed, some of the basic beliefs that underpin American thinking about arms control seems to rule out the possibility of achieving greater compatibility between negotiating policy and military strategy.

The Function of Arms Control

A central fallacy of the existing approach to arms control is the belief that the primary function of negotiations is to alleviate sources of military instability. Probably the most conspicuous aspect of the SALT enterprise is the absence of any shared consensus between the two sides over the role and utility of long-range nuclear weapons, in particular, the meaning of "strategic stability." And without such a consensus, negotiators have failed to work out solutions to such problems as ICBM vulnerability. In March 1977, for example, the Carter administration tabled a proposal that, from the American perspective, would have restructured both sides' arsenals along more stable lines: the most threatening (and vulnerable) component of both sides' forces would have been de-emphasized while each would have been free to build up its more secure sea-based and bomber forces.

Although some American officials argued that Moscow's rejection of the so-called "comprehensive proposal" simply reflected a lack of imagination, there were sound strategic reasons for turning down the Soviet action. For a start, given technological and geographical reasons, the idea of placing greater reliance on SLBM's (sea-launched ballistic missiles) and bombers undoubtedly appeared unattractive to Soviet planners. More important, from a Soviet doctrinal perspective, the growing vulnerability of American ICBM's was probably viewed as a stabilizing rather than a dangerous development. What the March 1977 episode reveals, along with the experience at MBFR, is that, lacking any agreed notion among negotiators over what "stability" constitutes, the most likely outcomes of arms control are agreements like the SALT II treaty—accords that ratify rather than restructure the prevailing character of the military balance. This is surely why the Vienna talks have so far failed to produce an accord, while there are good reasons for the West to insist on manpower parity in the center region, the Soviet Union possesses equally strong incentives for maintaining its existing position of superiority.

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The foregoing should not be interpreted to suggest that arms control outcomes are always militarily meaningless. Agreements, such as the 1972 ABM treaty, can of course have a major impact on the plans of both sides. But as in the case of the ABM treaty, it is probably a mistake to view new agreements as part of a process of doctrinal convergence. The hypothesis that Moscow, in agreeing on severe restrictions on ABM deployment, agreed, in effect, to a system of "nuclear mutual vulnerability" must be judged against continuing Soviet efforts in the areas of air defense, civil defense, antishubmarine warfare, and antisatellite systems. A much more plausible explanation for Moscow's decision to enter into the treaty is that with the American Safeguard system ready to undergo deployment, the Soviet Union made a hardheaded decision to close off competition in ABM's. Again, the lesson is not that arms control outcomes reflect a narrowing of strategic beliefs, but that nations can sometimes reach agreement for very different reasons.

Arms Control and Military Change

A second fallacy that proceeds from the notion of arms control as a "solver" of defense problems is the idea that military programs that threaten existing negotiations somehow endanger deterrence. As suggested above, the most common result of arms control is not enhanced stability but the *registration of reality*; agreements are often controversial because more than anything else, they spotlight military deficiencies. But when looking at the impact of military programs on arms control negotiations, there is a common tendency to confuse means and ends. Weapons that for one reason or another pose threats to existing negotiations are viewed as threatening stability when, in fact, the impact of their deployment might be just the opposite.

The cruise missile program is an example of a weapon which threatened arms control talks but the deployment of which might in fact be stabilizing. It is not hard to understand why the cruise missile complicated efforts over the last 3 years to complete the SALT II treaty. The relatively small size of the missile posed challenges to verification, while its utility in both strategic and theater roles (armed with nuclear and conventional warheads) created daunting problems of categorization. The irony, of course, is that while cruise missiles posed a threat to SALT, their deployment in large numbers would be more likely to strengthen than to weaken deterrence. While clearly a second-strike weapon in a strategic role, their ability to offer more survivable basing modes at land and sea and their possible marriage to a new family of conventional munitions would be clearly desirable in theater roles.

There can be little doubt that what some people refer to as the "qualitative arms race" can threaten military stability. New weapons technologies can increase first-strike incentives and produce unwanted side effects, such as collateral damage. In the longer term, they can also force wrenching changes in prevailing patterns of military thought, as laser and charged-particle defensive systems might necessitate in a decade or more from now. At the same time, technological superiority continues to be an official goal of American defense policy. Had the SALT process been underway in the early 1960's, the Soviet Union, together with many arms control proponents in the United States, would have probably maintained that the deployment of Polaris SSBN's created verification difficulties and also represented another destabilizing round of the "qualitative arms race." It did represent a new departure in military technology, but in an era of growing ICBM vulnerability, the deployment of SSBN's can hardly be viewed as anything but a beneficial development. If arms control is not a substitute for unilateral defense initiatives, then the costs for negotiations of fielding new systems must be measured against the military benefits that will be derived from their deployment.

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Disaggregating the Military Balances

The cruise missile case is also useful in highlighting the tendency of negotiations to distort, simplify, and most importantly, compartmentalize military reality. As the acronym implies, the SALT process uses as its central organizing principle the idea that there is a distinct class of American and Soviet forces known as "strategic weapons." While this was generally an accurate description of the state of technology during the 1960's, a new class of more accurate and flexible systems, like the cruise missile, is making traditional distinctions between "strategic" and "general purpose" forces obsolete. (Moreover, new munitions, like fuel-air explosives and enhanced radiation weapons are blurring distinctions between nuclear and conventional weapons.)

As a result, the SALT process, with its preoccupation with the "homeland-to-homeland" nuclear balance between the superpowers, has become an increasingly inappropriate forum for coping with weapons technologies that are relevant in both "central strategic" and regional military contingencies. SALT outcomes that limit these systems are unattractive because they foreclose options for upgrading theater defenses. At the same time, agreements that exclude these systems are equally unattractive, because, as the controversy over the Backfire illustrates, neither side likes the idea of allowing the other to increase its intercontinental-range arsenal under the guise of expanding its theater forces.

Because of American nuclear commitments to the defense of Western Europe, the notion of a "homeland-to-homeland" balance fostered by SALT was never terribly attractive. During a period in which the systems limited by the process were not directly relevant to the defense of the theater, bilateral agreements were bearable. But in a period when it no longer is possible to compartmentalize the American-Soviet strategic balance, new SALT agreements seem certain to work against the military interest and the political cohesion of the Western alliance.

If SALT points out the problems of trying to limit a functional category of arms, like strategic weapons, the Vienna talks underline the dangers of geographical compartmentalization. Since the talks got underway, analysts have complained about the geographical asymmetries inherent in efforts to limit forces in an artificially bounded chunk of central Europe. Some critics have worried, for example, that if any agreement covering American and Soviet forces were reached, the United States would be forced to withdraw forces beyond the Atlantic while the Soviet Union would have only to move its forces back into the Western Military District. Most Western governments, however, have viewed this as an acceptable price to pay in order to achieve some semblance of manpower parity in the center region.

But the geographical consequences of an accord at MBFR would take on much greater significance if, as now seems likely, an agreement also limited military equipment, particularly nuclear delivery vehicles. The concept of a "nuclear balance" in the NATO guidelines area is meaningless because the countries there can be targeted by Soviet weapons lying outside the boundaries covered in the negotiations. This is the essential problem of NATO's "Option Three" proposal. It is predicated on an assumption that was debatable in 1975, but will certainly not be the case in the 1980's. By constraining nuclear delivery vehicles in central Europe, the West might not only limit its options to respond to shorter-range systems like the SS-21 and SS-22, but as mentioned above, the alliance could also find itself hampered in countering longer-range systems, like the SS-20, which are targeted against, but not deployed in, central Europe.

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Parity and Military Requirements

In a similar way, military reality is also distorted by the artificial geographical boundaries in the Indian Ocean negotiations. Discussing naval forces at sea without reference to shifting capabilities on land probably can work only against the West. For the foreseeable future, carrier-based aircraft will probably provide the only immediate air power that the United States will be able to bring to bear within the region. In the most critical areas on the Indian Ocean littoral and the Persian Gulf, Soviet land-based air could be decisive.

But a more basic question is whether the attempt to freeze the existing naval balance at some rough level of "parity" is even a desirable goal in applying arms control to the Indian Ocean. In both SALT and MBFR, parity can be justified as a negotiating outcome, because both the United States and Soviet Union possess roughly similar interests in guaranteeing their own security and that of their respective allies in Europe. However, the stakes for the two sides in the Indian Ocean, and more particularly the Persian Gulf and the Middle East, seem quite disparate. Although closer to the Soviet Union, the Gulf is far more important to the West. Arguably, then, the United States might need to maintain superior forces in the region.

It is also questionable whether "parity" is a desirable goal in approaching negotiations on conventional arms transfers. As both political and military instruments, arms transfers confer influence in peacetime and, on occasion, leverage in time of conflict. Although the United States and the Soviet Union are commonly lumped together as the "two superpowers," they obviously differ in their ability to use military supply relationships to their own advantage. Particularly in such regions as Latin America, where the United States has long enjoyed greater access, the proposal for putting the superpowers on equal footing with regard to arms sales seems to make little sense.

THE BUREAUCRATIC FACTOR

Although the problems outlined above stem primarily from a conceptual tendency to make arms control an end in itself, they have been strongly reinforced by bureaucratic behavior. For example, while few analysts believe that the American-Soviet balance in central strategic forces should be viewed in isolation from other aspects of the East-West military balance, it is almost inevitable that officials deeply immersed in the day-to-day complexities of SALT pay little attention to the wider implications of negotiating outcomes. Thus, until European governments began to anxiously question the implications for Alliance security of cruise missile constraints at SALT, the Carter administration did not begin to consider in a serious way how the negotiating process had begun to "spill over" into the realm of theater nuclear forces. Similarly, one reason that the administration was also late in recognizing the psychological and military problems posed for Europe by the SS-20 was that the weapon had not emerged as a factor in either SALT or MBFR.

The tendency to seek parity in negotiations, even when this might be an inappropriate goal, can also be explained in bureaucratic terms because officials want proposals that are "fair" that have a chance of being accepted. Finally, officials responsible for arms control understandably have a natural aversion to new weapons technologies, particularly systems that appear to threaten central organizing concepts, such as the cruise missile at SALT, or weapons that pose verification problems (like the MRS basing mode for the MX). Whatever case can be made for the weapons on strategic grounds, they make negotiations more difficult and in the minds of many officials, this is much a weightier consideration.

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These factors help explain why, in a bureaucratic sense, the establishment of an arms control process is in some ways more important than whether it produces an agreement. To begin with, the creation of an arms control process allows new participants to shape policy in the area under discussion. In the absence of arms control, decisions over military posture and weapons development and deployment are dominated by the Defense Department, with the services possessing a large voice in most matters. But once a "defense problem" is transformed into an "arms control issue," questions like the future of American naval forces in the Indian Ocean become central matters of concern for the State Department and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA). Indeed, both the State Department and ACDA have a vested interest in proliferating arms control negotiations if only to maximize their impact on defense policy. It is not hard to understand, then, why the State Department strongly opposed the 1978 decision to suspend the Indian Ocean talks and why it pushed so hard for a resumption of the negotiations prior to President Carter's summit meeting in June 1979 with Leonid Brezhnev in Vienna.

While there are strong bureaucratic incentives to begin negotiations, there are also payoffs to be gained from continuing them. Some years back, political scientists noted that in major weapons system procurement programs, military organizations often lost sight of the original military rationale for new systems and that "getting the job done" became the measure of bureaucratic success. Thus, while the supersonic B-70 bomber was obsolete to Soviet high-altitude surface-to-air missiles when it was ready for deployment, the organizational and personal stakes involved in the program made it almost impossible to turn off. In such a way, it was argued, there was a "mad momentum" to weapons procurement. In the same way, there is also a "mad momentum" to arms control in the sense that the goal of achieving agreement can supplant an earlier strategic objective. A basic rationale for plunging into the MBFR exercise, for example, was to dampen enthusiasm in the Senate for unilateral withdrawal of American troops from Europe. That rationale has ceased to exist, but the MBFR dynamic continues.

These factors are useful in explaining why arms control can sometimes become a bureaucratic end in itself, but they do not shed much light on how negotiations become decoupled from defense planning in the first place. At the heart of the matter are deep-seated differences of view over such basic questions as the utility of military force, the severity of the Soviet military threat, and the nature of Soviet-American arms competition. On one end of the spectrum, there are those who argue that military force is of declining relevance in the post-Cold War era, that the Soviet Union is beset with all sorts of domestic problems and new foreign threats, such as China, and that the arms race is essentially a mechanistic game of "monkey see, monkey do." On the other end of the spectrum, observers argue that the utility of force has not declined. The Soviet Union is depicted as a stronger, increasingly more assertive power and the arms race is said, in fact, not to be a race at all, but a much more complex phenomenon in which both sides are running at different speeds and for different reasons.

There is no way that government can resolve these differences in perception, but what is surprising is how the structure of the national security establishment seems to widen them. Arms control and defense planning functions are not only fragmented throughout the government but the nature of the interagency process seems more designed to create differences than to reach consensus.

In part, the existence of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency is responsible for this state of affairs. Having no responsibility for either threat assessment or force planning, but possessing strong vested interests in negotiations, ACDA has little reason to get involved in the difficult trade-offs between arms control and unilateral military flexibility. This was not always the case. Created in 1961, the agency was seen as an

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instrument for bringing arms control issues to the attention of the national security establishment. But ACDA may have become a victim of its own success, or more precisely, the success of arms control. As arms control moved from being a diplomatic experiment to a central fixture of American foreign policy, ACDA's role has been displaced by arms control units within the Pentagon, the State Department, and the National Security Council. The result is that in order to justify its existence, the agency has had to become ever more doctrinaire in its adherence to the primacy of arms control. This has not only created unnecessary bureaucratic frictions, but in many cases, it has curiously reduced the influence of the agency.

The innovation of arms control impact statements has further accelerated ACDA's estrangement from the defense planning community, because the process actually encourages the agency to adopt a different perspective on weapons issues than the Defense Department. The fact that ACDA and the Defense Department report to different committees on Capitol Hill and possess different congressional constituencies only serves to deepen this split.

In the Pentagon itself, other divisions are at work. It is no coincidence (as the Soviets are fond of saying) that the rise of arms control as a central policy objective accompanied the expansion of civilian control in the Pentagon. The so-called "McNamara Revolution" of the 1960's not only brought managerial changes to the building, but also a new sympathy for negotiated military restraint. Understandably, the military services viewed arms control as part of a larger threat to their traditional prerogatives. And they were correct in doing so. By framing military issues as arms control problems, civilian-dominated organizations, such as the Office of International Security Affairs, were able to gain considerable influence at the expense of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Thus, like ACDA in the wider interagency process, the services, along with the Joint Chiefs, were gradually pushed to adopt extreme positions on arms control. As in the budgetary process, their views gradually lost credibility and they came to be seen as obstacles to agreement. In the process, the professional military has inevitably come to view arms control as a threat rather than an opportunity.

FINDING A NEW BALANCE

The central argument of this paper has been that arms control and defense planning are out of kilter largely because misunderstandings about what can be achieved in negotiations have been reinforced by bureaucratic behavior. In this section, several prescriptions are offered for dealing with this problem.

Scaling Down Ambitions

The central reality of arms control is that only rarely do negotiated outcomes address pressing military concerns. To reiterate, arms control is primarily useful for registering and codifying an existing balance of forces. This can be a useful outcome. At SALT, the belief that American and Soviet strategic forces are roughly equivalent (at least in size) is probably critical to the maintenance of detente, however uneasy. In the same way, an MBFR agreement that provided for equal manpower ceilings (assuming an agreed data base) would also create a condition of "optical parity" that would surely enhance political confidence in both Eastern and Western Europe.

Moreover, arms control agreements can create a degree of predictability that is useful both politically and militarily. In criticizing arms control, it is easy to lose sight of the uncertainty that plagued political leaders and military planners during the first half of the 1960's. In the early part of the decade, the tendency to exaggerate Soviet strategic

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programs led the United States to rush ahead with programs that, by 1965, seemed unnecessary. American overreaction in the early 1960's probably fostered a tendency in the latter half of the decade to underestimate Soviet strategic ambitions, an even more dangerous development. Whatever else SALT II does, it will enable political and military authorities to agree on the character of the strategic environment in the mid 1980's. Thus, beyond the political value of the agreement, SALT II will serve as a useful military planning tool over the coming decade.

But "optical parity" and predictability are not the same things as the maintenance of deterrence. In strategic forces, the maintenance of credible deterrence requires the deployment of American land-based systems in a more survivable basing mode and, more controversially, an enhanced ability to threaten hard targets in the Soviet Union. In the European theater, deterrence also requires more survivable nuclear forces as well as more "useable" theater weapons. It could turn out that many options for bolstering deterrence in these areas could well complicate future arms control efforts. There is no obvious solution to this dilemma. Some observers, like Alton Fry and Christoph Bertram, have argued that the emphasis in new arms control efforts should be shifted from limiting numbers and types of weapons to exploring agreements that would prohibit "destabilizing" strategic behavior such as threatening each other's retaliatory capabilities.

Reflecting this tendency, the present administration, despite the lessons of SALT I II, seems interested in shaping a new set of grandiose goals for the next round of negotiations. In the view of this writer, this would be a major mistake. Asking too much from SALT III not only runs the risk of raising expectations that will surely be disappointed later, but it places a national security burden on SALT that it cannot bear.

If there is a solution, it probably lies in asking arms control to do less instead of more. Thus, at SALT III, the United States should not seek severe quantitative reductions or tighter qualitative constraints. An accord that provided both sides with some flexibility for dealing unilaterally with their separately perceived military problems might not only be more negotiable but might also be more conducive to overall stability. Scaling down ambitions for arms control will not totally eliminate the very real tensions between efforts to achieve "optical parity" at SALT and unilateral efforts to strengthen deterrence. But the first step toward wisdom in this area is to recognize that such a tension exists.

Using Arms Control to Bolster Deterrence

While negotiations alone are unlikely to produce solutions to military problems, arms control, in conjunction with American defense initiatives, can offer some promising approaches to coping with new Soviet challenges. Perhaps the strongest military argument that can be made for SALT II is that by putting a ceiling on Soviet missile warheads, the agreement works to enhance the potential survivability of the MX. Without a limit on warhead fractionation, the argument goes, the Soviet Union could counter any deceptive basing system for a mobile missile by massively expanding its warhead inventory.

One can think of other ways that possible arms control outcomes could work synergistically with unilateral defense decisions. For example, limits on Soviet air defenses at SALT III, particularly around hard targets, would ensure the continuing effectiveness of cruise missiles. At the same time, it is probably a mistake to allow American forces to become overly dependent on arms control constraints accepted by the Soviet Union. Although Moscow has agreed to fractionation limits at SALT I, the MX will not undergo deployment until after the treaty is due to run out. Thus, at SALT III, Soviet negotiators could either refuse to agree to further limits on fractionation or more likely,

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exact a steep price in concessions elsewhere and demand major concessions in other areas as a price for enabling the United States to proceed with the MX.

The main way that defense programs and arms control can interact in a positive fashion is by enhancing American negotiating leverage. As the ABM case suggests, weapons programs can provide incentives for the Soviet Union to consider negotiating outcomes that do more than simply ratify prevailing strategic trends. Observers have suggested, for example, that Mr. Carter's MX decision could force the Soviet Union, for the first time, to think seriously about the merit of severe constraints on MIRVed ICBM's.

Yet, "bargaining chip" negotiating strategies must be approached with caution. In the ABM case, the United States possessed a system that was technologically vastly superior to what Moscow had and, equally important, its deployment lay right around the corner. These conditions are absent in the MX case. First, with the MX only now starting full-scale development, it is unrealistic to expect the system to provide American negotiators much negotiating leverage in the immediate future. Second, the system's hard-target capability will not be qualitatively different than Soviet systems undergoing deployment at the same time. Thus, it is probably unrealistic to expect that the Soviet Union would react to the threat of MX deployment by agreeing to a scheme for de-emphasizing land-based ICBM's. A much less painless response to the MX would be for the Soviet Union to find a more survivable basing mode for its own ICBM's.

Political problems can also arise from the inappropriate use of "bargaining chips." This is perhaps most clearly illustrated in the current effort by NATO to agree on a plan for modernizing long-range theater nuclear forces. Because of the sensitivity of nuclear deployment issues in various European states, governments are attracted to the idea of coupling an alliance decision to deploy a new, long-range system with an arms control offer to the East. While this strategy might allow the alliance to overcome domestic opposition in West Germany and Holland to modernizing American nuclear forces in central Europe, in the longer run, it could backfire. The problem is that it is hard to see why, at this stage, Moscow would be interested in any arms control proposal aimed at limiting long-range theater forces.

Just as the MX, with an initial operational capability (IOC) in 1986, is unlikely to arrest Moscow's current deployment of the SS-18, an extended-range Pershing, with an IOC in the early 1980's, is unlikely to coerce Moscow into dismantling its existing SS-20's. At most, if the Alliance proceeds with the deployment of several hundred medium-range systems during the next few years, it is conceivable that Moscow would accept some upper limits on the size of its long-range theater forces. But even this outcome may not be possible. By hoping (and in some cases, pretending) that there is a negotiating solution to the SS-20 problem, when in all reality there is not, the alliance runs the risk of being criticized for using arms control as a "fig leaf" to justify new military programs.

Refocusing, Restructuring, and Stopping Arms Control

While it has become conventional wisdom that arms control should be considered when shaping defense policy and programs, it is interesting that so little thought is given to how existing negotiations should be adapted to changing military realities. Although a second SALT treaty has finally been completed, the principal problems that dragged out the talks—such as verification, Soviet ICBM preponderance, and the "gray area" weapons—loom as even bigger obstacles in SALT III. Thus, even if the United States enters the negotiations with fairly modest goals, SALT III could quickly become bogged down. **In these circumstances, it seems worth exploring whether a more piecemeal**

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approach to SALT III, one that attempted one issue at a time, would make more sense than seeking a more "comprehensive" arrangement that sought to deal with several issues simultaneously. In a more sequential approach to SALT III, negotiators might first grapple with theater nuclear concerns, such as the status of cruise missiles in the protocol, while deferring discussions on "deep cuts" in central forces to a later phase of the talks.

Also, changes might be profitably made to existing approaches at MBFR. While manpower ceilings remain a useful political goal, ceilings on equipment of the sort envisaged by the "Option Three" proposal raise awkward problems during a period in which the Alliance is engaged in upgrading its conventional capabilities and thinking about nuclear modernization. Given the character of the Warsaw Pact threat, arms control outcomes that constrain the use, rather than the size, of military forces in central Europe would be of great utility. This, of course, is the essential function of "confidence building measures" ("associated measures" in MBFR parlance). Negotiated limits on force deployment and maneuver have only recently come under serious study, but if associated measures do offer a real possibility of complicating Soviet surprise attack options while enhancing tactical warning, then this is an avenue worth exploring in Vienna.

In the future, MBFR may not be the best place to negotiate arms control in Europe. Especially if equipment limits, instead of manpower or confidence-building measures, are going to be the focus for negotiations, the French proposal for an arms control forum reaching "from the Atlantic to the Urals" makes far more strategic sense than continuing to do business in Vienna.

The possibility of revising existing arms control arrangements to bring them more into line with emerging military realities should also not be overlooked. Revision of the ABM treaty to facilitate the deployment of hard-site missile defenses is an especially interesting option. So far, it has received little serious consideration out of a fear that tampering with the 1972 treaty could lead to an unraveling of the entire agreement. Until recently, this concern could be justified by the fact that prior to the completion of SALT II, the ABM treaty was really the only strategic arms agreement between the two super powers. However, the conclusion of SALT II should now enable both sides to examine whether the ABM treaty should be adapted to address the problem of ICBM vulnerability. The deployment of hard-site defenses might not only enhance the survivability of multiple-launch point ICBM basing systems, but it might even rule out the need for deceptive basing modes altogether by giving a new lease on life to fixed silos.

Finally, while some negotiations might be usefully rechanneled and replaced, others should probably be abandoned. A prime candidate is the Indian Ocean exercise. Not only is the concept of a "naval balance" in the region analytically unsound, but the goal of the negotiations—to freeze American and Soviet naval deployments at their existing levels—is most likely incompatible with growing US security concerns in the region. At the very time that the region is taking on greater importance to the West, the Iranian revolution, radical currents in Arab politics, and local suspicions have made naval forces probably the only reliable way for the United States to project power in the area. When the United States has finally sorted out what it needs to be able to do in the region and has implemented these steps, then it might be useful to take another look at arms control.

Shaking Up the Bureaucracy

From the standpoint of organization structure and process, the goal of harnessing arms control to defense planning is hindered in two ways. First, parochialism in negotiating perspectives makes it almost impossible to devise any comprehensive strategy for arms control. Second, bureaucratic frictions and disconnections often make it difficult to mesh negotiating objectives with defense planning goals. In other words, means need to

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be found for increasing communication among arms controllers and between arms controllers and defense planners

The place to begin is to find ways of minimizing the bureaucratic polarization between arms controllers and defense planners. In retrospect, the creation of the ACDA was probably a mistake. By its very existence and role in the interagency process, the agency reinforces the notion that negotiations offer an alternative path to international security. Although it would be counterproductive at this point to attempt to disband the agency or to incorporate it into the State Department, some marginal changes could bring the agency back into the mainstream of the policy process. The appointment of a retired Army general to lead the agency was doubtlessly inspired, in part, by short-term political considerations, but nonetheless represented a healthy step toward greater cross-fertilization within the Government's national security establishment. For symbolic reasons, it is probably wise to insist that directors of the agency be civilians, but perhaps ADCA's charter could be amended to require that the deputy director be a serving military officer. Such a change might work two ways: it would bring an operational military perspective to senior levels of the agency and it would also give military officers a deeper insight into arms control.

Indeed, one of the most conspicuous failures of the present system is its failure to elicit and profit from high-level military participation. In striking contrast to the Soviet pattern, arms control has become a mostly civilian enterprise, viewed with suspicion and sometimes open hostility by the military services. This is the fault of both uniformed officers and their civilian counterparts. Rather than concerning itself with the broad policy implications of negotiations, the military establishment is overly preoccupied with how arms control will affect specific hardware programs. Yet, the parochial concerns of the military are often justified by the way arms controllers use negotiations to gain leverage over military force planning and weapons decisions. There is no easy solution to this problem, but it is clear that the Joint Chiefs of Staff and senior elements of the services must be given a larger role in arms control planning and the negotiations themselves. This not only means giving the services a larger advisory capacity, but greater responsibility in the actual conduct of negotiations as well.

Greater military responsibility for arms control would foster greater harmony between defense and arms control objectives and negotiating outcomes that might win greater support within the military establishment. There is something wrong when, in the United States, the White House has to worry whether the former JCS representative to the SALT delegation will openly oppose the new treaty while, in the Soviet Union, his counterpart is now the chief of staff of the armed forces.

The role of the State Department also needs to be examined. Even more than ACDA, the proliferation of new negotiations has worked to enhance the influence of the State Department on defense questions. This has led to a significant expansion in the number of State Department officials focusing on military problems, particularly in the Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs. There has always been a notorious shortage within the foreign service of skilled defense professionals, so an increase within the State Department of competence in this area is a healthy development. But the role of the department and, in particular, the Bureau for Politico-Military Affairs, should be kept in perspective. In the 1960's, there was legitimate concern that the Pentagon's Office of International Security Affairs was becoming a "little State Department." Now the State Department's Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs seems to be evolving into a "little Defense Department." The bureau does have an important role to play in assessing the political implications of proposed defense policies and programs. But it risks compromising this function by becoming a competitive center for defense analysis.

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While some of these steps might break down some of the barriers that have grown up within the bureaucracy, the tendency to compartmentalize different aspects of the arms control process will remain a serious problem. Conceptually, it is appealing to think about the formulation of a comprehensive arms control strategy which will be aimed at ensuring that negotiating goals in different settings remained coherent and compatible. But even if it were possible to formulate such a strategy, it would probably be too vague to be of much use.

Instead of a "grand design" for arms control, it would be much more useful to institute a continuous system for monitoring existing negotiating processes. The system would examine a number of important questions: the relevance of existing American arms control goals to changing military circumstances, the effect of various negotiating outcomes on planned and future American forces, the implications of negotiating outcomes for other arms control efforts, and finally, apparent changes in Soviet arms control policy. Of course, all of these questions are now taken up on a random basis in different parts of the government. But a high-level security planning office, perhaps situated in the National Security Council, which could centralize and coordinate the monitoring process, might be able to produce new and far more useful variants of the Arms Control Impact Statement: not analyses of the narrow impact of new weapons on negotiations, but studies of the impact of arms control on American security.

Rediscovering Defense Policy

It is perhaps too easy to blame the dilemmas in defense policy now confronting the United States on an unblinking enthusiasm for arms control alone. In fact, one reason that arms control has become such a dominant factor in national security planning is that in many areas, negotiations have proceeded in a defense policy vacuum. Arms control, in other words, has often become a surrogate to thinking about defense problems. It is not difficult to understand why this has happened. Unlike earlier periods, there is today no general doctrine, such as "containment," around which to organize defense policy. Nor do military planners possess the luxury of strategic superiority with which to avoid difficult choices. Instead, in an era of unprecedented Soviet military growth, the United States, still recovering from the shock of Vietnam, is profoundly uncertain over the meaning of the Soviet buildup and how to respond to it. Arms control, by promising to cope with the Soviet challenge while also restraining an unnecessary military response by the United States, has seemed to offer an opportunity for escaping a divisive and enervating debate over defense policy.

But if the thesis of this essay is correct, that arms control, in the final analysis, is mostly useful only in defining military problems, then negotiations cannot be used as a crutch. For arms control to play a useful role, much of the confusion over American goals in such areas as strategic doctrine, theater nuclear and conventional forces, as well as maritime and projection capabilities, must be outlined in far greater precision than is now the case.

One of the most difficult issues that must be addressed is the impact of growing Soviet strategic counterforce capabilities on the credibility of deterrence in the 1980's. While the so-called "Schlesinger Doctrine" of flexible strategic options aroused intense controversy a few years ago, it has now become an accepted part of American nuclear strategy. But beyond this, it has become difficult to discuss, in concrete terms, what the prevailing American strategy for nuclear targeting is. For example, how far down the road will Harold Brown's concept of a "countervailing strategy" take the United States in matching the Soviet Union's war-fighting approach to strategic deployment and employment? In the MX decision and other actions, such as recognizing the contribution that

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civil defense can make to strategic stability, the administration seems to be toying with what could become a radical shift in deterrence strategy. But so far, the far-reaching implications of such a shift have escaped wide-scale public attention.

The relationship of strategic balance and American deterrence doctrine for European security is another area which has escaped close scrutiny in recent years. What special demands does the requirement of "extended" deterrence place on strategic force design? The answer to this question is important in thinking about the future of theater forces. In an era of parity, it is questionable whether forces can any longer be considered escalatory instruments. Escalation control and battle management become obviously more attractive and these goals should thus be weighed heavily in decisions on the sizing and design of theater forces.

At present, the NATO Alliance is caught up in difficult and complex consultations over the deployment of a few hundred long-range systems that would be able to reach the Soviet homeland. While immensely important, the long-range theater nuclear force (TNF) issue should not be allowed to obscure the fact that the Alliance confronts a Soviet program for modernizing theater nuclear forces across-the-board. Again, lacking any overall consensus on the role of theater nuclear forces, unless an effort is made to take a comprehensive look at the adequacy of NATO's existing posture--examining such controversial issues as whether "combined" nuclear and conventional options are now necessary to maintain deterrence--the most important implications of the Soviet actions are likely to be missed.

Basic issues could also be ignored in the area of conventional forces. The Alliance is engaged in a long-term defense improvement program, but this effort is proceeding with a minimum discussion over NATO strategy. Although suggestions for radically transforming the Alliance along the lines suggested by Canby and other critics are in many cases politically unfeasible, it is clear that NATO's existing adherence to linear and firepower-dominated concepts of defense needs to be reexamined.

Finally, despite years of analysis, the great debate over whether sea control or projection should take precedence in naval force design is still unresolved. Although the growth of Soviet maritime power has made the sea control mission seem a more pressing requirement than ever before, resource constraints, the concurrent growth in Soviet projection capabilities, and political instability in the Southern Hemisphere have also made "strategic access" an equally important concern. The problem, of course, is that even if these doctrinal issues are resolved, some basic force structure questions will have to be addressed, such as the familiar question of whether large ship, small fleet navies are more desirable than small ship, large fleet ones. In the area of projection, meanwhile, other problems need to be addressed, particularly whether the most important contingencies in the Persian Gulf and elsewhere are likely to be ones in which small, rapidly deployed forces will be decisive or whether larger, more slowly available forces with greater staying power will be crucial.

At present, these questions are being resolved on an expedient, piecemeal basis. Unless longer-term, more coherent plans linking military purposes and force structure and sizing are adopted, arms control inevitably will be forced to take on a burden it is unsuited to bear. In the end, national security, along with arms control, will suffer.

PANEL 1 PAPER:

Theater Nuclear Forces and "Gray Area" Arms Control

Michael Higgins and Christopher Makins

This paper considers the problem of theater nuclear forces (TNF) in Western Europe in relation to their military and political contexts. It seeks to derive from this analysis conclusions about the policies the Alliance should follow toward both TNF modernization and East-West negotiations on theater nuclear forces. In summary, the paper argues that:

- **The deliberate ambiguity of Alliance TNF doctrine is no longer a useful device to avoid Alliance tensions.** A renewed attempt is needed to develop a more explicit and coherent doctrine as the indispensable basis for sound force posture and negotiating policy decisions, and to promote a greater assimilation in Western Europe of the role of theater nuclear forces in Alliance strategy.
- **Such a doctrine will inevitably be based on a refurbishing of the original concept of the "seamless web" of deterrence.** Thus, it will involve a more coherent definition of the relationships between allied theater nuclear forces on the one hand and US single integrated operational plan (SIOP) forces and Allied conventional forces on the other. Within that concept, it is the relationship between theater nuclear forces and conventional forces which necessarily provides the primary basis for decisions about modernizing the TNF posture.
- **European concerns about US reliability underlie many of the current problems concerning theater nuclear forces in the Alliance.** Therefore, while deployment of new US longer range TNF systems is almost certainly required to strengthen the Alliance capability, a renewed effort is also needed to define the potential contribution to Alliance deterrence of the nuclear forces of Britain and France.
- **Western European politics require that a new TNF negotiating proposal be developed in parallel with modernization plans.** Experience and the requirement to protect Allied cohesion suggest that this negotiation should be multilateral, involving participation by European states which either possess nuclear systems or are host to theater nuclear forces.
- **The military context of theater nuclear forces in Europe does not justify a distinction between longer range and other TNF and suggests that such a distinction would be positively damaging to the Alliance if reflected in Allied policy on East-West TNF negotiations.**
- **There is no assurance that the Soviet Union would accept a proposal for a multilateral negotiation covering theater nuclear forces of all ranges.** But the Alliance should refuse adamantly to discuss any TNF (even those covered by the SALT II Protocol) except in such a framework.
- **The fundamental political goal of the Alliance in dealing with TNF issues must be to protect Allied cohesion in the medium term.** Many considerations of short-term expediency conflict with this goal, but every effort should be made to set them aside.

THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES AND ALLIANCE STRATEGY

Ever since Soviet deployment of substantial numbers of nuclear weapons oriented toward Europe in the 1960's, studies within the Alliance of where the advantage would lie in a theater nuclear war have been inconclusive. Many Europeans believe that if such a conflict favors either side, it probably favors the Warsaw Pact whose armor advantage

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and shorter, more secure lines of communication would take on overriding significance in the face of the enormous attrition of a nuclear war. More importantly, most Europeans believe that a "limited" nuclear exchange would leave Europe devastated, while sparing the United States and the Soviet Union. For these reasons, Europeans in general have resisted the concept of actually fighting and winning a nuclear war in Europe, preferring instead to rely on the threat of automatic escalation (coupling) to the US strategic forces to deter Soviet aggression. During the early days of US nuclear superiority, this "massive retaliation" strategy suited the United States as well as the West Europeans. After the Soviets started to achieve a significant second strike capability with their central strategic forces in the 1960's, however, this strategy began to lose its appeal to the United States and its credibility to many Europeans.

Not surprisingly, a succession of US Governments, starting with the Kennedy administration, have attempted to redirect NATO strategy toward a flexible response posture emphasizing conventional forces. For the Europeans, however, prolonged conventional war has little more appeal than nuclear war, especially since the cost of being prepared to fight a conventional war is prodigious, given the Soviet propensity for large active-duty military forces. And most significantly, many Europeans (especially the French) have seen the US attempts at shoring up the conventional defense and the emphasis on "battlefield" applications of nuclear weapons as efforts to "decouple" the US strategic forces from NATO defense.

Current NATO strategy reflects these strains over nuclear weapons doctrine. MC 14-3, the approved NATO defense strategy, is a compromise in which the Europeans accepted flexible response, with its requirement for initial conventional defense, while the United States reaffirmed its readiness to escalate to strategic nuclear war if necessary. Although both parties agreed that theater nuclear weapons would remain deployed in Europe as a vital link between conventional and strategic capabilities, the agreement has not reconciled their fundamentally different points of view. To most Europeans theater nuclear weapons, with their potential for escalation, represent a direct link to US strategic forces; to the United States these same theater weapons, with their controlled application and damage limiting potential, offer the best hope of containing a nuclear war, short of strategic exchange.

The purposeful ambiguity in employment doctrine has served the purpose of dampening conflict and divisiveness with the Alliance on nuclear issues. But it has also served as a large impediment to effective planning for the application of nuclear weapons and, consequently, to the process of acquiring and deploying them. As a result NATO has an extensive assortment of systems and weapons deployed in Europe with little apparent balance with respect to ranges, yields, and in-theater deployments. While this situation has historically been acceptable to most Europeans—indeed some have seen the apparent lack of coherence in NATO deployments as enhancing deterrence because of the unpredictability of NATO responses—recent developments have combined to reduce European confidence in the deterrent value of theater nuclear forces.

The most striking of these developments is the erosion of European confidence in US leadership and the US strategic umbrella. This disquietude was prompted in part by the Soviet achievement of a secure capability to threaten US territory with Soviet strategic forces, and in part by other factors, including the polarization of the debate within the United States over the adequacy of US strategic forces. This, in turn, has aggravated European concern about recent Soviet activities such as deployment of the SS-20 missile and the Backfire bomber. The result is that the traditional European dependence on the threat of nuclear escalation as the primary deterrent is providing less and less comfort, and Europeans as well as Americans are recognizing a need to "do

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something about nuclear forces in Europe. But doing something that makes sense both to Europeans and Americans requires some degree of consensus over the role of nuclear weapons in Alliance strategy. Employment doctrine ambiguity, though serving a useful function in the past, is no longer viable faced with the need for decisions on theater nuclear force improvements and negotiating policies. While it once permitted the Alliance to avoid damaging disagreements, it has now become a potential source of divisiveness.

American efforts since the 1960s, the nuclear planning group studies and debates during the 1970s, and the recent NATO High Level Group (HLG) deliberations have generated a greater awareness among Europeans at the defense ministry, armed forces, and defense scientist-researcher levels of the need for clear concepts of how theater weapons would actually be used in a conflict and the kinds of force improvements required to make potential employment in different roles more "credible." But there has been little broader acceptance among political and other elites or in public opinion of realistic roles and missions for theater nuclear forces in Europe. Yet, assimilation by politicians and publics of these issues will be required if force posture and negotiating policy decisions are to receive broadly based and durable support.

EUROPEAN THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES IN EAST-WEST NEGOTIATION

The ambiguity of Alliance doctrine on the role of theater nuclear forces has been paralleled in recent years by the uncoordinated way in which TNF have become involved in East-West negotiations. Four separate, though related, developments have occurred which should be briefly recalled in their order of appearance—forward-based systems (FBS) in SALT, Option III in mutual and balanced force reductions (MBFR), cruise missiles in the SALT II Protocol, and the enhanced radiation weapon (ERW).

Despite all the diplomatic ballyhoo on the subject of forward based systems, no Alliance consensus on the substance of the matter has ever been developed. However, now that the SALT II statement of principles commits the United States to "resolve" some of these issues in SALT III, the substance will have to be broached in one way or another and the need for a set of agreed upon Alliance policies has consequently grown.

Concerning Option III in MBFR, it is hard to avoid the conclusion that the offer of once-for-all, indivisible, nonreciprocal withdrawals of US nuclear systems in exchange for withdrawals of Soviet tanks was a mistake. It has not provided a key to unblock the negotiations; its nonreciprocal nature (which was a consequence of the asymmetrical Allied position on tank withdrawals) has been called into question by the Soviet TNF build-up; it has become the target of Soviet bargaining efforts (in their proposals of May 1978 they offered to reduce fewer tanks in exchange for the same size Option III); it has become increasingly hard to view as a once-for-all injection of TNF into East-West negotiations, since it has now been on the table for 5 years, and for a period it inhibited Allied efforts to pursue, through the nuclear planning group, work on TNF modernization.

The handling of the cruise missile issue in relation to the SALT II Protocol showed how difficult such matters are to resolve in the Alliance. However, the fundamental problem of European suspicions that the United States was willing to trade European interests (however unclearly defined) for exclusively US advantage in SALT would have been hard to overcome, even with better Allied consultations. As with Option III, so more strongly over cruise missiles, the lack of any clear Alliance doctrine on the role of theater nuclear forces permitted the growth of uncertainty and doubt about the significance of

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negotiating moves, which under certain assumptions were perfectly sensible, but under others were not.

Finally, the idea of the United States, which may or may not have been seriously intended, of matching restraint in ERW deployment with Soviet restraint in SS-20 deployment emerged as a disembodied short-term political expedient which was unrelated to any overall conception of negotiations about TNF. However, the failure to develop this idea more precisely deprived it of any great significance.

Some would draw from this historical mosaic, and from other considerations, the conclusion that the Alliance ought not be in the business of negotiating about TNF at all in this view, not only are negotiations more likely than not to lead to agreements disadvantageous to the West, but they are almost bound to have a dangerous demobilizing effect on Western political and public opinion. Thus, the Alliance should simply decline to negotiate about FBS or theater-based cruise missiles in SALT, withdraw Option III and the ERW offer, and ignore consequent Soviet protestations.

There are two types of arguments against this conclusion. First, it cannot be conclusively demonstrated that there are no security gains to be derived from negotiations, and to permit TNF deployments in Europe to evolve without a serious effort to seek beneficial negotiated restraints, qualitative or quantitative, is unnecessarily risky for the Alliance. The questions—and perhaps more importantly the prejudices—at issue between the two views on these points are so far-reaching as to preclude thorough treatment in this paper. Second, for numerous reasons of geography, history, and political psychology, several Western European countries attach great importance to trying to negotiate an improvement in East-West relations. One can argue about the permanence of this attitude, but one cannot doubt its present political force. At the least, therefore, as recent Alliance discussions have shown, an effort to develop a TNF negotiating policy alongside TNF modernization policies is essential to Western European support for the latter.

This paper accepts the force of these arguments against the anti-negotiation school. But it also proceeds from the premise, derived from recent experience, that in the foreseeable future negotiated agreements cannot be expected to lead to a militarily significant reduction in the threat which either the Western Allies or the Warsaw Pact faces from theater nuclear forces. The most that they can achieve is a greater degree of predictability, and therefore stability, in the level of TNF deployments and possibly some moderation of the rate and nature of change in those deployments through qualitative restraints (for example on "new types" and testing).

The fundamental question, therefore, in terms of negotiations, is how best to seek such benefits as they can confer. The four cases described earlier, and the inherent logic of the problem, suggest that there are two ways forward in terms of negotiations on TNF. First, to continue to deal with them piecemeal, with some issues falling into MBFR, some into SALT, others conceivably elsewhere, and thus some being dealt with multilaterally, some bilaterally, and so on. Powerful reasons of short-term political expedience and negotiating inertia argue for this approach, the objections have more to do with medium-term risks to Alliance cohesion and domestic political consensus on TNF issues. The second approach would be to develop a more coherent and comprehensive approach to those negotiations. As a basis for judging between these two approaches, it is necessary to examine first the military context and second the political context of TNF in Western Europe.

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THE MILITARY CONTEXT FOR THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES

The current purposeful ambiguity in NATO's TNF employment doctrine stems not so much from uncertainty about TNF capabilities, or disputes over which targets are most suitable for theater nuclear forces, as from disagreement over which of the wide range of potential options offers the greatest deterrence; hence, for which options the force should be best suited in size and structure. The underpinnings for this disagreement and the backdrop against which it is played out can be found in current NATO and US TNF employment policies, which are spelled out in a series of documents expanding on the basic flexible response concepts of MC 14/3.

These documents, which are listed and summarized in the appendix, reveal that both Alliance and US policies call for the full range of employment capabilities. But whereas the NATO-approved documents are concerned more with the political impact of initial NATO use against fixed targets and the linkage to the SIOP, US policies concentrate more on the military results of controlled TNF application, retaliatory use and preplanning, and on the impact of theater nuclear forces on the conventional defense. This situation reflects two rather polarized concepts of TNF use. The first of these can be characterized as the European view and the second the American view, although both concepts have strong advocates on both sides of the Atlantic.

The "European" concept sees theater nuclear forces as essentially serving two functions: first, deterring aggression by implying almost automatic nuclear retaliation to any kind of aggression, nuclear or conventional; and second, in the event of war, giving a political signal of willingness and ability to escalate to the SIOP. For these roles, finely tuned systems and deployments are not necessary and might even give the wrong impression to an aggressor. From this point of view, almost any concept of military advantage to be derived from TNF employment is dangerous, in that it implies a possibility of large-scale, limited nuclear war in the theater. Holders of this view might see a need for improved longer range systems capable of penetrating into the Soviet Union as a political response to SS-20 deployments. But they would be unlikely to support wholeheartedly more general improvements in TNF warfighting capabilities.

The second, or "American," concept holds that the most effective deterrent derives from a credible capability to prevent an aggressor from achieving his military objectives; this can best be done with a combination of strong conventional forces and theater nuclear forces which can be applied with precise effects to influence the course of a battle. Holders of this view would likewise support modernization of the longer range systems because of the increasing vulnerability of aircraft in this role and a recognition that Poseidon is unsuited to it in many cases. But they would also call for parallel improvements across the whole range of TNF systems, and their support, to enhance assurance that TNF can be controlled, can actually survive until used, and can achieve the desired damage to military targets.

Neither of these concepts provides a suitable basis for Allied TNF force posture and negotiating policy decisions. The "European" concept plays down or ignores the fact that even giving a political signal requires real operational capabilities which, at present, are highly suspect. For example, the Soviet nuclear forces and their command and control (C²) are configured and trained to preempt NATO nuclear attacks; that is, to react with a massive strike of their own *within* NATO's nuclear preparation and decision time. Given current NATO nuclear decision processes, C², and TNF vulnerabilities, it is not at all clear whether NATO could execute a limited first strike "signal," even if it chose to do so. Moreover, the "European" concept presumes that while there is a political requirement for European participation in a general nuclear war, US strategic forces can make up for any deficiencies in theater forces. Yet, with the growing vulnerability of the US

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land-based strategic forces, the proliferation of targets, and the SALT constraints on US central systems, the ability of those systems to cover European military targets independent of theater forces is decreasing. And, in any event, US central systems are not well suited for several target types most relevant to Alliance defense (for example, hardened command, control, and communications sites).

The "American" concept suffers from the weakness that it puts too much emphasis on limited nuclear warfighting, which is anathema to Europeans, and not enough emphasis on the political necessity to maintain the strongest possible link to the SIOP. For this reason, proposals such as improvement of the security and survivability of TNF and their C² against Warsaw Pact nuclear attacks which, as was suggested above, are almost certainly needed even to carry out the "European" concept, all too often appear to derive from a willingness to consider a widespread nuclear exchange in Europe without escalation. Such proposals consequently fail to command general Alliance support.

It is therefore highly unlikely that a NATO consensus on TNF employment, strong and specific enough to provide a durable basis for rational force posture and negotiating policy decisions, can be formed around either of these popular concepts. What is needed both for these purposes and, as will be argued below, also for political purposes in the Alliance, is a renewed effort to find and elaborate a concept which can attract a broader base of support among the Allies. Such a concept would have to make more explicit the relationship of TNF to the SIOP at one end of the spectrum and to the conventional battle at the other.

At the "Eurostrategic" end, US central systems and longer range theater systems must provide the major deterrent and the eventual response to massive Soviet threats against the European target base. Improvements in TNF command and control and in longer range systems' prelaunch survivability and ability to penetrate defenses are important to this role.

At the combined arms end of the spectrum, theater nuclear forces provide the principal deterrent to massive Soviet conventional attacks, unless the Alliance develops the ability to contain such attacks conventionally. But to be effective, such a deterrent must be based on a demonstrable capability to halt a large-scale combined arms attack and prevent loss of territory. This requires an ability to locate and destroy military targets in the field and their support in the rear. Strategic forces are neither designed nor configured for this purpose, but theater forces are. TNF forces of all ranges are required for this purpose, not just battlefield systems. The large proportion of shorter range TNF systems in the Allied inventory is perhaps the greatest weakness of the present Allied posture, both militarily and in terms of its exposure to political opposition in Western Europe.

This argues for a refurbishing of the original conception of deterrence as a "seamless web" of capabilities across the whole spectrum of forces as the basis for a new consensus within the Alliance. The Western European Allies have gradually come to accept that, despite their distaste for fighting a prolonged conventional war in Europe, overall deterrence is strengthened if the Alliance has stalwart conventional defenses. Similarly, the Allies could gradually come to agree that overall deterrence would be strengthened by a more effective, demonstrable capability to execute a broad range of options than is provided by the present theater nuclear force.

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The evolution of such a consensus would depend on several factors. First, it would be facilitated by a successful effort to develop more specific TNF selective employment plans (SEP's) and associated notions of how these could be effectively related to political efforts to prevent further escalation and terminate hostilities. Second, a new consensus would obviously influence and be influenced by near-term force posture decisions at all levels, particularly on theater nuclear forces. The nuclear-armed cruise missile perhaps provides the most interesting example of these points. For to the extent that its credibility will in the future depend on relatively large-scale employment to ensure penetration, even against relatively small sets of targets, its suitability as a vehicle for conveying the desired political signals might be compromised, in the eyes of many Western Europeans. Whence the case for including a ballistic missile component such as an extended-range Pershing in any longer range TNF modernization program.

Force posture decisions at the conventional and SIOP levels will also be influential in the development of the required consensus and subsequent TNF decisions: at the conventional level, because of the effect of the decisions on the level of the nuclear "threshold" (in short, the longer the need for nuclear decisions can be delayed, the more credible the capability to apply the theater nuclear force effectively); at the strategic level, because of the impact of changes in the strategic balance on European confidence in the US nuclear guarantee and in its deterrent effect on the Soviet Union.

Within the "seamless web" doctrine, force posture decisions for theater nuclear forces should logically be based on the requirements of providing a demonstrable capability to respond to threats to NATO territory, rather than on the requirements of providing a capability to signal intent to escalate and to participate in a general nuclear response. For the latter, capability will be contained in a theater nuclear force properly configured to support the land battle in Europe (including an in-theater capability to strike targets in the Soviet Union), but the converse is not necessarily true. Similarly, for the purpose of negotiations it is the tie between conventional forces and TNF which is crucial. The goals of negotiation must be designed to protect the Alliance's capability to configure its conventional and theater nuclear forces to assure complementarity. To take only one example, the threat of nuclear strikes forces an aggressor to disperse his forces and thereby alters the requirements for conventional defense. Safeguarding the link at the SIOP end of the spectrum presents less of a problem in terms of negotiating postures; it is, in essence, an intra-Alliance problem of conceiving limited deep-strike options which are both politically acceptable and which deliver the desired signal. A TNF negotiating structure which focuses on the contribution of theater nuclear forces to US SIOP forces, at the expense of the operationally decisive interaction between TNF and conventional forces, risks damaging disruptions of NATO's overall defense posture as negotiations unfold. Bilateral US/USSR negotiations on longer range TNF (so-called "gray area systems"), which clearly relate these systems to the US/USSR strategic equations rather than to the theater balance, would run precisely this risk.

Targeting asymmetries and relative numbers and dispositions of forces on the two sides also argue against isolating longer range TNF for special arms control treatment. Although both sides target essentially the same kinds of military and military-support targets with theater-oriented weapons, two very important differences must be noted in the relative capabilities of the two sides to attack these targets:

- There are many more targets for theater nuclear forces at all ranges on the Pact side than on the Western side, yet the Pact currently has many more theater-oriented weapons than the Allies.**
- A large fraction of the Pact targets are in the Soviet Union and can only be covered by NATO longer range systems (greater than 1,500 km), while the comparable**

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Allied targets can be covered by Warsaw Pact systems of much shorter range (greater than 600 km).

Since the prime objective of the Soviets in any negotiation about theater-oriented systems must be assumed to be to limit Allied systems capable of striking the Soviet Union, these targeting asymmetries appear to offer the Soviets a striking advantage if negotiations are confined to longer range systems: whereas the Allied capability to attack Soviet targets depends exclusively on longer range systems, the Soviets can mount essentially identical threats to Western European targets with long-, medium-, or even short-range systems. Moreover, these longer range systems on the Allied side (dual-capable aircraft and the drawing-board missiles) are also the only Allied systems capable of striking Pact military targets in the East European countries. The Soviets should be delighted with the prospect of possibly limiting numbers of, and improvements in, Allied systems capable of striking the Soviet Union (and also targets deep in Eastern Europe), since the West needs the greatest improvements in these forces, while exposing to negotiation only a small fraction of their forces capable of targeting all of Western Europe.

By contrast, the Allies should see negotiated agreements as useful only if they have the potential to stabilize and make more predictable the entire TNF threat to Western Europe, and do not leave open legitimate paths by which the effect of such agreements could be circumvented, as would be the case with agreements limited only to longer range systems. Further, given that the current Alliance posture is "bottom heavy" in its emphasis on battlefield systems, that is where the Alliance might find negotiating capital.

Some of these relationships are displayed graphically in Figures 1 and 2. Figure 1 compares Alliance and Pact theater-oriented nuclear forces with ranges greater than 600 km. It shows that if Allied systems on both sides and Poseidon, which is already covered in SALT, are excluded from negotiation, and if Allied systems incapable of striking the Soviet Union (and comparable systems on the Soviet side) are likewise excluded, the negotiation would boil down to bargaining between a large and versatile mix of Soviet aircraft and longer range missiles, each of which has a modernized version in process of deployment, versus US dual-capable aircraft (every one of which is desperately needed for conventional defense) and US drawing-board missiles. Figure 2 shows how the aircraft and missile components change over time, illustrating that US/USSR freezes at current levels and limits on the introduction of new missile systems would probably have little impact on Soviet TNF because of their current high levels and because their new generation missiles are already being deployed, while freezes and limits on new US deployments would greatly impact on the Alliance, which is just in the process of deciding what types and how many new missiles to deploy. (These considerations are magnified by the targeting asymmetries discussed earlier.)

One final point arises about negotiations. The classification of TNF delivery systems by range is inherently imprecise when it comes to aircraft or cruise missiles. The attempt to reach a satisfactory classification around a given range criterion is therefore certain to introduce an extremely troublesome element of complication into the negotiation, and into corresponding force improvement programs.


In sum, therefore, this consideration of the military context of theater nuclear forces strongly suggests two conclusions:

- An effort to refurbish the concept of the seamless web of deterrence as it applies to TNF is a vital prerequisite to a sound set of force posture and negotiating policies. The links of TNF to US SIOP forces and to conventional forces are of equal importance to the Alliance. But it is the relationship between TNF and conventional

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Figure 1

Comparison of Alliance and Warsaw Pact Theater Nuclear Delivery Systems — 1978 (ranges ≥ 600 km)




NOTE: NUMBERS DERIVED FROM PUBLICLY AVAILABLE DATA. PRIMARY SOURCES: THE MILITARY BALANCE 1978-1979 (ISS 1978) AND ARMS CONTROL ENTERS THE GRAY AREA BY MUEZGER AND DOTY IN INTERNATIONAL SECURITY VOL. 3, WINTER 78/79.

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Figure 2

Comparison of US and USSR Theater Nuclear Delivery Systems 1968 — 1988 (ranges $\geq 600\text{km}$)



NOTE: NUMBERS DERIVED FROM PUBLICLY AVAILABLE DATA. PRIMARY SOURCES: THE MILITARY BALANCE 1978-1979 (HSS 1978), AND "ARMS CONTROL ENTERS THE GRAY AREA" BY METZGER AND DOTY IN INTERNATIONAL SECURITY VOL. 3 (WINTER 1978-79).

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forces which must primarily determine TNF force posture decisions and negotiating strategies.

- TNF of all ranges (with the possible exception of ADM's and very short-range systems) should be covered together in negotiations. This will reflect operational reality, will avoid placing the Alliance at a crucial bargaining disadvantage, and will help ensure that the security of Western Europe as well as the security of the Soviet homeland gets proper attention in TNF negotiations.

EUROPEAN TNF IN THEIR POLITICAL CONTEXT

Three important sets of political issues arise in connection with European TNF policy—Western Europe domestic politics, intra-Alliance politics, and the East-West politics of the negotiating approach advocated here. These will be discussed in turn.

Western European Domestic Politics

The fundamental question here is whether, and if so how, assimilation by Western European elites and publics of a coherent role for theater nuclear forces in Alliance strategy can be facilitated. Without a broader base of support for Alliance TNF policies, those policies will be increasingly prone to erosion by political opposition, Soviet propaganda and diplomatic pressures, and any renewed decline in European confidence in US reliability. By contrast, the greater the degree of assimilation that can be achieved, the stronger the degree of future cohesion in the Alliance and European confidence in the credibility of deterrence.

Some would argue that the spectre of the nuclear devastation of Western Europe is so formidable that no set of policies could lead to a more widespread acceptance of a role for TNF, other than as the shortest of fuses to the unleashing of the SIOP forces. If this is correct, then governments have the choice of either imposing TNF modernization decisions against irreconcilable political opposition or of shrinking from such decisions in order to avoid that opposition.

However, there is no particularly compelling reason to adopt this view. As the history of the progressive European assimilation of the idea of a serious conventional defense during the 1970's has shown, a combination of a growing Soviet threat, US pressures for force improvement programs, good political management, and a visible and carefully worked-out negotiating effort (that is, in the conventional force case, MBFR) can lead to shifts of attitude outside the narrow circle of defense specialists. But such a process in the TNF area would require the greatest possible degree of coherence in Allied policies on force posture, on negotiating strategy, and on the relationship between the two.

First, the force posture. The divergence between the present posture and doctrine is too easy a target for those in Europe who are skeptical about the role of theater nuclear forces. The danger now is that a policy to modernize longer range TNF in isolation will be open to criticism in Europe because it does not also rationalize the shorter range systems and the doctrine for their use. This point has been made openly in the Netherlands by some moderate socialists who accept that there is a case for modernizing longer range TNF, but who believe that the task of selling such decisions (notably the basing implications) would be made harder if they seemed merely to be expanding the role of theater nuclear forces in Alliance strategy. But the same point is also valid to a greater or lesser extent in other Western European countries, including the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) and Belgium.

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The need for coherence also arises in connection with negotiating policies. A partial approach to negotiations on TNF, whether concentrating on longer range or on shorter range systems, is open to the obvious criticism that the Soviet TNF military threat to Western Europe can be identical from systems of essentially any range. The flaws inherent in such an approach mean that to the extent that Alliance governments need a negotiating position which they can defend publicly, a partial approach is not well adapted to the need. It is consequently also unlikely to permit governments to wean gradually their publics from their interest in negotiation in the quite conceivable event that no useful negotiated agreement seems in the cards.

Finally, the relationship between force posture and negotiating policies also needs to be as coherent as possible. Ideally this should be done by defining both the minimum deployment levels required on the Western side, even if Allied negotiating goals were to be quickly achieved, and the additional options which would need to be implemented if they were not. While this is not an easy requirement to meet, some attempt to do so is desirable. But it would have to be more carefully conceived than the vague linkage between Allied ERW deployment and Soviet TNF programs which was established in the spring of 1978.

Perfect coherence in these various respects is not easy to attain. Failure to satisfy totally each of these requirements need not prevent greater assimilation of the role of TNF in the Alliance countries. But the more nearly coherence can be attained, the greater the prospect of promoting such assimilation.

Intra-Alliance Politics

The two central issues of intra-Alliance politics are the implications of European concerns about the reliability of the US strategic nuclear guarantee and the related question of what approaches, to TNF negotiations in particular, can best protect the cohesion of the Alliance in the medium term.

The role of transatlantic confidence, or the lack of it, in determining attitudes toward defense issues in Western Europe is as obvious as it is often hard to measure precisely and discuss openly. All too frequently, as with the question of European, especially German, concern about the SS-20, what are basically issues of European confidence in US reliability are perceived, discussed, and "resolved" in terms of other issues. But failure to distinguish between the observed symptoms of concern and the true causes of the disease can make the chosen treatment largely ineffective.

There is no need in this paper to discuss in detail the reasons for which European confidence in the reliability of the US strategic guarantee has declined in recent years. That it has done so is now generally accepted, though there is less agreement as to how far the previous level of confidence can be restored. That it could decline further is equally clear given that the Allies face potentially divisive issues both within the context of European security (SALT II ratification and SALT III) and outside that context (energy, Middle East problems, economic, and monetary issues).

In this situation the Western European Allies find themselves pulled in different directions on TNF posture questions. On the one hand they are inclined to look for reassurance from the United States in the form of actions which demonstrate both to themselves and to the Soviets that the US guarantee is being reaffirmed. Thus many Germans, for example, attach importance to basing new longer range TNF on the ground in Western Europe as a visible symbol of commitment and too hastily dismiss the arguments on military and perhaps also cost grounds for sea-based systems, such as the SLCM.

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On the other hand, some Europeans, consciously or unconsciously, increasingly recognize the need for some reinsurance against a further increase of doubt about US reliability. Whence the gradual (and not always very explicit) revival of interest in the importance of TNF under sole European control and, in particular, of a modernized British nuclear force.

The interests of Alliance cohesion in the longer term dictate a two-prong policy on TNF modernization to deal with this situation. First, the suitability of Allied TNF to perform their assigned missions, rather than calculations about short-term political reassurance to the FRG, should primarily determine the mix of systems deployed, since the level of European confidence in the credibility of the role of TNF in Alliance deterrence is likely, ultimately, to depend on this. If the characteristics of sea-based forces make them attractive as a component of a new longer range TNF mix, then the United States should make the case for them on military and technical grounds and recognize that providing effective and lasting political reassurance to the FRG is a more complex question than simply accepting current German perceptions of what TNF systems would best provide such reassurance.

Secondly, the major Allies need to address much more explicitly than hitherto the issue of the potential contribution of forces under European control to Alliance deterrence. At present this essentially means British forces, since the French are in no position to depart from Gaullist orthodoxy to the extent of discussing their forces in this way. However, the discussion should at least consider the possibility of forces developed in Europe with minimal US assistance (for example, cruise missiles and their launchers) which the French might procure for their own national purposes, but which could eventually contribute to a concerted TNF capability in British and French hands.

Three nations—the United Kingdom, the United States, and the Federal Republic of Germany—are vital to deciding the issue of the contribution of forces under national control to overall Alliance objectives. The British, and especially the Conservatives, could overcome their persistent tendency to think of their nuclear forces in essentially Gaullist terms as intended for almost exclusively British national purposes. Further, they could initiate a dialogue, notably with West Germany, about how those forces could contribute to overall Alliance goals (and thus, in effect, help to alleviate German anxieties). The new British Government has indicated that it may be more open-minded on this subject than were its predecessors, though it is too early to know what, if any, new policies will emerge. The United States could exercise its considerable ability to influence the British in this direction. Additionally, US cooperation would be required for the implementation of any concrete proposals along this line. But deciding to use the influence it has in this matter would require a painful process of reflection for the United States about the further dilution of its domination of Western nuclear policy. The Federal Republic of Germany could make more explicit the importance it attaches to this aspect of the TNF problem, and it could help stimulate a more imaginative approach by the British and perhaps also by the United States. By contrast, the French cannot at present be expected to make any direct contribution in this area. However, their concern with the potential consequences of German anxieties about US credibility is such that they will be interested in, and in certain circumstances sympathetic to, any British efforts to take German requirements into account in their forthcoming force posture decisions, just as they are at least tacitly sympathetic to US longer range TNF modernization programs.

Intra-Alliance psychological and political pressures also influence the attitudes of the major Alliance countries toward TNF negotiations. These pressures have pushed the Alliance toward the line of least resistance in the short term, even at the risk of intensifying the longer-term problems of preserving Alliance cohesion.

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In the United States two factors have been striking. First, the experience—and bureaucracy—of SALT and the SALTocentric bias of US policy on East-West problems has created a reluctance to modify the character of SALT and a desire to assimilate longer range TNF problems into the SALT orbit. This reluctance has been reinforced by a disposition in some quarters to reassert the traditional pattern of US dominance in the Alliance, if only to avoid the frustrations inherent in a more multilateral conduct of Alliance affairs. Some of the more dubious arguments in support of handling bilaterally a negotiation on longer range theater nuclear forces in SALT III appear to derive from these predispositions.

One such argument is that longer range TNF must be handled separately from other TNF for negotiating purposes because of the desirability of avoiding complexity and dealing with those parts of the problem that lend themselves most readily to solution. Quite apart from the reasons given above why an attempt to deal with longer range TNF alone would actually be disadvantageous to the West and why an attempt to discriminate between longer range TNF and others creates greater complexity, this argument flies in the face of the US experience in SALT and MBFR. In both negotiations complexity has for the most part become a necessity in order to achieve a sound negotiating posture on inherently complex issues.

The Western European Allies would certainly like to see further progress toward stabilizing the central strategic balance through SALT III as soon as possible; such progress is arguably more likely to occur with TNF issues detached for treatment elsewhere than with what could well become a TNF albatross and related problems of Alliance management around the neck of SALT.

The major Western European countries are subject to different pressures which dispose them, too, to shy away from participation in any TNF negotiations and to favor dealing with longer range TNF, if at all, in a bilateral SALT III. The French case is the clearest. French opposition to having French nuclear forces limited by any agreement is total and will remain so as long as the grip of the Gaullist doctrine about nuclear issues is politically, if not intellectually, secure. There is no prospect of substantial change before the Presidential elections of 1981, and not much thereafter. Not that the logic of these attitudes is overpowering. The French themselves insist (rightly) that their nuclear forces are central systems and that for this reason alone (with the possible and minor exception of Pluton) they should not be covered in any negotiation on TNF.

At the same time, the French concern with German anxieties about German security, and the touching French efforts to revive flagging German confidence in the reliability of the US nuclear umbrella, are wholly inconsistent with the fundamental tenet of Gaullist nuclear doctrine that a nation will only use nuclear weapons in defense of its own national territory. This inconsistency appears to be making itself felt among some French intellectuals. But for the time being, the grip of orthodoxy and of a basic skepticism about the feasibility of useful TNF negotiations is so strong that at least one answer which Gaullist doctrine would appear *not* to preclude—a TNF negotiation, including France, from which French nuclear forces were excluded as central systems—is still not seriously considered. Yet such a negotiation, if successful, could help alleviate German anxieties by making the TNF balance more stable.

The present German approach is still less conclusive logically, though equally powerful politically. German reticence about becoming directly involved in nuclear decisionmaking (including, on the part of the Social Democratic Party (SPD), a desire to have its hands free of excessive responsibility in this area, the better to deal with party pressures against accepting an enhancement of the TNF role in Alliance strategy) inhibits direct German involvement in any TNF negotiations. This attitude doubtless also

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owes something to the evident German concern to play down the element of questioning US reliability, which surfaced in Schmidt's International Institute for Strategic Studies speech, and which has been superseded since late 1978, at least in appearance, by a revived emphasis on the need for Alliance solidarity and confidence. In both these ways the German attitude is rooted in short-term expediency and ignores the fact that direct German participation alongside the United States in TNF negotiations would be likely (again on the MBFR models) to create greater understanding and cohesion, not the reverse. It could also presumably offer the SPD some domestic political dividend by showing them to have embarked actively on a new phase of detente.

The British case is less clear, only partly because the new government has not yet worked its way through the problem. British reluctance to have British SLBM's covered in any TNF negotiation is understandable. But, as with the French forces, there is no reason why they should not be considered as central systems for treatment (if anywhere) in SALT. For the rest, the British desire not to become involved in TNF negotiations probably derives mostly from skepticism—all the stronger now that the Conservatives are in government—about the value of, and prospects for, success in such negotiations. This attitude is almost certainly mutable. Any sign that the Americans—or Germans—attach importance to British participation could well bring about a change of heart.

It follows that the Alliance finds itself in a curious position. Having taken several initiatives which have led to the inclusion of TNF in negotiations (or virtually so)—for example, on Option III, the ERW "offer," the insistence on a negotiation track in parallel to the HLG—the major allies remain either skeptical about the value of these initiatives or inhibited from developing a coherent and comprehensive policy framework within which to set them. In particular the European allies, while in the longer range TNF area the principal source of the pressure for a negotiating policy, apparently lack the will or capability to undertake the analytical work essential to its development and also the interest to participate in it. Yet, nothing in recent experience (notably with MBFR) justifies the conclusion that Western European governments, which have in recent years been increasingly inclined to form strong opinions of their own on these subjects, will necessarily be content simply to follow the US lead in formulating negotiating positions.

In this situation the lessons of SALT I and SALT II are of decisive importance, because of the effects on allied cohesion of bilateral dealings between the United States and the Soviet Union on issues which affect European security. The history of the SALT decade as it has affected the Alliance has been traced elsewhere. Two conclusions emerge clearly from it. First, Western European suspicions, in the absence of any direct experience of the negotiations and of any responsibility for formulating negotiating policies, about the US propensity to trade away European interests against purely US ones, are endemic and damaging. The question is not how to eradicate these suspicions but how to control them. If, as seems unavoidable, and unless they are taken up in some other forum, the substance of European nuclear security interests is dealt with bilaterally in SALT III, the ground for such suspicions (for example, that TNF interests are being traded against the US interest in reductions) will be more fertile than ever. After all, the TNF issues are more important to Western European security in several ways than they are to the security of the United States.

The second conclusion is that the inherent practical and bureaucratic obstacles to consultative procedures, which satisfy Western European governments that their interests have been fully taken into account by the United States and adequately defended in negotiation, are such as to make largely irrelevant the theoretical ways in which consultations could be improved. Conceivably, some mechanisms in which European representatives were directly involved in US policymaking deliberations and, in effect, given a

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right of veto over US negotiating positions in areas of direct concern to Western Europe, could meet the need. But it is far from certain. And even arrangements of that kind would not help to give Western European governments the feel for the dynamics of the negotiation—and the sense of political responsibility—essential to sound judgments on tactics. Thus, proceeding in this way would involve an unnecessarily high risk of Allied dissatisfaction and unease as negotiations developed.

These considerations point to the conclusions that any negotiations on theater nuclear forces should be multilateral and should define TNF so as to exclude the British and French "strategic" forces which would be considered to be equivalent to US and USSR central systems. The United States would appear to be the only country with the political room for maneuver and the standing in the Alliance to be able to take an initiative to this end with any hope of success. And even if, as seems possible, Britain and West Germany could be persuaded to join, France would surely not do so. This being so, it would be essential to try to work out some (rather informal) consultative mechanism in which the French would agree to participate so that their suggestions could be considered, and also some means of taking account of those French forces, like Pluton and its successors, which could only with difficulty be claimed to be central strategic systems.

This conclusion may strike horror into the hearts of many for whom multilateral negotiations seem a wearying prospect. But, for all their problems, both MBFR and CSCE* have been enormously successful in Alliance terms as sources of Allied self-confidence and consensus on issues which at the outset seemed menacingly divisive. Participation is important and does promote assimilation by political elites and public opinion of the subjects being treated. The parallel with the SALT-related frictions is striking. If, as has been argued above, the concerns, notably about the SS-20, which have given rise to recent European interest in TNF negotiations are symptoms of a disease whose basic cause is a decline of confidence in the United States, a substantial part of the correct treatment of that disease should be through procedures explicitly designed to restore that confidence (so far as it can be restored).

East-West Politics. The third set of political issues relates to the East-West dimension of the TNF negotiation problem. Is there any reason to suppose that the Soviet Union would agree to the negotiating approach recommended here?

The immediate Soviet reaction to a Western proposal to deal with TNF in a multilateral context in the way proposed here in all probability would be adverse. They have a long-standing and self-interested view that SALT should cover all systems which can hit Soviet territory, but not others. And they have the obvious interest, already discussed, in dealing with longer range TNF separately from other TNF; but the Soviets' ultimate reaction cannot be predicted with confidence. As with SALT and MBFR, an effort of persuasion might well be needed in order to bring them around to accepting the idea. That effort need not fail. Among other things, the West would have a fair amount of leverage in view of what would appear to be a strong Soviet desire to bring US cruise missile programs in particular, and FBS in general, under negotiation. If this is so, then the West should be able to exercise considerable influence by standing firm on a position that either all TNF must be considered together in a multilateral forum, or there should be no negotiations on any theater systems at all.

This approach would be all the stronger for the fact that the Western position would have a substantial logical coherence in providing some kind of forum for discussing all kinds of nuclear forces, central strategic and theater, according to criteria as cogent as any that the Soviets could advance. Similarly, while the Soviets might prefer to see

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British and French systems included in the theater balance, Western recognition that those systems could at the proper time be discussed in SALT should represent to the Soviets a modest advance on the present position.

But the decisive argument in this connection is that it does not much matter if the Soviets do not accept the proposal, at least immediately. For the critical facet of the policy is that by presenting a comprehensive and easily defensible approach to the whole range of TNF problems, the Alliance would place itself in a much stronger position to preserve its cohesion in the face of Soviet rejection (or indeed the stagnation of negotiations) than it would with the piecemeal approach, to which present policies seem to be leading. Thus, the defensive strength of the proposal against Soviet propaganda campaigns and counterproposals might well prove to be its most important characteristic.

CONCLUSION

The argument of this paper has been that in approaching the problems of TNF posture and negotiation the Allies should take as their fundamental aims protecting the cohesion of the Alliance in the medium to longer term and promoting greater assimilation by Western European societies of the role of theater nuclear forces as part of Alliance strategy. By optimizing their policies and programs to meet these aims, the Allied would be more likely to achieve a stable deterrence and a strong common defense than by policies which, however apparently decisive and impressive in the short term, tended over time to increase intra-Alliance frictions and domestic opposition to Alliance strategy. In this perspective, several different lines of argument converge on two main conclusions. First, TNF modernization should be approached across the whole range of TNF, with a view to producing a force posture which reflects a more coherent doctrine and takes into account both US insistence on a clearer military rationale for TNF employment and the primary European interest in TNF as indicators of further escalation. Second, TNF negotiating options, which should so far as possible be closely interlinked with the modernization process, should also cover essentially the whole range of systems in a multilateral negotiation, and not involve piecemeal treatment of different subsets of TNF in different—and in part bilateral—negotiating contexts.

Apart from the substantive arguments against these conclusions which are discussed in the paper, two arguments of a more procedural kind stand out. First, that they would delay in some way either the progress of SALT III or the Alliance decisions on modernization of longer range TNF. In addition to the fact that such delays, if they occurred, could be a small price to pay for greater Alliance cohesion over time, two points need to be made in this connection. First, there is every chance that, even if it got off to a slower start, SALT III as it concerns central systems would actually proceed faster without TNF attached to it than it would with that attachment. Second, the significance of longer range TNF modernization decisions over time for the strength of Alliance strategy and deterrence will be in large measure a function of the assimilation of TNF as a whole by Western European countries. A short delay in the interest of facilitating such assimilation might also repay dividends over time.

The second essentially procedural argument is that the momentum of the Alliance's work on these questions has become so strong that changing course now would be positively harmful. The problem with this view is that momentum could well lead to a damaging political situation in Western Europe and to a chaotic position in various negotiations. Such an outcome would surely serve no one's interests except those of the Soviet Union. Nor would the approach recommended here involve the wholesale abandonment of recent Alliance work on modernizing TNF or proceeding into some kind of

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negotiation. But the distinct change of emphasis and direction implied could be sufficient to enable the Alliance to steer more effectively between the rock of paralysis of modernization efforts and the whirlpools of unnecessary domestic, intra-Alliance, and East-West frictions.

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APPENDIX. US AND NATO THEATER NUCLEAR FORCE EMPLOYMENT POLICIES

Starting in 1968 the NATO Nuclear Planning Group (NPG) and the military headquarters staff (SHAPE) undertook a series of conceptual and contingency studies related to theater nuclear use, some of which led to policy statements, and others which probed the practical limitations of theater nuclear forces. To the extent it is formalized, NATO theater doctrine is contained in a series of major policy documents, war plans and procedures, and subordinate unit plans flowing from these studies. The employment policy documents are

- MC 14.3 *Overall Strategic Concept for the Defense of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Area* (September 1967)

- DPC D (69)58 (Revised) *Provisional Political Guidelines for the Initial Defensive Tactical Use of Nuclear Weapons by NATO* (December 1970)

- DPC D (69)59 *General Guidelines for Consultation Procedure on the Use of Nuclear Weapons* (November 1969)

- DPC D (70)59 (Revised) *Concept for the Role of Theater Nuclear Strike Forces in ACE* (December 1972)

- DPC D (75)4 (Final) *Ministerial Guidance* 1975 (July 1975)

In addition, there is an approved document (NPG D (74)10 of October 1974) giving guidance for communicating NATO's intentions (CNI) in the event of a decision to employ nuclear weapons, and there is, in process of approval, a draft document called the "Phase III Study," which consolidates all current employment guidelines and includes as yet unapproved guidance for follow on use. In general, the official documents lay out the following policies:

The function of NATO TNF is to deter aggression by confronting an aggressor with unacceptable risks.

Should deterrence fail, NATO will use nuclear weapons if the Pact uses them or if the integrity of NATO forces and territory is threatened by conventional attacks which cannot be contained by conventional forces.

The objective of initial NATO use of TNF is to induce the aggressor to make the political decision to withdraw. The ultimate willingness and capability to escalate to strategic war is essential to this objective.

Political control over nuclear weapons use must be preserved at all times and the decision to initiate NATO use of nuclear weapons should be based on as thorough a consultation process as possible.

NATO use of nuclear weapons should seek to minimize collateral damage while achieving the required military damage.

NATO should maintain a theater nuclear capability offering a wide variety of use options.

SACEUR's Nuclear Operations Plan and subordinate commanders' operations plans provide specific fixed targets to be attacked in the event of general nuclear war, giving detailed priorities and damage goals for a wide variety of military and military support targets. To date, these operations plans are much less sophisticated about limited nuclear options (Selective Employment Plans - SEP's). But the SHAPE staff and subordinate staffs are developing more plans for limited strikes with theater based forces. Discussions within NATO's High Level Group have also contributed to a better

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understanding of the roles and possible targets for limited nuclear strikes deep within Pact territory.

Current SACEUR policies on SEP's might be summed up as follows:

- Limited strikes, including attacks into the Soviet Union, are to be planned and executed only by the highest NATO command levels. Such attacks should achieve significant results in terms of target damage, but should also be clearly limited in scope, placing the difficult decision for further escalation on the enemy. These targets can be military or political, but should have a direct bearing on the conflict in Europe. Successful execution of the attack should contribute materially to accomplishment of NATO's political objective of causing the enemy to cease his aggression and withdraw from NATO territory by convincing the political leadership that aggression can be continued only at enormous cost. Through such attacks it should be clear to the aggressor that NATO is resolved to go to any lengths necessary to defend itself, but is also willing to terminate the conflict short of general nuclear war if the aggression ceases and the enemy withdraws.

NATO policy for theater nuclear weapons is, of course, also US policy. But the United States has expanded its official views on TNF employment beyond that contained in NATO and SACEUR documents. During 1972-73, the US Government conducted a series of high-level reviews of US policy for employment of nuclear weapons. Based on this work, the President issued NSDM 242 in January 1974, setting forth for the first time Presidential policy guidance on weapons employment. NSDM 242 was amplified in April 1974 by the Secretary of Defense in his *Policy Guidance for the Employment of Nuclear Weapons* (NUWEP). NSDM 242 and NUWEP provide the United States a common framework of guidance for both strategic and theater nuclear forces. Regarding TNF, the US policy stresses the following principles:

- Civilian control over the nuclear weapons employment planning and execution process is essential.**
- There should be a wide range of TNF and strategic force employment plans which provide the United States and NATO with options short of all-out SIOP execution to help defend vital interests, help control escalation, and contribute to terminating the war under conditions acceptable to the United States and its allies.
- There should be more emphasis on options for retaliation against Pact military forces *after* Pact nuclear attacks in the theater to enhance deterrence of such attacks.
- There should continue to be options for NATO first use, but more attention should be given to raising the nuclear threshold through improved conventional forces and more survivable TNF.**
- More attention must be given to provision of timely information on the political-military situation to National Command Authorities to enhance top-down control and to support deliberations and decisions.
- TNF employment planning should include greater civilian-military interactions to ensure that military plans are responsive to civilian objectives and constraints, and that civilian advisers to the President are cognizant of the strengths and limitations of these plans.

Panel 2
POLITICS AND THE LIMITED
CONTINGENCY FORCE

An analysis of the elements of instability in areas outside Europe and the problems of exercising leverage on events. An evaluation of the planned Limited Contingency Force in terms of political, military, and logistic problems and a consideration of alternative responses. An assessment of the impact of these considerations on US relations with emerging power centers and the Soviet Union.

PANEL 2 Participants

CHAIRMAN: Dr. Richard Ullman, Editor, Foreign Policy Magazine

RAPPORTEUR: LTC Cloyd H. Pfister, USA, Senior Research Fellow, National Defense University

AUTHORS: Dr. Geoffrey Kemp, Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University; Dr. Clark Murdock, Associate Professor, State University of New York at Buffalo

PANELISTS: Mr. William B. Bader, Staff Director, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations; Ms. Nancy Bearg, Director, Policy Analysis, Near Eastern, African and South Asian Affairs, OASD (ISA); Mr. Fritz Ermarth, National Security Council; Mr. Phil Karber, Assistant Vice President (National Security Programs), BDM Corporation; Dr. Edward N. Luttwak, School of Advanced International Studies, The John Hopkins University; RADM James A. Lyons, Jr., USN, Joint Chiefs of Staff, J-5; Admiral Daniel J. Murphy, Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy; Mr. Robert J. Murray, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA) for Near Eastern, African and South Asian Affairs; Dr. James O. Nathan, Department of Political Science, University of Delaware; Honorable Brent Scowcroft, International Six, Inc.; Mr. Dale Tahtinen, American Enterprise Institute; General Maxwell D. Taylor, United States Army (Retired); Professor F. J. West, Naval War College; Dr. Paul D. Wolfowitz, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Regional Programs (PA&E); Dr. Dov Zakheim, Congressional Budget Office.

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PANEL 2 SUMMARY

Politics and the Limited Contingency Force

Richard Ullman
Cloyd Pfister

The panel commenced discussions against the background of two excellent papers, one by Geoffrey Kemp on "Contingency Planning and Persian Gulf Options" and the other by Clark Murdock on "Political and Military Dimensions of the African Problem, 1980-2000." Several additional background readings were also recommended to the panelists, including the following: a Congressional Research Study by John Collins and Clyde Mark entitled "Petroleum Imports from the Persian Gulf: Use of US Armed Force to Ensure Supplies"; General Maxwell Taylor's recent article in the American Enterprise Institute's *Foreign Policy and Defense Review*, "Changing Military Priorities"; Chester Crocker and William Lewis' article in the summer 1979 issue of *Foreign Policy*, "Missing Opportunities in Africa"; and Richard Ullman's article in the summer 1979 issue of *Foreign Affairs*, "Salvaging America's Rhodesian Policy."

Panelists first sought to identify the characteristics of the contemporary international environment that have inspired the debate over limited contingency force implications. The following observations were voiced.

THE CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT

There is today a new global strategic environment. Not only is there strategic parity, but the Soviets have acquired the capability to project forces beyond their traditional spheres of influence and have demonstrated a willingness to exercise this capability in pursuit of foreign policy objectives. The precise nature of such objectives was much discussed; there was no consensus, however, on whether these objectives are based on an overall geopolitical strategy, opportunism, or an ideological view of the relative correlation of forces in the world's social, political, and economic evolution; or whether they are in response to legitimate requests from various political factions for great power support in local competitions for power.

A second observation was that there is a growing imbalance in the raw power inputs between Soviet and Western investments in general purpose and projection forces. Because this disparity is growing, policy choices must be made. For the first time, there is a possibility of a US-Soviet military confrontation in a non-NATO and non-Korean environment. Judgment on the likelihood and nature of such contingencies in the Middle East, Africa, or other regional contexts, and whether we can expect to have a limited war (or a half war) with the Soviets, without escalation to the one-and-a-half wars of the familiar planning figure, are issues which will drive budgetary and force structuring decisions.

Third, the obvious dependence of industrialized and modernizing economies on energy and scarce resources has accentuated the interdependence of economies and the interregional impact of events and crises around the globe. General Taylor set forth the thesis that threats to our economic vitality in the 1980's and beyond will become increasingly serious. In his view, force structure adjustments, and changed defense budgetary priorities, in addition to other military and nonmilitary measures, will be required.

Finally, and perhaps most relevant, there are changed perceptions of the US will and capability to attempt to influence, by the variety of means available to it as a great

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power, the events and processes which affect its interests. The perception of many—friends, adversaries, and Americans themselves—is that the United States has drastically reduced its world roles, and that, especially during the last several years, it has concentrated on Europe, and perhaps Israel, to the exclusion of wider security roles.

A few states particularly important to us, and particularly dependent upon us, seem to feel that the United States will not stand by them in a crisis. Notable in this respect is Saudi Arabia. For far more complicated reasons, Jordan and Turkey are also examples of such states, but the list might include other states of the Persian Gulf and elsewhere. There are other states, less important to us, and less reliant upon us, which feel that the risks of making the effort required to support US positions may often outweigh the benefits. Kenya may be one example; Morocco another.

Most serious are the perceptions of adversaries. Some observers argue that the Soviets and their allies—Cuba most notably—feel that they can project power far from their shores to affect the outcomes of political-military struggles within other societies, without serious risk of anything more than a rhetorical confrontation with the United States.

Then there are some aspiring regional powers—Libya and Iraq may be examples—which may feel that the United States will not pose serious obstacles as they attempt to fulfill their regional (or even extra-regional) aspirations at the expense of others powers.

The interests, perceptions, and vulnerabilities of the nations of Europe and Japan received much attention. The interests of these nations vary according to their dependence upon Middle East oil, their internal political processes, and their uncertainties over the utility of force and intervention to protect their interests. For them, real or potential cleavages exist in achieving a common strategy, and the need for US leadership is evident.

Panel members disagreed about the effectiveness of current US policies and leadership initiatives. There was agreement that, to many friends and adversaries alike, we are sending ambiguous signals about our interests, capabilities, and intents. The perceptual lag in the post-Vietnam era may have overemphasized an acknowledgment of the limitations of our power and the legitimacy of a foreign policy of self-interest. Some panelists saw an American consensus developing for an activist foreign policy, arising from perceptions by American citizens that small states are threatening the United States.

These and other observations on the world environment have made examination of the utility and nature of limited contingency, or better stated, *ready reaction forces*, a highly topical subject for serious analysis. Parenthetically, the panel unanimously agreed that the phrase "unilateral force," which has appeared in the press of late, is a particularly unfortunate term, since it implies a force which would not be appropriate to the tasks or political realities.

Panelists saw an indefinite future in which political turbulence, unresolved ethnic and border disputes, and attempts by external actors to affect internal power struggles would remain the dominant realities in most Third World nations, most notably in Africa, but also in the Middle East and possibly the Caribbean as well. It was perhaps a shortcoming of the focus of the panel, and the types of papers commissioned for it, that little attention was given to Asian, Latin American, or Caribbean contexts for rapid reaction force contingencies. However, the panel did address general questions of the utility of force, as well as the tools of diplomacy and variables in the calculus of power, which might be used in such unstable environments to increase the probability of outcomes more favorable to US interests.

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Having said this, the panel spent much time discussing the nature of potential threats to US interests, reviewing existing capabilities and limitations of potential adversaries to secure a relative advantage; and attempting, without agreement, to assess the intentions of the Soviet Union and its allies.

In terms of US access to raw materials, some panelists argued that the type of regime was of little significance to the United States. However, in the case of Saudi Arabia, others indicated that to the Saudi royal family, the definitions of regime and state are one and our relations with Saudi Arabia are affected by the royal family's perceptions of our support, or lack of support, for interests and threats which they perceive to be significant. Hence, events in the Horn of Africa, Angola, and Iran, for example, create questions in Saudi ruling circles of US willingness to come to their support in time of need or to challenge the exercise of power by the Soviet Union and its allies. Thus, Saudi threat perceptions, as in the recent Yemen crisis, must be factored into our definition of threat.

Overlay upon this the mosaic of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Because of the US-Israeli special relationship, for every action on Arab-Israeli issues there is a reaction which the United States must address. For example, the Camp David Accords were judged by the Saudis as not adequately taking into account their fundamental interests in the status of East Jerusalem. This and other similar strains in US relations with moderate Arab states have increased immeasurably the importance of our assuring momentum in the search for a comprehensive peace in the Middle East. Since American interests straddle both sides of the Arab-Israeli conflict, the task facing the US leadership in signaling unambiguous vital interests, capabilities, and intentions is formidable, and vastly complicates an assessment of the utility, and purposes, of limited contingency forces in the Middle East.

There was no disagreement that Soviet capability to project power has vastly improved during the last decade, and is still growing. This observation applies not only to the USSR's own forces, but also to Soviet abilities to supply and advise others. It was noted that Ethiopia stands in sharp contrast to other Soviet adventures in the area of military assistance.

Nevertheless, the United States still retains substantial superiority in a number of crucial respects, such as, in the ability to deploy and sustain Army and Marine Corps ground forces, in the range and quality of air and amphibious forces, and in sea control. Some noted that the United States could have interdicted Soviet and Cuban airlift and sea lines of communication (LOC) to Angola and Ethiopia, but chose not to do so.

Closer to the Soviet homeland, the USSR would have difficulty deploying major ground force units, even in the Persian Gulf. Soviet LOC in the Caucasus are not highly developed. Although Iran poses a formidable geographic obstacle, the fall of the Shah, the subsequent turbulence in the Iranian military establishment, and the rejection by the Khomeini government of a regional security role, have reduced the time Iranian forces could have bought for the United States by slowing a Soviet ground attack. One of the more serious threats, envisioned by some of the panelists, would be a Soviet drive into Iran that stopped there. Then, by sitting astride the Persian Gulf, the Soviets could use this power position to influence policies of the Gulf states, challenge the oil lifelines to the West, and exploit cleavages in European, Japanese, and US response strategies. The possibility of dividing the Western alliance appeared to some panelists to be the most serious Soviet threat.

The panel faced, but never resolved, whether the United States would have to, or would even want to, engage Soviet ground forces in that theater. The key question was whether we can realistically expect to have a limited war (or a half war) with the Soviets.

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without escalation. That is, would attempting to fight the theater war so degrade our abilities to fight the big war that we would not prudently engage in it?

Panel members agreed that the United States should have sufficient forces deployable in the Persian Gulf to deter Soviet moves, and to reassure friends and allies. But should we also aim to achieve a warfighting and winning capability? Most panel members seemed to feel that only such a capability could provide effective deterrence of enemies and assurance to friends and allies. Yet there were some who felt there is a difference, particularly in what we can afford. Some argued that our strategy must consider the long-term implications of the amount of force required for what period of time. In Vietnam, it was reasoned, we had no prior concept of the upper limits of our involvement. Others argued that just because we cannot or will not allocate the resources to prepare for the high end of the conflict spectrum does not mean that we should not prepare for missions short of the half war, and thereby hope to deter that war from ever happening.

It was generally agreed that we were more likely to find US and Soviet air and naval forces, rather than ground forces, engaged in support of friends. Naval blockades, mine laying or clearing operations, quarantine, air interdictions, and sea control, were seen as likely missions for US forces. In Africa, no role was seen for US ground force involvement. Attention needs to be paid to measures to counter terrorism and sabotage.

There was some disagreement as to how scenario-dependent force structuring should be. But most panelists agreed that a US Limited Contingency Force (LCF) should not be region or scenario-specific, but should be planned and configured to meet as wide a range of contingencies as possible. Forces need to be interchangeable for many missions. It was argued that because of worldwide interests and the wide range of possible scenarios, we need to prepare for a worse case, not worst case, contingency. Being so prepared, we could handle most lesser cases. To be effective, limited contingency forces need to be more than declaratory policy.

Most agreed that the fundamental issue was how to affect perceptions of US reliability, resolve, credibility, and constancy of purpose. We need to demonstrate the limits of Soviet and Cuban power. Mr. Murdock's paper pointed out that marginal inputs of power prolonged, or precluded, local resolution of conflicts in most African scenarios and that large inputs of power were decisive. We, therefore, needed to be able to demonstrate the vulnerabilities and limitations of Soviet force projection capabilities.

Regarding southern Africa, there was considerable debate but no consensus. Mr. Murdock's paper stressed the need for the United States to commit resources (not forces) to its declaratory policy and practice active diplomacy in damping serious racial conflict in that region. In the view of some members, the United States has a clear interest in forestalling a black-white, red-white war in southern Africa. The danger of inaction and declaratory policies, without resource commitments, lies in permitting unrealistic perceptions that Soviet and Cuban power appear as the determinants of events. The main significance of Soviet and Cuban activities in Africa has been on perceptions in the Middle East and elsewhere. We also need to consider what impact Soviet bases, if acquired on the littoral of Africa, would have on complicating our own strategic planning. Should we have to counter such a Soviet military presence, the US force structure implications could be substantial. Hence, the need arises to demonstrate the vulnerability of Soviet sea and air LOC to remote places. We ought to exercise our ability to interdict their forces and add complications which Soviet planners will have to take into account.

Panelists asserted that we should not confine our analysis of what we do about Cuba to the continent of Africa. One panelist outlined measures to increase the economic costs to Cuba of military intervention.

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While much of the discussion dealt with potential Soviet intervention and what to do about it, some panelists recognized that political and social upheavals due to mostly internal reasons were the most likely crisis scenarios. We can and must differentiate the causes of crises, whether they be domestically or externally instigated and exacerbated. Such determination affects the perceptions of legitimacy accorded to US policy responses. In many crises the introduction of US military forces is not the appropriate response, but rapid provision of military and/or economic assistance may be needed. Agonizing delays in providing expeditious military assistance are caused by both production lead time constraints and bureaucratic policy processes. Such delays seriously undermine political effectiveness. We must act quickly if we expect to influence events, when they can be influenced.

In seeking African solutions to African problems, and to lessen opportunities for East-West conflict, some panelists believed the United States should be prepared to rationalize our arms transfer policies to selected countries. In their view, the United States should provide tailored packages and training assistance so that, if and when peacekeeping forces are required, they may come from combat effective units on the continent itself. The United States and friendly nations could provide airlift and logistic support. It was noted that the Soviets and their allies place great emphasis on arms transfers and military advisory assistance to African clients. The resulting asymmetry of effort may require selected adjustments and rationalization of arms transfer policies, in order to send unambivalent political signals of interest and resolve. However, not all members agreed that our arms restraint policies were ambivalent.

The issue of producing arms at a technological level suitable to third country customer requirements was addressed in both the African and Middle Eastern contexts. The possible requirement for specialized equipment, specifically a light tank for US projection forces, was discussed.

AREAS OF AGREEMENT

Hence, we come to what the panel felt needed to be done. Not surprisingly, there was considerable disagreement within the panel as to how effective a capability we already have. The panel divided on this issue according to the seats its members occupied, with civilian members of the national security establishment feeling most optimistic about existing and planned capabilities. Several members pointed out that we already have an LCF, and have had such a force for years, in the form of the 82d Airborne and 101st Airmobile Divisions, marine assault units and divisions, and various air and naval units and carrier forces.

Some argued forcefully that there is a strategy and force mismatch. General Taylor, in his *Foreign Policy and Defense Review* article, and in the plenary session, laid great stress on the need to assure sea control and to prepare for the sizable logistical and lift requirements for intervention forces. All recognized the need to consider other elements of power when addressing appropriate strategies for the region. These elements include political, diplomatic, economic, and intelligence factors; covert action; the whole spectrum of force presence options; combined exercises; basing and overflight; security assistance packages; prepositioned stocks; and involvement of third countries or surrogates.

There seemed to be agreement on the following propositions.

1. Force structuring should not be scenario-specific. Interchangeability of forces is required for a variety of contingencies. However, one panelist pointed out that

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specialized training and force tailoring requirements need to be addressed by planners and commanders tasked with preparing for Middle East contingencies.

2. Time is often critical, and speed essential, in putting some forces on the ground quickly or in delivering sizable security assistance packages rapidly.

3. We should not attempt to intervene to seize oil fields from a hostile force; the oil facilities are too vulnerable to rapid destruction. We might find ourselves intervening to save oil facilities from destruction by others, but that should be by invitation of the producing state on whose territory they lie. And we should make this proposition as clear as we can, since many of our Middle East-Persian Gulf friends harbor the dark suspicion that we might, in fact, turn on them and attempt to seize the oil fields.

4. The vast geographical expanse of the Middle East-Persian Gulf region places a premium on US air and naval power. Tactical airpower might interdict regional cross-border operations against key countries of concern to the United States, such as Kuwait or Saudi Arabia. Air and naval forces might interdict Soviet (and Cuban) reinforcements going into the Horn or elsewhere in sub-Saharan Africa.

5. Until further progress is made in resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict in a manner which meets the political and psychological needs of the moderate Arab states, any American base facility in the Middle East-Persian Gulf region is out of the question. Parenthetically, the Arab-Israeli dispute was a background to our panel discussions. Although panelists did not discuss it directly, they all recognized the constraints this dispute imposes on the pursuit of certain US interests. The panel did not discuss the ways in which Israeli forces should be factored into regional equations of options to achieve US objectives. The political implications of exercising such an option would be substantial. Further, although the United States cannot establish anything like a base in any Arab or Gulf country, absent a much higher than present perception of threat on its part, Saudi air bases are, or soon will be, capable of rapidly receiving and supporting flown-in squadrons of US tactical aircraft, Airborne Warning and Control Systems, and command and control elements. This would be very far from starting from scratch. Other facilities, ports, and airfields elsewhere, such as Djibouti, may be available for some contingencies.

6. The combination of the importance of air and naval power with the lack of bases emphasizes the role of Diego Garcia as a crucial US asset which might be expanded to support prepositioned supplies or predeployed units during a regional crisis.

7. For these reasons, and because of the asymmetry in US and Soviet power in proximity to the Middle East-Persian Gulf region, the United States should abandon the effort to reach agreement with Moscow on an Indian Ocean "zone of peace." Any agreement which is remotely likely to be negotiable would be too one-sided in its effects. One strong dissent registered on this was that rather than abandon the negotiations, the United States should frankly assert that it seeks a genuine balance of capabilities in the region that would include not only US and Soviet forces deployed at sea, but also those based on land capable of bringing power to bear on regional targets. That would include Soviet land-based aircraft. The Soviets would almost surely refuse such an enlargement of negotiations. We could therefore gracefully bring negotiations to a temporary or permanent close, and those so inclined in Congress would not be able to insist that we negotiate, rather than deploy additional forces into the region.

8. Finally, the panel saw no possible uses for US ground forces in sub-Saharan Africa. That does not mean that the panel—or some of its members—do not foresee possible contingencies in which the United States might want to put military pressure on Soviet and Cuban forces operating in or near Africa. This pressure could assume active

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means, such as air or sea interdiction, and more passive means, such as mining or otherwise blocking ports in receiving countries, or as discussed earlier, putting pressure on Cuba directly. Nor does it mean that the panel does not recommend increased American military assistance to some African governments—not, however, including the white-dominated governments of southern Africa.

AREAS OF DISAGREEMENT

On all of these points there was, or seemed to be, agreement. Now for the issues on which there was lively discussion, but on which there was a lack of unanimity.

1. A general point. Although members of the panel were much impressed by the arguments put forward by General Taylor in his recent article, "Changing Military Priorities," the panel did not sufficiently discuss the trade-offs, and other measures the article recommended, to arrive at a consensus about its serious proposals. Specifically, there was no consensus in favor of General Taylor's admonition that it is trade and resource constraints by potential adversaries that will most endanger us during the 1980's and that, given scarce resources, we should be prepared to give substantially higher priority to upgrading our ability to counter these threats than to improving our strategic nuclear or NATO forces. Some members emphasized the insurance principle: we must pay attention to situations in which the stakes are catastrophic harm, although the risks may be small. Others—members of the administration—argued that, contrary to the impression, NATO needs do not dominate our planning, and that the administration gives considerable weight to the need to maintain a credible capability for operating in non-NATO areas. Nevertheless, there was a strong feeling that the lion's share of incremental resources should go toward the kinds of missions likely to be addressed by an LCF.

2. So what is to be done? Panelists recognized that it is easy to assemble a wish list. Trying to avoid that kind of departure from real resource constraints and repeatedly recognizing that some trade-offs would be required by almost any set of actions recommended, the panel distinguished four sets of measures, albeit the list is by no means comprehensive:

- First, the panel developed some relatively low-key, low-budget measures:
 - (a) Somewhat enhanced over-the-horizon presence, such as embarking Marine amphibious units and building up Diego Garcia's facilities
 - (b) Command post exercises with forces of friendly regional governments
 - (c) Combined contingency planning with regional states
 - (d) Air defense exercises
 - (e) Air and sea interdiction exercises to demonstrate vulnerability of Soviet LOC to forward areas
- Second, the panel devised a set of somewhat more expensive measures:
 - (a) Greater intratheater lift capability—air and sea
 - (b) Prepositioned equipment sets for US forces, on Diego Garcia or on forward deployed logistics ships. One member proposed an LCF based on a number (the number he used was 10) of independent mechanized battalion task forces with substantial support utilizing prepositioned battalion sets (it was pointed out that one brigade set (3 or more battalions) would cost approximately \$0.5 billion dollars.)

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- (c) Prestocked and possibly prepositioned military assistance packets of long lead time equipment items for friendly countries
 - (d) Maintaining a carrier task force in the Indian Ocean. This might be an existing carrier or a new one; if an existing carrier were taken from the Pacific, a compensating fly-in to Japan of tactical air units could be considered
- Third, there was a set of more controversial and/or more expensive measures, including:
- (a) Making the LCF from the Marine Corps, more sharply distinguishing Army and Marine Corps roles, with the Marines taking on the main role in Third World contingencies
 - (b) Developing military equipment specifically with LCF contingencies in mind—a lighter tank for instance—and doing so for both US and friendly forces
- Fourth, a set of measures specifically aimed at Cuba was suggested by a member of the group:
- (a) Measures designed to isolate Cuba economically, such as refusing to allow ships that call there to call in US ports or to handle US goods
 - (b) More severe sanctions up to and including a blockade

3. The unilateral-multilateral issue. Of course, it is desirable that any and all such projections of military power should be multilateral—on the part of the United States and some of its allies. But given different vulnerabilities and interests, the allies are unlikely to play expanded roles in these contingencies. The panel came to no agreement about the degree to which the United States should feel constrained to act only with allied co-participants. There seemed to be a considerable feeling that the United States should be prepared to act unilaterally—although the label “unilateral force,” which General Rodgers and the press had applied to the LCF, was unanimously regarded as unfortunate.

4. Finally, there were the two central questions of when and why the United States should make use of the capabilities that might be provided by the various components of an LCF. These questions arose repeatedly throughout the discussion and were the ones on which there was least agreement. They are, of course, closely related. What actions on the part of the USSR or its allies, or of regional states, constitute a sufficient threat to American interests to call for a US military response?

Members of this group gave divergent assessments, for example, of the degree to which Soviet and Cuban activities in Africa thus far have threatened US interests. There was considerably greater agreement regarding the nature and salience of US interests in the Middle East-Persian Gulf region than in Africa. For example, some members asserted that the United States has no interests in Africa that are intrinsically vital, that interests there are essentially subjective, and that the United States would be likely to have continued access to sub-Saharan natural resources regardless of the regimes in power. Yet African events can affect perceptions here and abroad of US credibility and US and Soviet relative power equations. Moreover, should the situation deteriorate seriously in southern Africa with sizable Soviet/Cuban support to radical factions and guerrilla forces, there could be profound effects on domestic politics in this country, as the administration wrestled with an appropriate response.

Thus, we come full circle to where we started—with perceptions and with the necessity to take actions that affect them. Perceptions are the stuff of international politics and affect the process by which domestic consensus is achieved or divided on appropriate foreign policy objectives.

PANEL 2 PAPER:

Contingency Planning and Persian Gulf Options

Geoffrey Kemp

MILITARY CONTINGENCIES AND US STRATEGY

Although one must commend the Carter administration's decision to establish a 110,000 man force for possible use in the Middle East-Persian Gulf region and other Third World areas, the policy process by which this decision was reached is less praiseworthy. The case for establishing a limited contingency force for intervention in potential conflict areas outside the present geographical boundaries of NATO should not be justified on the basis of particular regional crises. Similarly, the sizing and configuration of an intervention force should be, in the main part, independent of specific scenarios and geographical areas. The reasons for the foregoing statements are important and should be examined before proceeding to the specifics of the Middle East-Persian Gulf theater.

The first reason is that, for the foreseeable future, the United States will remain a global power with worldwide interests. Further, there is every indication that US interdependence with the rest of the world is on the ascendancy rather than on the decline. At any time there is a strong possibility that US national interests may be sufficiently jeopardized to require a response involving the use of force. Yet, given the wide range of possible threats to US interests, it is impossible to predict when or where such events may occur and what level of military response may be required.

The second reason is that the establishment of an intervention force which is independent of specific scenarios is necessary to demonstrate America's political resolve to defend its global interests by sustaining a force-in-being with a flexible warfighting capability for most circumstances, short of general war. The alternative, namely to establish forces for specific contingencies, reflects the very worst type of planning: reactive, scenario specific, and often too late to be effective.

It is not that the proposed limited contingency force will be too late to be of use. Rather, it is that the long-delayed decision to develop such capabilities reflects an attitude that still regards the use of American military power in securing American national interests as being generally counterproductive. For while this viewpoint may have had some merit in the context of Vietnam, it bears no relationship to the emerging international environment. The diffusion of power, especially the growth of Soviet military power, has changed things. The United States finds itself more involved than ever with global politics and economics, and given unresolved conflicts the fundamental requirement for an effective power-projection capability is growing while the difficulties of projecting such capability are increasing.

In sum, the United States exists in a multipolar, diffuse world which is still replete with traditional sources of conflict and which is bedeviled with potential sources of conflict over the distribution of resources and wealth. Hence, it is essential that the United States accept that more military forces than are currently programmed will be needed into the indefinite future, and that "solving" the Persian Gulf oil dependency will probably not diminish this need.

With these observations as background, the military environment in the Middle East-Persian Gulf region will now be addressed. It is not the purpose of this paper to provide a detailed inventory of force levels and budgets necessary to sustain a spectrum of military

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operations in the Middle East-Persian Gulf region. Rather, the paper attempts to do three things: to remind the reader of the historical background involving the role of external military power in the region; to discuss the military options in the region from a global, geopolitical perspective; and to outline a range of military threats and possible military responses by Western and local powers.

THE MIDDLE EAST-PERSIAN GULF CASE

Although it is obvious why the Middle East has assumed greater importance for the Western powers, the linkages between oil dependency and the role of force are less appreciated. At one level of analysis, the issue is simple: the Soviet Union is the only power that poses a long-run military threat to Western interests in the area, and it is developing the types of forces necessary to intervene in the Persian Gulf and thereby deny the West oil. However, the extent to which the use of this capability is related to possible US responses and, if used, how successful it would be in furthering overall Soviet geopolitical interests, are less clear. Before attempting to answer some of these broader questions, it is first appropriate to say something about the historical background involving the use of external military forces and then speculate on the political circumstances which might tempt the Soviet Union to use its power projection capabilities to intervene in an area of such sensitivity to the Western powers. Although there are other, more likely, scenarios involving local conflict without Soviet participation, the initial emphasis upon Soviet threats can be justified on the grounds that if the United States can deal with these threats, it can deal with lesser threats.

Relevant Historical Background

Historically, Russian leaders have demonstrated both "defensive" and "offensive" attitudes towards the Middle East-Persian Gulf region. During the nineteenth century, numerous territorial advances were made by the Czars at the expense of the Ottomans and Persians. This eventually led to confrontations with Britain, who saw Russian advances in Persia and Afghanistan as inimical to the security of India. Britain fought several wars in Afghanistan with the primary purpose of preventing the Russians from taking over that wild country. Although Britain eventually reached an agreement with Russia and supported the partition of Persia in 1906 (due primarily to Britain's setbacks in the Boer War), British suspicions of the Russians did not cease. However, by the time of the outbreak of World War I, Britain and Russia were allies and there was more at stake than territory. Both countries had major oil investments in the region: the Russians at Baku and the British in Mesopotamia and southern Persia. Both countries were fearful lest the Germans and their Turkish allies destroy or capture these resources which had now assumed strategic importance.

Russian fears regarding the vulnerability of its southern front were reinforced following the civil war in 1917 and the eventual ascendancy of the Bolsheviks. Once World War I ended, British, American, and French forces rallied to the White Russian cause, and Britain used troops in northern Persia to help fight the Red Army. In fact, in 1922, a British flotilla in the Caspian defeated Bolshevik ships at the battle of Alexandrovsk.

The fact that Russia's oil resources were vulnerable to attack in the Caucasus again became an issue at the beginning of World War II. The Nazi-Soviet Pact of 1939 included, among other things, a secret protocol signed by Ribbentrop and Molotov, that, in effect, promised the Soviet Union a free hand in the Persian Gulf region in the event of a German victory in the West, thus confirming the worst suspicions about Soviet offensive

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tendencies. During the period of the phony war (September 1939 to May 1940), Russia supplied Germany with oil. Some allied strategists, notably General Weygand, proposed plans to bomb Russian oil production at Baku and Batum from French air bases in Syria.*

The German invasion of Russia in June 1941 led to an alliance between Britain and the Soviet Union. In August 1941, British and Russian units invaded Iran in the wake of German advances in the Western Desert and European Russia. The announced pretext for the attack was to enforce a strict neutrality on Iran, a condition that was felt to be in jeopardy in view of the large number of German fifth columnists in the country and the generally pro-German attitude of Reza Shah. In reality, the attack was designed to protect the Persian Gulf oil fields in Iraq and Iran from Axis attack if and when Germany and Japan, respectively, broke through the Caucasus and conquered India, and also to secure a second line of communication, in addition to the Arctic routes, by which the Allies could resupply Russia.

The invasion of Iran was a rout, or, as General Slim later referred to it, *opera bouffe*. In less than a week, Russian forces, which had invaded across five entry points along the entire northern border, had overrun the Iranian resistance, had occupied Tabriz and Mashhad, and, jointly with the British, had entered Tehran. The Russian attack was well coordinated and the ground force invasion was accompanied by air strikes against air fields of the major northern cities. The performance of the Iranian forces was very, very poor and widespread desertions of officers and men occurred, especially in the northeastern province of Khorasan. The British invaded with two forces. One force under General Slim entered Iran from bases near Baghdad and crossed the border along the traditional route to the east which led through the mountains to Kermanshah. Aside from a brief skirmish at the Par Lak Pass, Slim's Indian troops had little difficulty overcoming the well equipped but poorly led Iranian forces. The second British force under General Harvey attacked in the south from Basra in Iraq with the objective of capturing the Abadan oil refinery and port loading facilities. Although some fighting took place in the operation and a few British casualties were sustained, the resistance only lasted a few days.

For the remainder of World War II, Britain and Russia jointly occupied Iran and were joined by a large number of US Army personnel, who eventually took over the responsibilities for maintaining and operating the "Persian Corridor" through which millions of tons of lend-lease material were sent by ship, rail, and road into Russia from Persian Gulf ports. Aside from several skirmishes with tribesmen, the only significant military issues in Iran between August 1941 and May 1945 which have relevance today were the plans drawn up by General Auchenleck in June 1942 to defend northwestern Iran against a possible German attack from the Caucasus. These plans had as their objective the defense and protection of the oil facilities and ports of the Gulf. However, it is especially

*This scheme was aptly satirized by A. P. Herbert at the time:

Baku, or, the Axis scheme
It's jolly to look at the map
And finish the foe in a day
It's not easy to get at the chap
these neutrals are so in the way
But if you say "What would you do
to fill the Aggressor with gloom?"
Well, we might drop a bomb on Baku
or what about bombs on Batum?"
Heh-heh. I'm all for some bombs on Baku
and, of course, a few bombs on Batum.

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interesting to note that the line of defense chosen as most suitable for a stand against the German army was in northwest Iran.

Iran was the scene of the first major postwar military crisis between Russia and the West. After the war Russia refused to withdraw its forces from northern Iran and established autonomous republics in Azerbaijan and Kurdistan. At the time, there were no direct military means either Iran or the Allies could use to oust the Russians, so they were confronted at the United Nations. Implicit in the Iranian decision to stand up to the Russians in 1946 was the overwhelming power and support of the United States and the Soviet perception that the benefits of establishing a puppet state in northern Iran were far outweighed by the costs of antagonizing the United States and Britain so soon after the defeat of Germany. It is worth noting, however, that during the Azerbaijan crisis, Soviet troops moved to within 30 miles of Tehran in a display of intimidation against the Iranian government.

The Middle East/Persian Gulf area was not to become the focus of direct Soviet involvement for 9 years following the 1946 crisis. Although the Soviet Union was indirectly involved in numerous events in the region in the intervening years, the primary focus of cold war activities and confrontations was in Europe and the Far East. Yet, this is not to say that the Allies ignored the importance of the region in the event of another world war. Between 1946 and 1950, US war planning assumed that a world war with the Soviet Union would be protracted. While it was anticipated that the United States and eventually the Soviet Union would use fission weapons which would play an important role in a world war, it was not assumed that these weapons alone would be sufficient to carry the day. Thus, it was expected that a global conflict with geographic dimensions similar to World War II would take place. In this context, the Soviet land threat to the Middle East was taken seriously.

There was, at the time, great concern with the security of oil supplies. Although the United States had successfully "oiled" its allies through two world wars, the estimates in the late 1940's and early 1950's suggested that US petroleum reserves would not be adequate to provide oil for another major war that lasted much beyond 6 months, hence the need to secure the Middle East.

The outbreak of fighting in Korea in 1950 was followed by the subsequent testing and building of the fusion weapon by both the United States and the Soviet Union. This development ushered in the thermonuclear era and the gradual introduction of the concept of deterrence as the key to stability in the nuclear age. However, the H-bomb was not to enter service with the US Air Force until 1956, and as late as 1953 the Joint Chiefs of Staff expected that a general war with the Soviet Union would still be a protracted one.

The West's perception of its vulnerability along the Soviet southern border was the factor behind John Foster Dulles' famous trip to the area in 1954, which led to the concept of a "northern tier" of defense against Russia based on an alliance between Turkey, Iran, Iraq, and Pakistan. The subsequent brouhaha over the proposed Baghdad Pact became, ironically, the catalyst for a concerted Soviet offensive to "leapfrog" the West's forward defense line and openly court alienated anti-Western countries such as Egypt and Syria. It was President Nasser's objection to the Baghdad Pact and the refusal of Britain, France, and the United States to supply him with more than token arms that paved the way for the famous Soviet arms deal which was announced in 1955. This arms deal represented a high water mark in the more assertive "third world diplomacy" that Stalin's successors, especially Khrushchev, were pursuing. By cleverly exploiting Western vulnerabilities in the Middle East, the Soviet Union was, therefore, able to gain an important foothold in Egypt which it was to keep for nearly 20 years.

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However, the short run effect of the 1955 arms deal was to accelerate the events that were to culminate in the Anglo-French attack on Egypt in 1956 and the Israeli defeat of the Egyptian forces in Sinai. At the time, the superpowers played a distinctly secondary role, with Eisenhower threatening the British economy if fighting was not stopped. Dulles and Eisenhower were able to dictate terms to Britain, France, and Israel by way of economic and diplomatic leverage, yet, ironically, it was the United States that now had to play a more assertive military role in the Middle East following the humiliation of Britain and France.

The next catalyst for greater US military involvement in the Middle East was the 1958 coup d'état in Iraq, which resulted in the overthrow of the monarchy and the ascension to power of radical anti-Western nationalists. At that time, anti-Westernism equated with pro-Communism, also, it was generally believed that the Iraqi coup would be followed by similar moves against the pro-Western regimes in Jordan and Lebanon. Britain and the United States, respectively, deployed forces to these countries in 1958 to protect the regimes.

During the first half of the 1960's, the Middle East-Persian Gulf area played a relatively quiet role in international strategic affairs as US-Soviet confrontations in Berlin, Cuba, and then Southeast Asia reached various climaxes. Britain retained a military presence in the Persian Gulf and the Arab-Israeli conflict, although punctuated by periodic violence, was deceptively calm. By the mid 1960's, however, the tempo of events was beginning to change.

In Britain, the Wilson government was forced, for economic reasons, to reassess its military presence "East of Suez," while along Israel's border, increasing belligerency by the Syrians and the Egyptians set the stage for the Six Day War in June 1967. This war catapulted the Middle East back into the front line of military affairs. Israel's remarkable victory was a major blow for the Soviet Union but, in the aftermath of that victory, France abandoned its former ally, Israel, and the Soviet Union increased military aid to its clients, thus forcing the United States to become still deeper embroiled in the direct security of Israel and, therefore, Middle East politics. The next year, 1968, the United States agreed to sell Israel F-4 Phantom aircraft, and Britain announced that it would relinquish its presence in the Persian Gulf by 1971, thus abandoning its traditional role of policeman in that area.

It should be remembered that in 1968 the term "energy crisis" was not in common use, and there was no inkling within political circles that the crisis of 1973 was only 5 years away, thus the British announcement was not greeted with undue alarm in most circles. The United States, which was by then deeply involved in the war in Vietnam, decided not to replace the British as Gulf policeman, but to rely instead on Iran and Saudi Arabia as the "twin pillars" of its new policy of backing potentially powerful local states in maintaining regional balances. In practice, this meant treating favorably requests for advanced arms and American technical assistance from these countries.

The Contemporary Environment

The 1973 Arab-Israeli war and the ensuing oil crisis was one of the most unexpected and traumatic events of the postwar era. From that time on, the strategic importance of the Middle East assumed new dimensions as the full magnitude of the energy crisis came to be appreciated. The direct results of the war and the oil embargo were to link the Arab-Israeli conflict directly to the energy crisis and the Persian Gulf, increase the purchasing power of the oil-rich states, make Israel more dependent than ever upon the United States, divide the Western alliance on the basic principles underlying the Middle East policy, and increase the Soviet involvement in Middle East military affairs.

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Between 1973 and the present, these underlying trends have continued. Western dependency on Middle East oil has grown in spite of numerous proposals to curb or reduce energy consumption, the military arsenals of the Middle East have swollen to unprecedented sizes (although the military implications of this phenomenon are less impressive than meets the eye), the West has suffered a major setback with the ouster of the Shah in Iran, Soviet diplomacy has suffered in Egypt, but has expanded in Africa and in the northern tier, especially Afghanistan, and, most serious, the Western allies still have no common strategy for dealing with crises in the region in spite of the fact that the strategic importance of the Middle East has never been greater.

The fall of the Shah's regime in Iran in the winter of 1979 and the continued animosity between Israel and most of its Arab neighbors, despite the signing of the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty in March 1979, are clear indicators that the Middle East-Persian Gulf region is, and will remain, highly unstable in spite of enormous infusions of money, technical infrastructure, and arms. Both the Soviet Union and the United States have learned bitter lessons from their respective involvements in this area over the past decade: first, Egypt ousted Soviet military forces from its country, and then the Shah's successors expelled all American military personnel from Iran.

To put it bluntly, events of the past 3 years have demonstrated the hollowness of the assumptions underlying the Nixon "doctrine"—which called for greater participation in regional defense by local actors—because, with the notable exception of Israel and elements of the Egyptian and Syrian forces, Middle East countries have not demonstrated an ability to manage and operate military forces in a major conflict environment. Furthermore, the collapse of the Iranian military establishment, following the Shah's departure, effectively removed Iran from the role of Gulf policeman, a role which it eagerly pursued under the Shah to the point of fighting in the guerrilla war in southern Oman.

What this means is that, in spite of massive arms transfers and defense expenditures which the countries of the Middle East-Persian Gulf region have incurred over the past 5 years, the gap between inventories and force levels and usable, effective military capabilities remains as wide as ever. Again, with the exception of Israel and some units of the Egyptian and Syrian armed forces, it is to be seriously doubted whether any of the local military powers could last for more than a few days against a well-equipped and well-deployed industrial power such as the United States or the Soviet Union. The implications, if true, are significant. They suggest that if political and economic factors are set aside, most Middle East-Persian Gulf countries are as insecure today as at any time. Insofar as the ability of the local countries to withstand an attack by the Soviet Union is concerned, these countries are probably stronger now than 10 years ago in their own terms, but the Soviet Union's capabilities for force projection into the region are even greater. Thus, at a time when the area as a whole has become more important to the West, it has also become more vulnerable to Soviet power projection.

Military Contingencies

With this strategic background in mind, what can be said about military contingencies that might require a US response? Unfortunately, there are an endless number of possibilities, and one could devote thousands of words sketching out different scenarios. Since this cannot be done here, and anyway is not a very useful exercise, it makes sense, instead, to talk about two sets of conditions which should influence possible US responses.

The first relates to the expected level of intensity of conflict in the region. Thus "low intensity" conflicts might include border skirmishes and terrorism in regions not directly

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Figure 2.

Contingency Spectrum

		Level of Soviet Involvement		
		Low/Zero	Medium	High
Level of Conflict	Low	"Best" Case		
	Medium			
	High			"Worse" Case

leadership might calculate that since neither side wishes to escalate immediately to a nuclear exchange, the war might remain nonnuclear for weeks rather than for days. In this case, the chances of either side achieving a decisive global victory are not high if military calculations alone are the criteria for success. The side that will "win" the war will be the side that holds the most important real estate *after the first phase*, thereby forcing the opponent to either negotiate or escalate to nuclear warfare.

The cornerstone of the NATO alliance has been and still is that the United States will be prepared to use nuclear weapons rather than lose Europe. While the credibility of this guarantee is increasingly questioned on both sides of the Atlantic, conservative Soviet planners might well calculate that, aside from a direct attack on the continental United States, an attack on Europe is still the most likely event to precipitate a US nuclear response and, therefore, an event to be avoided unless the Soviet Union itself is in desperate straits.

If both sides wish to avoid automatic escalation to a nuclear response and Europe remains the most sensitive arena for conflict, then it follows that a Soviet attack against the Middle East-Persian Gulf region is less likely to bring about Armageddon. But how could such an operation serve Soviet interests, given the dependency of the West on this area? At this point it is necessary to introduce the political realities of the Western alliance.

Europe-NATO-"the West" are terms that are frequently used interchangeably in the context of the East-West strategic balance. Certainly in the event of a nuclear war or an attack on Europe, it is reasonable to presume that this is the one issue on which there will remain great unification within the Western industrial world. However, a Soviet attack in the Middle East-Persian Gulf area, while obviously damaging to the West, would not have the immediacy of a conventional attack in Europe or a nuclear strike against US forces. Why? Primarily because the threat posed by a Soviet attack in the Middle East is *potential* rather than *immediate*. It presumes that control of Middle East oil would give the Soviet Union power over the European economies, and that occupation of the Gulf provides the means to control the Middle East and Indian Ocean. But *control* does not

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necessarily equate with *destruction*, and the political question is what would the Europeans recommend that the United States do if a Soviet invasion of the Middle East-Persian Gulf region was not automatically accompanied by the destruction of oil fields or an oil embargo? That is to say, Soviet occupation of the Gulf could be accomplished without shutting off Japanese and European SLOC's and if the Soviets were clever enough, might be carried out in parallel to generous overtures to the Europeans and Japanese to the effect that their oil supplies would be secure. While it is hard to imagine any Western leader believing such rhetoric, it has to be asked whether the threat of future Soviet cutoffs would be sufficient to unite the Western leadership to the point of recommending a military response on the part of the United States. The argument here is that under these sorts of circumstances, the West might well be divided as to the preferred response and therein lie the seeds of Soviet victory.

The More Probable Cases. One would hope that the above scenarios, like the attack in Europe, will remain low probability events. Yet, this is not cause for complacency given the disastrous impact that some of the "low level" threats could have for Western economic power. However, for the less intense, but more probable military contingencies, the appropriate, but difficult, question to answer relates to the *utility* of US military power as an instrument of overall US and Western power and influence.

The mere mention of lesser contingencies arouses deep suspicions in the Arab countries, who believe that in the last resort the West may use force to secure oil irrespective of Soviet involvement. The Arabs also believe that were it not for Soviet power, OAPC could not get away with its current pricing policy. Yet, the dilemma for the conservative Arab countries is that they see the Soviet Union as the ultimate threat. Hence the extraordinary confusion and ambivalence about the future role of US military power in the region.

For example, what should or could the West do if Palestinian terrorists began to attack oil facilities or oil tankers? To unilaterally dispatch US forces might only make matters worse; yet to expect local regimes to call for US military assistance also seems unlikely. Clearly, the best alternative in these circumstances would be for the local regimes to deal with the problem which, in turn, suggests that it is very much in US interests to ensure that countries such as Saudi Arabia are able to protect oil fields. Yet, to expect them to be able to undertake some tasks, e.g., mine sweeping, is unrealistic at present, in which case the United States should have the capability to engage in such missions once the political circumstances so permit.

Three Contingencies

In order to bring some focus to the discussion so far, the US forces required for three general types of contingencies will be examined. When appropriate, Soviet requirements will also be mentioned. The three contingencies are presence and peacekeeping missions, the protection of oil facilities and transit routes, and major conflict involving US and Soviet forces.

Presence and Peacekeeping. The Case for a Maritime Presence. The situation in the Persian Gulf region today is one that clearly calls for some presence and peacekeeping capabilities by the United States. Yet, translating this into force requirements is not easy since, as discussed above, any analysis must involve assumptions about the political, as well as the military, realities of the region.

Given the great sensitivities of the local Middle East states to the charge that they are pawns of either imperialism or communism, the prospects are not high that the United States, or for that matter, the Soviet Union, will be able to establish a significant military

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presence in a Middle East country under "normal" periods of tension. Despite the close relationship among Syria, Iraq, and the Soviet Union, neither of these Arab countries has shown much desire to become catspaws of Soviet diplomacy. Similarly, Saudi Arabia, and even Israel, and Iran under the Shah, have at various times made it clear that American ground and tactical air forces would only be welcome in the event of a major confrontation, which would probably assume Soviet involvement.

It is appreciated by the local powers, especially those with a pro-Western leaning, that some American military commitment and presence may be desirable, even on a day-to-day basis. For this reason there has been talk of increasing the American maritime presence in the Indian Ocean region to enable the United States, in a crisis, to deploy limited air and amphibious forces against local adversaries and, in times of major conflict involving the Soviet Union, to establish a bridgehead and protect critical facilities pending the arrival of US ground and tactical forces. This capability would meet many of the needs for establishing a presence and a demonstrated commitment, without incurring the political costs of a land base. In short, the situation supports the classic arguments in favor of a carrier task force.

What are some of the issues at stake in establishing a more substantive maritime presence for low-intensity operations? The first question is from where are the ships to come? A buildup of naval vessels in the area would have to be made at the expense of other fleets in the US Navy, and this raises questions of tradeoffs between running down the Atlantic or Pacific fleets for periods of time for the sake of a greater Indian Ocean presence. Furthermore, given the geography and lack of infrastructure in the Indian Ocean, supporting a carrier task force in this area is much more difficult, even in peacetime, than supporting such forces in the Mediterranean or West Pacific. Although the United States has no bases in the northwest quadrant of the Indian Ocean, it has limited access to local ports such as Bahrain for fueling, but this access is inadequate, and politically insecure. The nearest "base" is the British island of Diego Garcia, over 2,300 nautical miles from the entrance to the Persian Gulf. Diego Garcia is a vital element in any major fleet operation in the area, but it is far from sufficient. Furthermore, without the support provided by the excellent facilities at Subic Bay in the Philippines, the United States would have to rely on a base in Japan or the continental United States to provide the necessary backup support for an Indian Ocean fleet, unless it could be assumed that the Suez route was secure, which is a doubtful assumption.

Thus, any increased deployment of US maritime power to the Indian Ocean raises questions of running down forces earmarked for contingencies elsewhere, and also reinforces the importance of Diego Garcia. This seems to rule out serious negotiations with the Russians on a "zone of peace" in the Indian Ocean, which might exchange Diego Garcia for a Soviet base on the Horn or similar area.

In thinking through the requirements for a greater maritime presence in the Indian Ocean, the United States must also assess its needs for maritime air capabilities, for without good airborne surveillance of the area, the effectiveness of fleet operations would be seriously diminished. F-3 reconnaissance aircraft can use Diego Garcia on a limited basis, but access to a land base on the Arabian peninsula would also be a preferred option. There has been speculation that Masirah, an island off the coast of Oman

It is interesting to recall how swiftly times have changed. Less than 3 years ago support for funds for Diego Garcia construction was in trouble in Congress, since the move was seen as inimicable to progress towards détente and zone of peace diplomacy. Yet the point all along has been that to discuss the Indian Ocean as a unique geographical area and not include the Southern Soviet Union made no sense strategically. Soviet aircraft flying out of southern bases of that country could overfly Iran and Afghanistan and attack targets in the northwest quadrant of the Persian Gulf with comparative ease.

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could be used for this purpose, as could the base at Daharan in Saudi Arabia. In terms of offensive air capabilities, there is a possibility of rotating B-52's out of Diego Garcia, although at the time of writing this would not be possible owing to restrictions on runway width and the absence of a major ordnance depot on the island. These deficiencies could be remedied, although proposals to put B-52's on Diego Garcia, however appealing from a military point of view, would create very unfavorable political shockwaves around the Indian Ocean littoral states. Under the Shah, the United States had limited access to Iranian airfields for operating P-3's, and presumably other types of aircraft in a time of crisis. At present, it is assumed that US aircraft do not use Bandar Abbas and the other excellent airfields that Iran has in the south.

Finally, if the case for a maritime presence is strong, then the case for greater investment in amphibious forces is also strong, all of which points to improving the long-run capabilities of the Marines to deploy into areas such as the Gulf.

The Protection of Oil Facilities and Transit Routes It is argued here that the only circumstances under which the Soviet Union might be tempted to attack with the intent of destroying Middle East oil fields would be in the course of a general war. However, the military requirements for such attack and the options for defense against attack need to be mentioned in view of this possibility and the fact that the oil fields would also be vulnerable to terrorist attacks or in a local war not involving the Soviet Union.

Oil from the Middle East is vulnerable to military attack at various points in the flow cycle from oilhead to final terminals in Europe, North America, and Japan. The oil wells themselves provide a cluster of obvious targets, as do the collecting systems which bring the oil from the fields to the local terminal facilities. The collecting system is made up of pumps and pipes. The local terminal facilities usually contain oil-gas separation plants, local refineries, storage tanks and, most important, loading facilities for pumping oil onto tankers. The third stage of the cycle is the trans-shipment of oil, either by pipeline or tanker, to destinations outside the Gulf area itself. These pipelines and tankers are also vulnerable to attack.

Without going into detail, the following points can be made. All elements of the oil-flow cycle are vulnerable, but the most important targets are the oil terminals, since it is at these points that the oil from various fields is collected into one place for trans-shipment. In the case of Saudi Arabia, the most important local terminal is Ras Tanura, whereas in Iran, it is a Khark Island. These facilities are more important than the oil fields themselves, which present a great number of targets and, for that reason, have much greater redundancy. Similarly, once the oil has been loaded onto tankers, the number of targets increases and the potential for loss from attacks declines.

The most likely way these oil facilities would be attacked is either by sabotage or air attack for the facilities on land, and by air or naval interdiction for the tankers at sea. The land facilities can be defended either by ground forces and surface-to-air missiles or by air-defense fighters or, in the case of sea interdiction, by convoys, patrols, and minesweeping. With regard to Persian-Gulf oil, by far the most vulnerable stage of the cycle is within the Gulf itself. Once tankers have proceeded beyond the Straits of Hormuz, the threat from interdiction diminishes rapidly, for while the Soviet Union, or any power for that matter, could sink a few tankers in the early days of a conflict, to sink enough to seriously interfere with Western supplies would require a major commitment. At present, neither the Soviet Union nor the littoral states have the staying power to do this with ships and submarines and, once out of the Gulf, the tankers are soon out of range of Soviet naval aircraft. Thus, protection of the oil sea lanes outside the Gulf is a feasible mission for the Western powers, provided the Soviet Union has no major base outside its

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own borders. However, if the Soviet Union were to establish facilities in Southern Africa, Western Africa, or the Horn, this would pose a much greater threat in the future.

The facilities and transit routes in the Gulf itself cannot be totally protected. However, the level of damage that local powers and the Soviet Union can inflict would be very dependent upon the level of intensity of the campaign. It is easy to disrupt oil fields and facilities temporarily but it is less easy to destroy them and keep the production of oil down systematically. Furthermore, the Western countries are capable, given local land support, of raising the costs of such a campaign. An air defense would take a toll on systematic interdictions, and good ground patrols can cut down on sabotage operations. It is essential, however, that the West have adequate numbers of trained personnel capable of repairing damaged oil facilities. Facilities need not be returned to pre-attack condition, but only repaired enough to get out the oil.

Similarly, a few mines could stop traffic through the Straits of Hormuz in the short run. However, unless the adversary could sustain a mine-laying campaign, the Straits which are quite wide and deep could be cleared, provided, of course, the West has adequate minesweeping capabilities in the region, which it presently does not have.

Major Conflict Involving Soviet Forces. The ability of the United States and its friends and allies to counter direct Soviet military involvement in the Middle East-Persian Gulf region is highly sensitive to the assumptions made about (a) the behavior of local countries, and (b) the geographical location of the confrontation. For instance, if it were possible to imagine a united Western military effort that included cooperation from Israel, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Oman, and other friendly local forces, and if it were assumed that Turkey were still a well-armed and dedicated member of NATO, then the balance of forces, together with the forward basing and logistical support that this grouping of countries could bring to bear, would be formidable. Whether such an effort would be sufficient to prevent the Soviet Union from using military power would depend on the area in the Middle East being contested. The defense of northern Iran from Soviet attack would be much more difficult to mount than the defense of Israel or Egypt. Another assumption relates to the purpose of military force. If its purpose were to deter Soviet military activity, then the requirement would be to raise the costs to the Soviet Union of achieving victory so that it would desist from such actions in the first place. However, if the purpose were to defeat a Soviet attack and protect Western oil supplies, then a different capability would be necessary.

With these conditions in mind, what can be said about the US-Soviet balance of military power in the Middle East-Persian Gulf region? The first point is that, at the time of writing, neither the United States nor the Soviet Union has a permanent military base in the region at which American and Soviet ground and tactical air forces are stationed. Both countries have military missions in several Middle East countries, and both countries have deployed naval forces to the eastern Mediterranean and the northwest quadrant of the Indian Ocean. Second, both sides have some military access to local countries. Depending upon the circumstances, the United States can probably use facilities in Turkey, Israel, Saudi Arabia, and possibly Oman. Again, depending upon the circumstances, the Soviet Union could possibly use Syria, Iraq, and Ethiopia, as well as Afghanistan and Libya, for forward deployments. At this time, Iran is supposedly neutral which, in practical military terms, represents a major setback for the United States, since it can be assumed that the Shah would have permitted Iran to be used by American forces if a major Soviet threat were in the offing.

With regard to forces in being, neither side has major alert forces committed for a Middle East-Persian Gulf contingency. Both sides have some forces which could be

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rapidly deployed to the area, but the high-readiness forces are not necessarily the best suited for local conditions. For instance, the United States 82d and 101st Airborne Divisions, although able to deploy quickly, are not capable of fighting against a well-armed opponent since they have no heavy equipment and very limited logistics support. Similarly, the Soviet divisions stationed in the Transcaucasus and Turkmen military districts are not at Category 1 state of readiness. Both the United States and the Soviet Union could deploy tactical fighter wings to the area from bases in Europe and southern Russia, but whether the ground facilities would be sufficient to provide the necessary bed-down and support facilities is highly dependent upon particular cases. Both the United States and the Soviet naval forces have adequate support for the eastern Mediterranean, but their carrier groups in the south Arabian Sea face horrendous logistical support problems if anything more than a "presence" mission is envisaged.

These general points aside, what sorts of military operations could the United States and Soviet Union carry out in the area based on current strengths? Insofar as commitments are known, the only serious obligations the United States currently has in the area are in Turkey and Israel, although it can be assumed the United States also may have an interest in the defense of Egypt, Iran, and Saudi Arabia.

The Defense of Israel and Egypt Leaving aside Turkey in view of its NATO membership, it could be said that the United States has a credible capability to help Israel for three reasons: geography, Israel's own military capabilities, and the availability of good infrastructure in Israel itself. In terms of geography, although Israel is at the end of the Mediterranean and over 6,000 miles from the continental United States, it is within non-stop range of US military transport aircraft, which can be refueled from the United States itself. If landing rights in Portugal, Spain, and Italy are permitted, it would increase the deliverable payload permission, but such stops are no longer essential. Similarly, the sea lines of communication to Israel from the continental United States are relatively protected, unless one can imagine a future blockade of the Straits of Gibraltar. United States and Israeli ships using the Mediterranean would be vulnerable to local or Soviet interdiction. If the United States still has a carrier task force in the area, this force would be given a great deal of protection against Soviet attacks and would probably be sufficient to deal with any threats from, say, Libya.

Since Israeli forces are so superior to any combination of local Arab forces, including Egypt, and will be for at least the next 5 years and probably longer, it has to be assumed that the United States would only need to physically intervene with military forces—as distinct from resupply operations—if the Soviet Union were assisting the Arabs. On the further assumption that the Soviet Union would not risk the use of nuclear weapons, the threats would be from the Soviet Navy based in the eastern Mediterranean and from Soviet ground and tactical air forces that could be introduced into an Arab country, such as Syria. Provided the United States was prepared to attack Soviet forces on Arab bases, the combined forces of Israel and the United States, together with the ultimate risks of escalation, would probably be sufficient to deter the Soviet Union from a major military initiative; thus, the most likely outcome of the introduction of US troops would be to compel the two superpowers to negotiate a ceasefire and eventual settlement. Since the basic rationale for the use of US forces would be to prevent the destruction of Israel, it could be seen that such an outcome would be satisfactory, considering the alternatives. It would further suggest that at present Israel has little cause for concern with regard to possible physical destruction, as distinct from political defeat, in a future Arab-Israeli war.

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Many of the same arguments apply in the case of the US commitment to Egypt. Assuming Israel was prepared to offer facilities to the United States in event of a war between Egypt and, say, Soviet-supported Libya, the combination of geography, force levels, and infrastructure should provide the United States and Egypt with an advantage over the Soviet Union and its possible allies.

The Defense of Iran. The ease with which the Soviet Union overran northern Iran in 1941 could be repeated. Even under the Shah, when the Iranian armed forces were more disciplined, defense against a Russian attack would have been no more than a holding operation. Yet, the irony is that a plausible defense of Iran might be possible provided there were enough lead-time to reconfigure, re-equip, and retrain the Iranian forces and establish an infrastructure for deploying American forces.

Leaving aside the political credibility of such options, it should be noted that the terrain of northern Iran provides a formidable barrier. This terrain could, in theory, be exploited to slow down the rate of a Soviet advance, and thereby raise the cost of a Soviet victory, perhaps to the point of deterring an attack in the first place. This would require troops well trained in mountain warfare and prepared to engage in sabotage missions along the vulnerable lines of communication. It would also require a rear zone, with more conventionally equipped forces which would be capable of rapid mobility to prevent Soviet out-flanking maneuvers—for example, airborne forces to capture airfields and key road junctions in northern Iran.

It can be argued that the equipment required for such operations need not involve the extremely high technology systems of which the Shah was so fond. The most basic need is not for tanks and fourth-generation jets, but for an army that is prepared to fight.

The Defense of Saudi Arabia. Equally contentious is the defense of Saudi Arabia, about which there has been considerable speculation since the fall of the Shah. How protectable is Saudi Arabia, and what is the difference between protecting a regime and protecting the oil? Again geography, local capabilities, and infrastructure are three very important factors which the intervening force, whether for offense or defense, must take into account. Geographically, Saudi Arabia is vulnerable on account of its large size, small population, and hostile, or potentially hostile, neighbors, which include South Yemen and Iraq. For the future it cannot be assumed that North Yemen and Oman will remain friendly, especially if the rebellion in the southern province of Dhofar were to succeed. Although Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates presently have relatively stable pro-Saudi governments, the political turmoil in the Gulf has made long-range predictions a hazardous process.

In geographical terms, the most important targets in Saudi Arabia, namely, the oil fields, are located far from the Yemens but relatively close to Kuwait, Iraq, and the United Arab Emirates. Thus, military hostilities coming from the former countries pose less of a direct threat than military hostilities coming from the latter countries. However, in view of the potential vulnerabilities of the Saudi regime, it should be appreciated that military threats to the integrity of Saudi Arabia, no matter how irrelevant in military or economic terms, could have major political significance for the future of the country.

With this in mind, the strengths and weaknesses of the Saudi armed forces must be understood, both in the context of the political vulnerability of the regime and the potential military threats that face the country. Unless the Saudi armed forces can deter, and if necessary defeat, minor powers such as South Yemen, the creditability of the regime would be seriously weakened. In this regard it is probably more important for the armed forces to be able to quickly and decisively respond to minor incursions than to fly F-15 jets. There is little the Saudi Arabian armed forces can do in the foreseeable future.

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against sophisticated opposition such as the Soviet Union or Israel except raise the costs of admission. In the case of Israel, this could have some importance in the event Israel were embroiled in a conflict with all its Arab neighbors. In the event of an Iraqi attack, the Saudis would also be hard pressed unless active American participation was in process.

The third element influencing the effectiveness of outside forces is the local infrastructure and support facilities. In this category, the United States has clear advantages over the Soviet Union, since US engineers have virtually designed and built Saudi Arabia and increasing numbers of weapons in the Saudi inventory complement American systems. For instance, it would be much easier for the United States to establish a military presence in Saudi Arabia, perhaps by re-occupying the base at Dahanu, than for the Soviets to establish a base in that country.

All of the above factors are relevant, but are sensitive to the scenarios under which one envisages the use of US and Soviet military power in Saudi Arabia. For instance, it makes a great deal of difference whether or not the scenario assumes a Saudi plea for American help in anticipation of an external threat during a conflict or following a domestic insurrection or attempted coup d'etat. Similarly, from the Soviet standpoint, projecting forces into Saudi Arabia from established bases in Iraq at the behest of a radical Saudi successor regime, before any American presence in the area, is a much easier contingency than attacking Saudi Arabia with the United States already in position.

If the United States has time to build up a force with Saudi Arabian help, it would probably be sufficient to send token ground forces, several tactical air wings, and some specialized forces for oil-field protection. However, if the United States has to fight its way into Saudi Arabia against an established force equipped with heavy armor, the tasks would be formidable and probably could not be accomplished with present forces, unless major help from local countries, such as Israel and Egypt, were forthcoming.

The fundamental point to make is that there is an enormous difference between dispatching a token force for purposes of presence and peacekeeping, and dispatching a war-fighting force equipped, climatized, and with enough logistical support to conduct major operations in desert warfare.

US-Soviet Maritime Balance. While it may be possible to operate a major US fleet in the Indian Ocean in peacetime by straining all of the support facilities in the Pacific, this is very different from having the ability to conduct high tempo maintenance operations against a sophisticated adversary. Now that the Soviet Union has also sent a carrier force through the area, a force which, incidentally, faces very similar if not worse logistical problems than those facing the United States, two additional points become clear. First, the precarious state of US-Soviet maritime forces in the Indian Ocean gives rise to speculation that the rules of engagement that might be used in the event of a US-Soviet confrontation in the area are critical factors which would help determine the outcome. Second, the geographical problem of resupply dramatically highlights the importance of Iranian real estate in determining the ultimate balance of power in the area.

Iran is the key to maritime as well as land power in the Persian Gulf because of its borders with the Soviet Union and its commanding strategic position vis-a-vis the Persian Gulf. In crude military terms, if the Soviet Union were to invade and occupy Iran and had ready access to Iranian ports and airfields at the head of the Gulf and at Bandar Abbas and Chah Bahar, it would radically alter the balance of both land and sea power in the region. The Soviet Union's great maritime vulnerability in the Indian Ocean, namely, its lack of infrastructure and support facilities, would be eased and its ability to project land-based maritime power against US forces would be greatly improved. It is this possibility

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that makes the notion of an Indian Ocean arms control agreement with the Soviet Union so difficult to understand in strategic terms. The land mass of southern Asia is part of the Indian Ocean strategic theater, and by excluding Soviet military options on the land mass, the Soviet Union is given enormous advantages in a future confrontation. This leads to the conclusion that, in analyzing the maritime balance of power in the Indian Ocean, careful attention must be paid to the ability of the US and the USSR fleets and maritime air units to make use of land facilities for both operations and maintenance.

CONCLUSIONS

The range of military threats to US and Western interests in the Middle East-Persian Gulf area covers a wide spectrum from terrorist attacks against oil to Soviet invasion in a general war. Aside from military weaknesses, the Western powers are extremely vulnerable to political intimidation involving the use of force. In the absence of a united Western policy toward Middle East oil supplies, no consensus can be expected concerning the appropriate role for US military power in the region. Yet, the United States must, in the last resort, look after its own interests and, in this case, assume that decisions to use or not use force in the region will have to be unilateral ones.

The ability of the United States to respond with military power to defend its interests in the Middle East-Persian Gulf region varies dramatically according to the scenario. For this reason alone, it is unwise to try to configure a US limited-contingency or intervention force for specific missions in specific areas. The force should be capable of a wide range of missions in different theaters and it should have the maximum flexibility to operate in a global context. As long as the United States has global interests, an intervention force of this type will be necessary, irrespective of the changes that occur within particular regions.

The United States is presently assembling the military forces necessary to conduct low intensity operations in the Persian Gulf region, which will presumably be achieved without any major increase in the overall size of the armed forces. However, in order to be able to meet "worse" case contingencies while sustaining commitments elsewhere, an overall increase in the defense budget will be necessary. The range of threats in the region, including possible Soviet intervention, suggests that the United States must be capable of conducting high-intensity operations which will require the use of maritime forces including amphibious forces, heavy ground forces, and tactical fighter forces capable of air defense and deep interdiction. This, in turn, will require that great emphasis be given to the support requirements for such forces, including local infrastructure and logistics. In this regard, the cooperation of friendly local countries such as Israel and Saudi Arabia would be an extremely important element in the overall strategy. The support requirements also point to the necessity of the Diego Garcia base and the need to exclude the base from any new Indian Ocean Zone of Peace negotiations.

PANEL 2 PAPER:

Political and Military Dimensions of the African Problem, 1980-2000

Clark A. Murdock

Most efforts at predicting the course of events in sub-Saharan Africa begin with more or less elaborate disclaimers which cite the hazards of prophecy in an area experiencing such rapid change, often in directions diametrically opposed to past trends. This paper is certainly no exception. Yet the normal difficulties of prognostication are further compounded by the lack of consensus among observers about the meaning of recent events in sub-Saharan Africa; a recent issue of the *AFI Foreign Policy and Defense Review* presents six distinct and contrasting viewpoints on US policy options toward Africa.¹ The range of disagreement on issues such as Soviet objectives in Africa, the enduring nature of African nationalism, and the possibility of evolutionary change in South Africa is immense. This uncertainty over interpretation of events makes any projection about future trends or possibilities even more controversial.

This paper will begin, therefore, with a statement of my assumptions about the nature of the African context for US policy in the next decade or so. I will not engage in a spirited defense of my viewpoint, since such an effort would unduly lengthen this paper. Rather, I will provide a basis for an assessment of US interests in sub-Saharan Africa, an evaluation of current US policy and of the constraints on that policy, and finally, a review of some policy alternatives.

THE AFRICAN CONTEXT

Among the conflicting views about African politics, there is general agreement on one point: the African continent is unmatched in its geographic, economic, political, linguistic, and ethnic diversity.² For example, 57 languages are each spoken by at least 1 million people.³ Sub-Saharan Africa is one of the poorest regions of the world: 46 percent of its 270 million people (four-fifths of whom live in rural areas) live in poverty which is defined by the World Bank as a per capita income of less than \$75 in urban areas and \$50 in rural areas (in 1969 dollars).⁴ In addition to the problems stemming from economic deprivation, sub-Saharan Africa must also grapple with the political instability resulting from rapid decolonization. As Bruce Palmer, Jr. has observed:

Prior to 1957, only four independent states existed in Africa south of the Sahara: Ethiopia, Liberia, Sudan, and South Africa. In just a little over ten years, thirty-two more sovereign, independent states were created on the continent, with four more following in the 1970s. No comparable political transformation in such a compressed period of time has ever occurred before in the history of the world. Significantly, the boundaries of these new states, except in a few minor instances, are the same as those of the pre-independence colonial territory.

The combination of inherited national borders, diversified ethnic and cultural groups, and unaccustomed sovereignty makes for general political instability; the struggle for power will remain a dominant feature of the African context for years. Colin Leys uses the example of Nigeria to illustrate the enormous complexities of nation-building in Africa:

There one finds small communities that still cling tenaciously to their traditional systems, tribes that resist becoming integrated into national structures, and national groups, such as the Hausa-Fulani, numbering

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perhaps 20 million), the Yorubas (numbering about 12 million), and Ibos (about 8 million). The clans and tribes see themselves as minorities defending their separate interests against the dominant national groups, while at the same time engaging in local rivalries for power and influence in their own area. For their part, national entities have sought in the past to dominate the minorities living in their midst while also engaging in raw competition for central power with each other. Only if one sees the reality of Nigeria as a complex multinational state including a considerable number of minorities is it possible to evaluate the difficulties the country has experienced since its independence in evolving a workable federal constitution.

Legum goes on to stress "the transitory nature of virtually all the present regimes in Africa," to note that regime changes frequently bring radical shifts in a country's international orientation, and to conclude that this "*fluidity in Third World political directions is likely to remain a dominant reality in future international relations.*" (Italics in original)

Sub-Saharan political instability involves more than simple power struggles or ethnic separatist movements within states. There is also the prospect of continued interstate conflict over a number of issues, including unresolved ethnic/border disputes (such as that between Somalia, Ethiopia, and Kenya) and the possibility of attempts by external actors to affect internal power struggles (such as Zaire's support for movements within Angola or Tanzania's role in the fall of Amin). There are no shortages of local conflicts, both intrastate and interstate, and thus there are a plenitude of actors who are seeking help in their local struggles. Furthermore, with a few notable exceptions, a little external intervention can go a long way. Most sub-Saharan states are so militarily vulnerable that relatively small levels of external support can prevent resolution of national power struggles (for example, Libya's activities in Chad or Sudan, and Angola's and Zaire's support of liberation forces within each other's countries). Alternatively, a relatively large intervention can be definitive (for example, Soviet-Cuban support of the People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) in Angola and Ethiopia in the Horn of Africa, and Tanzania's invasion of Uganda).

There is a potentially significant role for external actors in local conflicts, and such external intervention is prevented only by an actor's assessment of the risks, costs, and benefits that attend each particular case. Collective security arrangements such as the United Nations (UN) or the Organization of African Unity (OAU) have simply failed to deter the internationalization of local conflicts--in fact, at the OAU summit meeting in July 1978, a resolution was unanimously accepted enabling any OAU member to call for foreign assistance in self defense. This prospect of continued political instability, in conjunction with an absence of disincentives to external intervention, is combined with two other principal facets (in addition to economic development issues) of the African context that create such perplexing problems for US foreign policymakers--the purpose of Soviet activities in Africa and the question of white rule in southern Africa.

The Soviet "Threat"

An analyst's position on the meaning of Soviet activities in Africa often determines his or her general stance with respect to US policy toward Africa. That the Soviet Union and Cuba have been active in Africa is scarcely open to question. It is estimated that there are in Africa 3,000 Soviet advisers, 3,000 East German advisers, and 40,000 Cuban soldiers and advisers--largely in Angola and Ethiopia, but also in a number of other states such as Mozambique and Tanzania. The increased militarization of African conflicts is reflected in the rapid growth of arms transfers to the area (over three times what they were in 1975) and in the increased Soviet role in these transfers (Soviet shipments went from less than a third to about half the total). From January 1977 to June 1978, the

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Soviet Union delivered \$1.3 billion worth of military equipment to sub-Saharan Africa, while Western Europe accounted for another \$400 million, and the United States for \$100 million.¹ What this activity means, however, is subject to considerable controversy. For convenience, the positions can be characterized as follows:

- **Grand Design**—The Soviet Union is pursuing its "historic, single-minded campaign to achieve world dominion for Soviet-led communism and . . . it intends to be able to use any and all means at its disposal to gain that end."¹⁰
- **Opportunism**—The Soviet Union will take advantage of opportunities to further its national interests and it defines its interests in much the same manner as any other state, including the United States.
- **Altruism**—Soviet-Cuban activities in sub-Saharan Africa are largely in response to the legitimate pleas for assistance either from the forces of social change, such as the MPLA or Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU), or from those under attack, such as Somalia.
- **Doesn't Matter**—African nationalism, as an enduring force, will ensure that the Soviet Union will reap no long-term benefits, regardless of Soviet motivation (Africa as the Soviet Union's Vietnam).

The policy stances associated with these caricatures would range from indiscriminate opposition to each Soviet move, judicious engagement of the Soviet Union (if US interests are "vital"), promotion of social justice in Africa (so as to obviate the need for Soviet assistance) and benign neglect (ignore Soviet advances, since they yield only temporary gains; remain unengaged in African conflicts).

My own interpretation falls somewhere between Opportunism and Grand Design. Soviet notions of security appear excessive, as Dimitri K. Simes has pointed out, the "Soviet Union cannot conceivably satisfy its ambition to be immune from foreign threats, both real and imagined, without gaining a decisive preponderance over its potential opponents."¹¹ The continuing Soviet military buildup—perhaps stemming from paranoid notions of security—has also greatly increased Soviet capabilities for the global projection of power, a capability that is being used with increasing frequency in sub-Saharan Africa. I would agree with George E. Hudson's contention that Soviet purposes in Africa would appear to be partly geopolitical, that is, the Soviet Union's desire for facilities in the littoral states of Africa stem from the geopolitical strategic bent of Soviet global policy.¹² I also find considerable validity in the argument that from the American viewpoint, it doesn't matter very much whether it is Opportunism or Grand Design driving the Soviet Union; in the absence of countervailing pressures, the Soviet Union's predisposition to view local conflicts through superpower glasses and to see East-West conflicts as zero-sum games, render arguments about the ideological component of Soviet foreign policy somewhat moot.¹³ The extent to which the Soviet Union is cautious and seeks to avoid direct confrontation with the West (as well as negotiate arms and trade agreements) does not erase the impression that, as Simes puts it, the "Soviet Union is developing the mode of behavior of a rising superpower, and a brutal and pushy one at that."¹⁴ As for the "Doesn't Matter" approach outlined above, I take little comfort in past Soviet failures in Africa, for those failures are not a guarantee for the future and, as will be discussed shortly, it does matter, there are US interests at stake in Africa south of the Sahara.

Southern Africa

The southern African issue dominates US policy toward sub-Saharan Africa. Black Africa's view of the United States and domestic political support for US policy toward sub-Saharan Africa are heavily influenced by US-southern African relations. These

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aspects will be discussed extensively later; but at this time it is appropriate to state in a summary fashion expectations about the future course of events in southern Africa—assuming no great changes in non-African actor activity.

Until quite recently, many observers predicted the early demise of white rule in southern Africa. The sudden collapse of Portuguese rule in Angola and Mozambique led many to see an acceleration of events—Kissinger's foray into southern African politics in 1976 occurred in the context of widespread expectations of the imminent collapse of the Smith regime under mounting pressure from black nationalist forces.¹⁷ Yet 3 years later, Zimbabwe-Rhodesia, with a black Prime Minister and a white-dominated social and political system, faces the prospect of a protracted, ever more costly war (casualty and white emigration rates for 1979 were approximately double those rates for 1978). Given the present level of opposing forces, a resolution of the conflict appears remote. South Africa appears to have turned its back on processes of peaceful change: declaring a "total lack of confidence" in the West, Prime Minister Botha has rejected current Western proposals for Rhodesia and Namibia as offering only "self-destruction" to whites and to moderates and has announced intentions to form a "constellation" of southern African states which will provide for its own "mutual defense."¹⁸ In effect moving its line of defense back to the Zambesi River, South Africa may well ensure the survival of Zimbabwe-Rhodesia for a number of years.

As for the prospects of peaceful change within South Africa itself, these appear minimal as well. In May 1979, the South African Government announced its intention to accept commission recommendations for widespread changes in black union rights, job discrimination laws, and the pass laws. But by the time legislation was actually introduced, white opposition to the proposals had drastically reduced their impact on apartheid (for example, black "migrants," who compose a third of the black labor force, were excluded from all labor organizations and racially-mixed labor unions were permitted only at the discretion of the Minister of Labor).¹⁹ With an increasingly militarized society, the South African regime appears quite capable of prevailing over all foreseeable external and internal threats. In short, white rule in southern Africa will not simply melt away.

The African Context—A Summary

In conclusion, the context within which US policy toward sub-Saharan Africa will be formed combines continued economic deprivation, political instability, and military vulnerability. In the absence of any effective collective security arrangements, this means that there will be numerous local conflicts, any of which may be internationalized by regional or global powers. Since the Soviet Union has achieved strategic parity and has increasing capabilities for projecting power throughout the world, the Russians will continue supporting the "inevitable forces of historical change." White rule will persist largely unchanged in South Africa because the magnitude of external support necessary to forcibly end white rule in South Africa carries far greater risks and costs than either of the superpowers wish to accept (for the Soviet Union, the risks of direct East-West conflict, for the United States, international and domestic political costs). This is scarcely a comfortable milieu for the promotion of US interests, the nature of which we will now consider.

US INTERESTS IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA¹⁸

Any effort by either of our nations to exploit the turbulence that exists in various parts of the world pushes us toward that road [of competition], even

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confrontation]. The US can and will protect its vital interests if this becomes the route we must follow.

Carter to Breshnev at the SALT II Summit¹⁹

What are US interests in sub-Saharan Africa? The answer to this question—as with questions about Soviet motivation or the future of white rule in southern Africa—figures prominently in both academic and partisan debate on the proper US role in Africa. Radicals and conservatives alike want to demonstrate that the United States has “hard” or “real” interests in Africa so they can demonstrate why the United States often frustrates popular aspirations in preventing the Communists from taking power. Much of this debate occurs because US interests in sub-Saharan Africa are of small import relative to US interests elsewhere in the world. Thus, it would not be credible for a US spokesman to state US interests in South Africa in the same manner as did former British Foreign Secretary Owen:

Our economic links with South Africa could not disappear overnight without causing grave dislocation to the domestic economy and having severe repercussions on the level of employment. We are living in a real world and this is a harsh fact which we have to take into account.²⁰

US interests in Africa are much more ambiguous than are those of Great Britain and to a great extent the debate over their significance has become sterile.

What is important is how policymakers perceive these interests and this is a subjective judgment that changes with the political context within which that judgment is made. The “fact” that the United States imports 90 percent of its chromium from South Africa, but has a 3-year supply stockpiled, means different things at different times; if anxiety grows because of extensive Cuban involvement in Angola, the United States suddenly finds it has vital interests that it must protect. That is not to say there are no countries or regions in which we have “real” interests, for the oil embargo has ended that illusion forever. Rather, it is to argue that in those areas where US interests are relatively marginal in comparison to all of our interests, the perception that the United States has a “vital interest” is a highly subjective one. It is a judgment that not only varies with the values of the observer but also varies for the same observer as the political context changes.

William Foltz begins his argument that the United States does not have “vital interests” in southern Africa with an interesting definition:

Such interests could be considered vital for two reasons: first, they may be of such real and compelling importance that no prudent policymaker could neglect to take them into account; second, they may be so important to the electorate at large or to certain politically powerful individuals and institutions that, without them, the continuity of an administration or its ability to carry out a coherent foreign policy would be jeopardized.²¹

This is a useful approach since it emphasizes the subjectivity of judgment (what a prudent policymaker would perceive) and the impact of domestic political factors, which may create a vital interest that the policymaker must pursue if he wants to maintain power. The importance of these two factors—particularly the impact of domestic political factors—will become clear in the following analysis of US economic, strategic, and political interests in Africa south of the Sahara.

Economic Interests

The current debate within the United States over energy supplies and US vulnerability to OPEC price increases, not to mention embargoes, has sensitized Americans to US dependencies on raw material imports—a sensitivity no doubt intensified by waiting in line for gasoline. Yet, the United States depends on imports for only

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15 percent of its total consumption of raw materials (about 50 percent of its petroleum consumption) while Europe imports 75 percent, and Japan 90 percent of their total consumption.²² Nevertheless, for the foreseeable future, the United States will be dependent upon raw material imports, many of which come from sub-Saharan Africa. Table 1 portrays US production stockpiles, and import dependence for selected raw materials. It is apparent that sub-Saharan Africa is an important source of certain critical raw materials. To put these figures in a broader context, US imports from sub-Saharan Africa represent approximately 7 percent of total imports (US direct foreign investment is less than 5 percent). United States trade with Black African countries has been growing far more rapidly than with South Africa—in 1977, US-Nigerian trade reached \$7 billion (most of that US oil imports), three times the total US-South African trade.²³

The political meaning of these statistics is far from clear. As I have argued elsewhere, the economic vulnerability of a nation with respect to any economic dependency is a highly complex question because, assuming a bilateral relationship, the actual vulnerability depends upon the opportunity costs involved for each party in breaking that relationship.²⁴ Certainly the United States would have a vital economic interest in South Africa if it were denied access to all South African minerals for 5 years, in the short run, because of stockpile inventories, alternative sources or substitutions, there is nothing, besides perhaps oil, to which we are greatly sensitive.

Debates about US vital economic interests always assume the validity of a complete denial scenario without economic retaliation—in the same fashion that some geopoliticians assume an interdiction of oil routes without that action being subsumed in a far greater conflict. The simple truth is that the size of the US market is so huge—and is so necessary to most states—that need for access to US markets renders most denial scenarios implausible (again with the possible exception of oil). In addition, as Foltz pithily points out (recent Nigerian threats about "appropriate actions" in response to any US or UK lifting of Rhodesian sanctions, to the contrary):

In thinking about the long term, one historic precedent is unambiguous: so far, at least, no regime anywhere in Africa, of any ideological or demagogical pigmentation, has refused to sell the United States any valuable mineral it produces when offered something like the going international commodity price.²⁵

The argument that radical states, even if they will not deny supplies, are more likely than conservative pro-Western states to engage in price-gouging loses credibility when one examines various national pricing policies with respect to petroleum or uranium. It is also unquestionable that American politicians and business leaders have become far more sophisticated about the necessity of having capitalist societies with which to trade—one needs only look at Gulf Oil's actions during the Angolan civil war or note that Gulf Oil facilities (which provide over 80 percent of Angola's foreign exchange) are currently protected by Cuban forces.

The foregoing is not to argue that there are no corporations (with interests, say, in southern Africa) which will attempt to affect US policies toward the region—witness the role of Union Carbide in passing the Byrd Amendment. It is to argue that there is no corporation that either cares enough (those with the largest investments in South Africa have less than 1 percent of their gross assets there) or is powerful enough to compel a US policymaker to pursue some "vital" interest. Public concern about our economic interests in sub-Saharan Africa will arise not out of the intrinsic merit of these interests, but rather as part of a political clamor stemming from other sources. In other words, rhetoric about US economic vulnerability will certainly be prevalent anytime African issues become salient, but their saliency will stem from political not economic concerns.

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Table 1. US Production, Stockpiles and Import Dependence for Selected Raw Materials (1975)

Raw Material	Domestic Primary Prod. as % Primary Demand ¹				Stockpile Inventories ² (months' consump.)			Import Dependence ³	
	1965	1974	1985	2000	US Govt	Private	% Import	Major African Sources	
Antimony	10	6	5	5	none	8	56	So. Africa (22%)	
Bauxite	13	8	6	10	7	3	85	Guinea (16%)	
Chromium	0	0	0	0	26	8	91	So. Africa (24%); Rhodesia (12%)	
Cobalt	8	0	48	93	30	1	98	Zaire (37%); Belgium (22%); also from Zaire	
Manganese	6	2	2	0	39	20	99	Gabon (32%); So. Africa (12%)	
Petroleum	78	63	44	27	none	2	35	Nigeria (17%); Algeria (7%); Libya (6%)	
Platinum	3	1	1	1	10	6	80	So. Africa (68%); UK (27%); also from S.A.	
Vanadium	85	64	59	26	1	4	36	South Africa (59%)	

¹ US Bureau of Mines, *Mineral Facts and Problems*, 1975.

² CBO, *US Raw Materials Policy: Problems and Possible Solutions*, US Bureau of Mines, *Minerals Materials: A Monthly Survey*, May 1977, *Minerals Yearbook*, 1974.

³ US Bureau of Mines, *Minerals and Materials: A Monthly Survey*, September 1976; Department of Commerce, *US Imports for Consumption and General Imports*.

Source: Adapted from Gordon Bertoin, "US Economic Interests in Africa: Investment, Trade and Raw Materials," in Whitaker, ed., *Africa and the United States: Vital Interests* (New York: New York University Press 1978), pp. 39-41.

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Strategic Interests

Analysts tend to group US strategic interests in sub-Saharan Africa into two general categories:

Geostrategic—Given global wartime scenarios (or as Geoffrey Kemp laconically says, "in the event of a major war with the Soviet Union"²⁷), sub-Saharan Africa is militarily important because of its proximity to theaters in the South Atlantic and the Indian Ocean—both of which play increasing roles in the deployment of US SLBM's. Nonnuclear wartime scenarios are essentially World War II analogies—need for ports, overland routes, etc.

Economic Security—In the context of the West's huge dependency on oil from the Middle-East, sub-Saharan Africa's proximity to two of the world's greatest "choke-points" (Red Sea/Gulf of Aden and the Cape of Good Hope) provides bases for the interdiction of the oil routes.

If one can accept the plausibility of scenarios which assume that in a global conflict interruption of oil supplies or theater conflicts in the South Atlantic or Indian Ocean would not be engulfed in the world conflict, sub-Saharan Africa retains some military utility. Nevertheless, other credible options to sub-Saharan uses exist, for example, interdiction of the oil routes in the Straits of Hormuz rather than at the Cape of Good Hope.

The problem with these expressions of US interests in sub-Saharan Africa is that they are too extreme—as with the economic denial scenarios, geostrategic rationales (including the interdiction of oil) assume very unlikely contingencies. If World War III occurs, Africa, and facilities based in Africa, will have little impact on its resolution. The interruption of Western oil supplies is far more likely to stem from the political acts of oil suppliers than from the wartime acts of the Soviet Union. The only economic denial scenario that I find plausible is denial by self-destruction (the Iranian model) that internal turmoil renders a supplier of raw materials incapable of production. Given the great political instability of sub-Saharan Africa, one can envision such occurrences (for example, Zaire or South Africa engulfed in civil war), but even in the Iranian case (which, of course, is far from resolved) the interruption of oil supplies was fairly brief. Even these denial scenarios are fairly unlikely (particularly in terms of how long supplies will be denied) and do not by themselves give the United States "vital" strategic interests in Africa south of the Sahara—although all denial scenarios will inevitably color any public debate.

I would argue, however, that there may be world situations in which events in sub-Saharan Africa do have considerable strategic importance. If, for example, in the spring of 1978, at the height of the security anxieties about Soviet-Cuban activities in Africa there had been a significant Cuban involvement in the Rhodesian civil war, US failure to respond would have had strategic consequences. There is clearly merit to the argument that a nation's commitments are interdependent and that, in some situations, failure to maintain a commitment in an area where a nation does not have "vital" interests may very well damage that nation in areas where it does have important interests. Saudi Arabian complaints to the United States about the American failure to respond to Soviet-Cuban involvement in the Horn of Africa is a case in point—as is, of course, Carter's first exercise of the presidential authority to approve arms sales without congressional sanction in the arms shipments to North Yemen. But these kinds of strategic implications are not intrinsic to any one area or country but are characteristic of a world with global rivalries. If the Cubans, to take the hypothetical example above, had suddenly appeared in the Philippines or Iceland rather than Rhodesia, much the same kinds of security concerns would have arisen. The point is, there are times when events will combine in such a way as to create strategic interests for the United States in sub-Saharan Africa.

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Determining the global or strategic significance of local conflicts is extremely difficult—in fact, a predisposition to infuse local conflicts with global significance often distinguishes those who endorse the Grand Design model of Soviet behavior. These observers would argue that the coincidence of the Soviet friendship treaties with Ethiopia, Vietnam, and Afghanistan, of the conflict in the Horn of Africa, of the fall of Cambodia, and of the turmoil in Iran clearly point to a purposive and successful Soviet imperialism. They then note the friendship treaty with Angola and wait for the other shoe to drop. Regardless of the "objective" validity of the argument, there is no question that if enough political actors believe it, then it will be true—a self-fulfilling prophecy. The perception of US global security interests in sub-Saharan Africa is not simply a function of events in the region but is highly affected by domestic politics within the United States—an administration may be compelled to pursue strategic interests (that is, define them as "vital") because domestic political pressures leave no alternative.

Political Interests

I have argued above that while the United States does have economic and strategic interests in sub-Saharan Africa they are in themselves not "vital"—that is, as Foltz said, so "important either to the electorate at large or to certain politically powerful individuals and institutions that, without them, the continuity of an administration . . . would be jeopardized." But, as a brief review of events surrounding the second Shaba incident in May 1978 will indicate, in conjunction with domestic political concerns, the saliency of sub-Saharan African issues within the United States can increase very rapidly, thus creating "vital" interests. It should also be stressed that these same political interests are also constraints upon the United States—that is, the political factors which confer saliency to African issues also greatly inhibit US freedom of action to pursue those same interests. This becomes particularly true with Southern African issues.

The international political interests for the United States in sub-Saharan Africa do not themselves create significant incentives for involvement—after all, they are instrumentally linked to our economic and strategic interests—but rather present a dichotomous environment within which the United States must act. For virtually all Black African countries, US policy toward southern Africa is a critical factor in determining their attitude toward the United States. No Black African country has recognized the new regime in Zimbabwe-Rhodesia, nor, for that matter, the new "states" created by South Africa. There has been some saber-rattling on the part of Black African countries with respect to US and UK actions on lifting sanctions—the use of Nigeria's oil weapon (which was used against Ghana to protest the execution of former leaders by the regime led by Air Force Lieutenant Jerry Rawlings) and the threat of a number of countries to withdraw from the Commonwealth.

United States relations with Black Africa are adversely affected to the extent that the United States is perceived as supporting white rule in southern Africa. The same is true regarding US economic ties to South Africa and US refusal to support economic sanctions against South Africa. Yet this has not affected US trade relations with Black Africa. On the other hand, President Carter's policy toward sub-Saharan Africa is widely viewed by white regimes as inimical to their interests, but again has not affected their receptivity to economic ties with the United States. Nor has President Carter's policy appeared to win enduring support from Black Africa.¹⁰ Whether a policy that appears to satisfy neither blacks nor whites in Africa will continue to incur no significant economic costs remains to be seen—this is unlikely in the case of direct support for regimes such as Bishop Muzorewa's.

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In short, the political environment in sub-Saharan Africa is an extremely difficult one for the United States because the participants view it as a zero-sum game. The United States, on the other hand, wants "only" the peaceful resolution of local conflicts, but this may very well prove an impossible goal. The great danger for the United States is that events will combine with domestic political factors to compel greater American involvement—an involvement which will surely alienate irrevocably either blacks or whites in Africa.

The domestic political context for US policy toward sub-Saharan Africa is quite complex and has several conflicting elements. A number of surveys indicate that US public opinion is emerging from what is often described as "post-Vietnam isolationism."²⁹ Public support for a more active US role in international affairs has increased from 33 percent in favor in 1974 to 55 percent in favor in 1978. Public support for increased defense spending has increased from 13 percent in favor in 1974 to 32 percent in favor in 1978. (Public support for decreased defense spending dropped from 32 percent in favor in 1974 to 16 percent in favor in 1978.) Public support for US military intervention abroad to protect Western Europe increased from 39 percent in favor in 1974 to 54 percent in favor in 1978. At the same time, however, faith in US power had clearly dwindled: in 1978, majorities felt that the United States was becoming less important and powerful (44 percent) and was falling behind the Soviet Union (56 percent). In addition, the American people favored, as John E. Reilly observed, "a foreign policy of self-interest" in a ranking of "very important foreign policy goals," economic nationalism objectives—the value of the dollar (90 percent), adequate energy supplies (82 percent), and American jobs (81 percent);—these objectives clearly outdistanced more traditional objectives, such as controlling arms (70 percent), containing communism (64 percent), or protecting allies (54 percent).

Yet this desire for a more active, self-interested foreign policy is not matched by a willingness to accept the burdens associated with it—over two-thirds of the American people feel that the United States gives too much foreign aid, though there is a slim majority who favor foreign aid (46 percent to 41 percent), and military assistance is opposed by a two to one majority. In short, the American people seem to want more from US government activities abroad but are willing to pay less (with the exception of favoring more defense spending to redress the Soviet-American military balance).

Within this general context, public attitudes toward sub-Saharan Africa are quite perplexing. While giving US-African relations a low saliency (only 4 percent saw these relations as an "important foreign policy focus"), surprising numbers saw important stakes for the United States in a few countries: when asked to identify countries in which the United States had "vital interests," Saudi Arabia headed the list (80 percent) followed by, among others, Great Britain (66 percent), South Africa (63 percent), Rhodesia (49 percent), and Nigeria (42 percent). Even more revealing is the fact that 25 percent favored sending US troops if Rhodesia were invaded by Cuban forces supplied by the Soviet Union (as compared to 54 percent for the defense of Western Europe from a Soviet attack and 22 percent for the defense of Israel from an Arab attack). This impression of considerable latent support for the maintenance of white rule in southern Africa—or at least a reluctance to sacrifice white rule to black nationalists supported by the Soviet Union and Cuba—is further reinforced by the declining support for black majority rule in Africa. Kenneth Adelman argues that

the American public at large is marching in the opposite direction from its leaders. Harris polls reveal that the public supported by 62-12 percent "black majority" rule in southern Africa in May 1976 during the Ford Administration. By June 1977, after the Carter administration had been in office several months, such support had dwindled to 46-25 percent. In the most recent poll of August

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1977 when the Carter administration's initiatives were in full swing the American people opposed by 53-41 percent the President's policy of advocating that Rhodesian whites turn their government over to the black majority.

It would appear that as events progress in southern Africa, public support for an African policy that "tilts toward Pretoria" is clearly increasing. American politicians' awareness of this popular trend was evident in the US Senate's support for the unconditional lifting of sanctions against Zimbabwe-Rhodesia.

It is the explosive potential resulting from the interaction of the strategic and racial attitudes of Americans that creates vital political interests for the United States in sub-Saharan Africa. A worst-case scenario involves the juxtaposition of black-white conflict with East-West conflict: as Carter's National Security Advisor, Zbigniew Brzezinski is reported to have remarked late last year, the point of disaster comes "when white nuns being raped by black guerrillas wearing red stars on their armbands start appearing on nightly television news."³¹ This merging of a "racial conflict" with an "ideological conflict" could create compelling pressure on an American administration to intervene on behalf of white rule in southern Africa—an intervention that would greatly affect US relations with the Third World, with US allies, and with the Soviet Union. That this scenario is not entirely fanciful is illustrated by the Carter Administration's reaction to events in early 1978.

In late January 1978, reports surfaced that the Soviet Union had begun in late December 1977 a large-scale airlift of men and equipment into Ethiopia. In early February, President Carter warned the Soviet Union that its growing military involvement in the Horn of Africa jeopardized American-Soviet cooperation on other issues. According to the State Department, Mr. Carter was not adopting Kissinger's "linkage" policy (wherein progress or lack of it on one issue would affect progress on other issues), but was rather "stating the obvious" about the implications of Soviet involvement in Africa.³² In mid-February, Ethiopia counterattacked; Secretary Vance called for a Somali withdrawal, and charged that approximately two thousand Cubans were "actually involved in a combat role" and that additional forces were "probably on the way."³³ The Carter administration's concern mounted rapidly: on 24 February Brzezinski claimed that a Soviet General was directing portions of the Ethiopian attack and that 10,000 to 11,000 Cuban soldiers were in Ethiopia (State Department estimates were 8,000 to 10,000). Brzezinski's rhetoric was also distinctly stronger than that of the State Department: "This is clearly an external, foreign intrusion into a purely regional conflict."³⁴

The following day, the State Department, responding to Soviet Premier Brezhnev's charge that improved Soviet-American relations were "blocked by all kinds of obstacles" raised by the United States, replied that "it is evident that the character of our general relations also depends upon restraint and constructive efforts to help resolve local conflicts, such as the Horn of Africa."³⁵ Brzezinski, however, continued to make this point more strongly: "We are not imposing linkages, but linkages may be imposed by unwarranted exploitation of local conflict for larger international purposes."³⁶ President Carter's position appeared to waver somewhere in between: after outlining three "hopes" for the Horn of Africa (Somali withdrawal, reduced tensions, and Soviet-Cuban withdrawal), Mr. Carter observed that "the Soviets' violating of these principles would make it more difficult [for Congress] to ratify a SALT agreement or comprehensive test ban treaty."³⁷

Once Ethiopia and Somalia stopped fighting, concern over the global implications of Soviet activities on the Horn waned but never receded completely. President Carter visited Africa briefly in May and reiterated a number of themes concerning US policy toward sub-Saharan Africa, noting the 16,000 to 17,000 Cubans in Ethiopia. Mr. Carter

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condemned the "military intervention of outside powers or their proxies" and told the Nigerians that "we must not allow great power rivalries to destroy our hopes for an Africa at peace." With respect to South Africa, the United States and Black Africa should "combine our determination to support the rights of the oppressed in South Africa with a willingness to hold our hands to the white minority if they decide to transform their society and to do away with the crippling burdens of past injustices." An administration official described these policies as "a new spirit of involvement as opposed to the 'run and hide' attitude of past administrations toward Africa. We now see that it is in the best interests of the United States to find African solutions to African problems before they reach the crisis stage."³⁸

The fragility of this policy in the face of racial and superpower concerns was soon demonstrated by the impact of the second Shaba invasion (with the prominent press coverage of white deaths in Kolwezi) and Ethiopia's major drive against the Eritrean rebels. While it is not clear to what extent the Soviet Union or Cuba was involved in either of these cases, the Carter administration specifically blamed the Cubans for encouraging the Shaba invasion and both the Soviets and Cubans for creating the conditions permitting the Ethiopian action. The extent to which the "climate of opinion" had hardened within the United States is amply illustrated by the *New York Times* editorial of 18 May:

Hardly a day passes without some new violent episode among the tribes of Africa as they struggle to preserve or to alter the boundaries inherited from their old colonial masters. Indirectly abetting both offensives, if not directly participating in them, are Cubans supplied and supported by the Soviet Union. Africans stiffened by these foreign legions have already prevailed in Angola and on the Somali front of Ethiopia. The mere threat of a Cuban-Soviet involvement already colors the diplomacy of Rhodesia. So with each new episode, a question for Americans returns more insistently: When will it be time for the United States to try to block these non-African adventurers?"

This is pretty strong stuff—particularly when one considers that most editorial opinion was more conservative than this. Many feature articles simply began with the lead, "A New Cold War?"

Even though US actions were fairly restrained (provision of 18 transport planes for the airlift of French and Belgian troops and participation in the joint financial package for Zaire), the level of rhetoric was fairly high. Mr. Carter, Mr. Castro, the Soviet Union, and various congressional committees argued vehemently over the extent of Cuban involvement in Zaire. Extensive press coverage was given to the 120 whites who were killed in Kolwezi, which was less than that given to the more than 300 black civilians who were killed. President Carter complained repeatedly that congressional restrictions limited his ability to function effectively (this involved him in a dispute over CIA Director Turner's discussion with Senator Clark about the possible resumption of covert military assistance to anti-Neto guerrillas in Angola). Anti-Soviet rhetoric probably peaked with Brzezinski's appearance on "Meet the Press" on 29 May. Brzezinski stated that the Soviet Union violated "the code of detente" and called for an "international response" to Soviet-Cuban actions in Africa. Citing the "strategic concerns" raised by their recent actions, he continued:

I am troubled by the fact that the Soviet Union has been engaged in a sustained and massive effort to build up its conventional forces, particularly in Europe, to strengthen the concentration of its forces on the frontiers, to maintain a vitriolic world-wide propaganda against the United States, to encircle and penetrate the Middle East, to stir up racial difficulties in Africa, and to make more difficult a moderate solution of these difficulties, perhaps to seek more direct access to the Indian Ocean."

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The strength and frequency of such attacks decreased but the ensuing coolness in Soviet-American relations (a pause in SALT negotiations, cancellation of some cultural and scientific exchanges, a stricter interpretation of what goods could be sold to the Soviet Union, and so forth) demonstrated the linkage between superpower relations and events in sub-Saharan Africa.

Anti-Soviet concerns gradually lost their preeminence in both official and editorial rhetoric. Within 2 weeks, *The New York Times* was calling for the United States to resist cries to "do something" about Soviet-Cuban penetration of Africa because there is a "real danger . . . that the domestic political backlash against Soviet and Cuban involvement in Africa will move the United States toward supporting Ian Smith's 'internal settlement' in Rhodesia."⁴¹ *The Washington Post* (in line with most editorial opinion) did not swing back as far as the *New York Times*. While praising the Carter administration's "broad-gauged African policy based on conciliation of disputes and advancement of development," the *Post* argued that the policy's "chief limitation" was its "failure to tie regional considerations to strategic ones. This is a requirement created not by American fancy but by the fact of Soviet and Cuban intervention, which has created a strategic factor where one did not previously exist."⁴² By mid-June, President Carter's policy toward Africa was back on track. Secretary of State Vance, appearing before the House International Relations Committee, said that the question of Cuban involvement in Zaire had been "blown out of all proportion" and warned that it was "very easy to slip into rhetoric that may be excessive and may lead to what people call the cold war."

In the African context, Mr. Vance noted that Soviet-Cuban military actions raise "serious concerns" for the United States and African states, and for the peaceful resolution of conflicts, but that US policy is "based upon an affirmative and constructive approach to African issues—helping African nations meet their pressing human and economic needs, strengthening their ability to defend themselves, building closer ties throughout Africa and assisting African nations to resolve their conflicts peacefully."⁴³ In a major speech the next day, Mr. Vance said the United States would not "mirror" Soviet-Cuban policies: "Our best course is to help resolve the problems which create the excuse for external intervention and to help strengthen the ability of Africans to defend themselves".⁴⁴

What are the implications of this review of the US response to increased Soviet-Cuban activities? Some might be tempted to pass it off as the zigzags of an indecisive administration, but this understates the extent to which cold war attitudes still prevail within the United States and the ease with which security anxieties can overwhelm other policy considerations when circumstances change. President Carter's policy toward sub-Saharan Africa tried to minimize both the extent to which local conflicts had global implications and to anticipate those conflicts by helping African states resolve their own problems, thus reducing opportunities for external intervention. Yet when conflict and external intervention did occur, the administration itself was unable to resist interpreting them in global terms. And this was a situation in which the racial issues were relatively minor, despite the extensive attention to white casualties in Zaire. The pressure for a more active US response might have been irresistible if the racial element had been more pronounced—as it would be in southern Africa.

US Interests in Sub-Saharan Africa—A Summary

US sub-Saharan interests, in a concrete, material sense, are not vital interests, because of the relatively small role that sub-Saharan Africa plays both strategically and economically. It is only under relatively implausible assumptions (largely long-term denial scenarios without retaliation or escalation) that one can make the case the United

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States has "vital" or "hard" interests in that area. Yet arguments stressing these interests will inevitably appear in debates over US interests in sub-Saharan Africa. US interests in sub-Saharan Africa are latently political in nature. As long as events permit American inattention to events in sub-Saharan Africa—particularly with respect to southern Africa or Cuban-Soviet involvement—the United States will not have "vital" political interests in Africa. But if the situation changes—if a black-white and a red-white conflict overlap—then the United States may have extremely important political interests that an administration will be compelled to pursue, and with very little room for choice about how to pursue them.

US POLICY TOWARD SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

United States policy toward sub-Saharan Africa has been remarkably stable since the failure of American intervention in the Angolan civil war. In April 1976, Secretary of State Kissinger toured Africa for the first time and his speech in Lusaka initiated a "new era of American policy." The major themes of this policy were:

- The assurance of US cooperation in helping Africans solve African problems ("African solutions for African problems")
- The expression of the ideals of human rights and social justice, including condemnations of apartheid
- The search for peaceful solutions to conflict in sub-Saharan Africa, particularly in southern Africa
- The promise of US economic assistance for African economic development
- The issuance of warnings of the destabilizing effect of external intervention and superpower conflict on the continent

Even though the Carter administration has frequently pointed to its African policy as a significant departure from past policy, the remarkable similarities in rhetoric are apparent in the major statements of Secretaries Kissinger and Vance, and President Carter (excluding many of Andrew Young's impromptu remarks—an exclusion frequently made by the Carter administration). The changes that the Carter administration brought to US policy toward sub-Saharan Africa were largely confined to two areas. First, the United States took a much more active role in facilitating Rhodesian and Namibian negotiations (no fewer than 10 Anglo-American shuttle trips in 15 months over Rhodesia). Second, President Carter ended Secretary Kissinger's "decoupling" of the issues of black rule in South Africa, Rhodesia, and Namibia by making it clear to South Africa that it could not postpone changes in its own racial policies by helping bring black rule to neighboring states.

I would argue that the theme of African solutions for African problems, coupled with a search for peaceful change, and offers of economic assistance, is quite appropriate in an area that will be characterized by chronic political instability in the foreseeable future. As far as its own economic interests are concerned, the United States does not really care what kinds of regimes prevail in sub-Saharan African countries as long as they are stable and independent. Obviously, issues of human rights can affect our preference for certain regimes, but this is a consideration imposed by US political attitudes, not by US material interests in sub-Saharan Africa. The problem is, however, that this policy cannot deal with conflicts that do not have peaceful solutions or with external interventions that African states, either collectively or individually, are helpless to prevent.

The most critical aspect of US policy toward Africa has been its commitment to a very limited arsenal of diplomatic tools with which to affect events. The US preference

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
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for peaceful change and African solutions to African problems translates into attempts to facilitate negotiations, declarations of good intentions, warnings about the harmful consequences of external intervention, promises of financial assistance, and the like. In the southern African region—which for the United States is the most difficult and potentially costly problem in sub-Saharan Africa—this means choices between policy alternatives that differ very little in their actual effect.

Gerald Bender observed about a year ago that the United States "has four choices in Rhodesia: (1) It can do nothing; (2) It can support the Patriotic Front; (3) It can back the internal settlement; [and] (4) It can continue pushing the Anglo-American Plan."⁴⁵ It is to President Carter's credit—and good intentions—that he chose, in the language of his administration, the "most positive, affirmative policy." But was there really that much difference between these alternatives? There were certainly differences in declaratory policy but I would argue that, given the level of US commitment, there was little difference in practical effect. "Do Nothing" would have reduced the extent to which US prestige had been committed to the region (even this is doubtful given Black Africa's view of US economic ties to South Africa) but there would still be a protracted civil war in Rhodesia (perhaps with fewer black faces in the Smith regime). American support of either the internal settlement or the Patriotic Front would have affected domestic and international perceptions of the United States, but would not have influenced the actual conflict, since the United States would not have supported either side in a fashion (military and economic assistance) that would have enabled it to emerge victorious. The Carter administration chose the fourth alternative and is reaping the dubious benefits of high-level commitment to a disastrous sequence of events. The most costly consequence, in my mind, has been the growth of political support within the United States for white rule in southern Africa and the increased probabilities for the worst-case scenario discussed earlier—the United States facing a large-scale race war in southern Africa which is coupled with demonstrable Soviet-Cuban involvement (thus permitting many white Americans to rationalize what are essentially racist sentiments).

The issues of social change in southern Africa are simply not amenable to current US policy directions. In southern Africa the problems are not economic development, income redistribution, or even regime change—these problems characterize non-white sub-Saharan Africa. In southern Africa, the problem is systems transformation—a white dominated society is to become a black-dominated society with all the political, economic, and social consequences that it entails. Clyde Ferguson and William Cotter, in an article advocating a policy of graduated sanctions against South Africa, note that the "American experience . . . has instructed that there is always a nonviolent accommodation to essentially racial conflicts. The result has been a kind of American myth—that there is always a solution to racial problems which will not unduly upset present arrangements and expectations."⁷³

The realities of southern Africa are quite different—an end to white political domination will greatly upset "present arrangements and expectations" (for example, the flight of 250,000 whites from Mozambique). The United States cannot bring blacks and whites to the conference table and help them "reason together" because all parties see the conflicts as a zero-sum game—there is no bargaining range between whites and blacks (not to mention among different factions of blacks). In short, there are no peaceful solutions to the southern African problem—and since there are no African actors powerful enough to impose a military solution, the inconclusive struggle will persist. There may well be an African struggle over this African problem, but not an African solution. And the longer the struggle continues, the greater the pressure on both global powers to intervene (pressure on the Soviet Union from its client states; pressure on the United States from its domestic public).

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THE CASE FOR AN ALTERNATIVE POLICY

If it were not for the problems of southern Africa and external intervention, US interests in sub-Saharan Africa--which, in the absence of these problems, are relatively minor economic interests--would be best served by a policy of benign indifference, with occasional spurts of humanitarian aid to ameliorate the consequences of the worst famines, droughts, and the other disasters which will plague Africa for the remainder of the century. Political instability in sub-Saharan Africa--whether it is the 13-year civil war in Chad, genocide in Burundi and Rwanda, the rapid regime changes in Ghana or Mauritania, or the conflict between Uganda and Tanzania--raises moral considerations but has little impact on US interests. But, as I argued earlier, the southern African problem and the continued prospect of Soviet-Cuban involvement will remain part of the African context for the foreseeable future, thus creating important political and strategic interests for the United States in sub-Saharan Africa.

A discussion of US policy options--for example, how might the United States deploy its planned "Unilateral Corps"--is premature because, as Crocker, Fontaine, and Simes point out, the critical issue is the "level of effort" problem.¹ The United States, in keeping with domestic political attitudes about bearing the burdens of foreign policy, is pursuing a policy in sub-Saharan Africa (and elsewhere) that is essentially declaratory. With very minimal commitments of resources (the magnitude is indicated by President Carter's "bold" decision to let Saudi Arabia pay about \$300 million for US military equipment for North Yemen), the United States is attempting to solve intractable problems in southern Africa and to counteract a Soviet-Cuban willingness to commit large amounts of men and material to that region. The US strategy simply won't work. The consequences may be that when political circumstances finally force US involvement in sub-Saharan Africa it will be under the worst possible conditions--on the side of white regimes engaged in a large-scale racial conflict that has strategic implications because of extensive Soviet-Cuban involvement.

Thus, any coherent and possibly successful US policy toward sub-Saharan Africa must begin with political leadership within the United States--a leadership that will convince Americans that US interests abroad necessitate a willingness to expend resources for military and economic assistance, and to use military capabilities. Both of these are exceptionally important in the African context because without resources, there are no "carrots" in US policy and without a demonstrated willingness to use military forces, there are no "sticks" either--there are only words and they have lost their credibility. It also must be stated that the likelihood of this happening is not very good. Domestic public opinion reflects the low salience given foreign policy concerns--much less to African problems--the unwillingness to accept the costs of an activist foreign policy, and the inability to look beyond immediate economic concerns. US political leaders and institutions have demonstrated little capacity to either alter these attitudes or act decisively in the face of them--even the most modest accomplishments in foreign policy (for example, the Panama Canal Treaty) take herculean efforts. Therefore, in all likelihood, US policy toward sub-Saharan Africa will remain largely declaratory in nature, that is, the United States will react to events but will have little capacity to affect them, and, in effect, will be dependent upon Soviet-Cuban restraint (even though we have given them little incentive for it) to avoid circumstances which might prove extremely costly to US interests.

If one were to assume, however, that the United States could pursue an activist foreign policy, what should be the course of action? I have argued elsewhere that regional powers are incapable of solving the Rhodesian problem--that no regional power is militarily capable of imposing a solution and no peaceful solutions are

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possible.⁴⁴ Tanzanian President Nyerere's call in early January for a British American military intervention to impose the Anglo-American plan is a poignant recognition of the realities of the southern African context.⁴⁵ This kind of intervention--a large scale US presence to impose black rule in southern Africa--is politically impossible within the United States. As I argued above, South Africa is capable of its own defense for the remainder of the century. What the United States must strive to do is prevent the inevitable violence in southern Africa from having significant global implications. In crude terms, what the United States should do is "buy" Black African tolerance for white rule in southern Africa through greater US involvement in Black Africa's economic problems and attempt to deter Soviet-Cuban involvement in southern Africa by a more active US role in Africa outside of southern Africa.

As Dimitri K. Simes argued,

The United States can effectively influence Moscow's assessment of the costs and benefits of its pursuit of international expansionism; the tools the USSR employs; and, most important, the outcome of the Soviet efforts. In Angola and the Horn of Africa the Soviet government did not feel that its maneuverability was restricted, given the absence of a credible threat of American reprisals. Soviet analysts publicly admit that their assessment of the risks was an important element in deciding whether to exploit various openings in the Third World.

Soviet-Cuban involvement in Angola and the Horn of Africa was decisive and domestic and international concern waned simply because the conflict was resolved. This would not be the case in southern Africa--South Africa's military power ensures levels of violence protracted enough and high enough to make conceivable a number of fairly gruesome escalatory scenarios. This in itself may be enough to deter extensive Soviet involvement, since most American analysts believe that the Soviet Union will intervene in the Third World only if there is little risk of direct East-West confrontation. But sitting back is a risky course for the United States, since the Soviet Union will be under increasing pressure to aid the "forces of liberation" as long as the conflict continues. The Soviet Union's involvement might gradually increase--in the absence of Western disincentives--until suddenly the worst case is upon us, unintended but compelling. Therefore, long-range US interests would be served by a more active opposition to Soviet-Cuban activities in "non-vital" areas in sub-Saharan Africa to reduce the risk of far more costly confrontations in "vital" areas.

While this policy would have the effect of aiding South Africa in its security problems, this does not mean the United States should join South Africa in its "constellation" of states on the tip of Africa. The United States should still press for internal reform and remain committed to black majority rule--after all, South African hostility to the United States is still an advantage in dealing with Black Africa and South Africa is unlikely to retaliate against the United States. But the United States should recognize that minor acts of sanction and censure cannot lead to significant change within South Africa and we are not capable of sustaining the kinds of intervention (whether it be an alliance of Western states or the United Nations) which would compel the internal transformation of South Africa.

What the United States can do is offer Black Africans some incentives to tolerate our inability to end white rule in southern Africa. These incentives would include a continued hostility toward white rule and a greatly expanded economic commitment to non-white, sub-Saharan Africa. If the United States were to do this, in conjunction with a greater willingness to counter Soviet-Cuban activities, the United States would be helping Black African regimes cope with political instability within their own countries--an assistance valuable enough to allow these same regimes to ignore southern African

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issues. Obviously this policy assumes a far greater "level of effort" (political, economic, and military) from the United States than does our current policy, but then it also holds some prospect of avoiding those contingencies which carry far greater risks and costs for the United States.

ENDNOTES: POLITICAL AND MILITARY DIMENSIONS OF THE AFRICAN PROBLEM

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- 3 "US Security Interests and Africa," p. 8
- 4 *Ibid.*, pp. 8-9
- 5 *Ibid.*, p. 7
- 6 Colin Legum, "Communal Conflict and International Intervention," in Legum, *Africa in the 1980s*, p. 28
- 7 *Ibid.*, p. 49
- 8 *Washington Post*, 15 July 1978
- 9 See "Prospects for Multilateral Arms Export Restraint," staff report, US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, April 1979
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- 12 See George E. Hudson, "Soviet-Black African Military Relations: A Proposition and Framework about Soviet Military Intentions and Behavior," paper presented at the Midwest Political Science Association Annual Meeting, April 1978
- 13 See Chester Crocker et al., "Implications of Soviet and Cuban Activities in Africa for US Policy," Center for Strategic and International Studies (Washington, DC: Georgetown University, 1 March 1979)
- 14 Simes, "Detente, Russian-Style," p. 54
- 15 R. W. Johnson, *How Long Will South Africa Survive?* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1977), pp. 209-40
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- 20 *New York Times*, 26 October 1978
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- 22 Gordon Bertolin, "US Economic Interests in Africa: Investment, Trade, and Raw Materials," in Whitaker, *Africa and the United States*, p. 38
- 23 See Sanford J. Ungar, "Dateline West Africa: Great Expectations," *Foreign Policy*, no. 32 (Fall 1978)
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- 25 Foltz, "US Policy Toward Southern Africa," in LeMarchand, *American Policy in Southern Africa*, p. 256
- 26 See Geoffrey Kemp, "U.S. Strategic Interests and Military Options in Sub-Saharan Africa," in Whitaker, Palmer, and Crocker et al
- 27 p. 123, Kemp
- 28 See Ungar, "Dateline West Africa "
- 29 The public opinion survey figures are taken from the Gallup Poll done in November 1978 for Chicago Council on Foreign Relations. These results appear in John E. Rielly, "The American Mood: A Foreign Policy of Self-Interest," *Foreign Policy*, no. 34 (Spring 1979) and *Public Opinion*, (March/April 1978)
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- 31 *Washington Post*, 21 December 1978.
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- 37 *New York Times*, 5 March 1978.
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- 39 *New York Times*, 18 May 1978
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- 41 *New York Times*, 1 June 1978
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- 43 *New York Times*, 29-30 April 1978, 1 May 1978.
- 44 *New York Times*, 21 June 1978.
- 45 Adelman and Bender, "Conflict in Southern Africa," p. 99.
- 46 Clyde Ferguson and William R. Cotter, "South Africa—What is to be Done," *Foreign Affairs* 5 (January 1978), p. 265
- 47 Crocker et al., "Implications of Soviet and Cuban Activities in Africa," p. 51
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Panel 3

**BEYOND NORMALIZATION: THE UNITED STATES
AND EAST ASIA**

An examination of both continuity and change in East Asia and the Pacific brought about by the achievement of full diplomatic relations between the United States and China. An analysis of the US-USSR-China-Japan quadrangle as well as regional issues as a basis for future conflict and resolution. An assessment of the prospects for a US role in maintaining peace and stability in East Asia.

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PANEL 3 Participants

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RAPPORTEUR: Capt William R. Heaton, USAF, Senior Research Fellow, National Defense University

AUTHORS: Dr. June T. Dreyer, Director, East Asian Programs, Center for Advanced International Studies, University of Miami; Honorable Francis T. Underhill

PANELISTS: Mr. Michael H. Armacost, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for East Asian Affairs (ISA); Mr. Robert W. Barnett, Resident Associate, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace; Professor George C. Christie, J.B. Duke Professor of Law, Duke University; Honorable Marshall Green, Senior Research Fellow, National Defense University; Mr. Jack H. Harris, Booz, Allen and Hamilton, Inc.; Mr. James R. Lilley, The Johns Hopkins University; Honorable Philip Manhard; Mr. Michael Pillsbury; Dr. Thomas W. Robinson, The National War College; Dr. Richard Solomon, the Rand Corporation; Dr. Robert Sutter, Foreign Affairs Division, Library of Congress; Dr. Richard L. Walker, Institute of International Studies, University of South Carolina.

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PANEL 3 SUMMARY

Beyond Normalization: The United States and East Asia

William Whitson
William Heaton

An underlying element of the discussions of Asia following normalization of US-Chinese relations was fundamental disagreement over the future state of Asia. In her paper, Dr. Dreyer argued that normalization has not brought stability and that Asia will continue to be an area beset with major and minor power conflicts. Ambassador Underhill argued that Asia is increasingly evolving into an area where the great powers will be less influential. The future US role in Asia is conditioned by which of these situations prevails.

Certain trends in Asia are readily apparent. Because of dynamic changes in technology, transportation, and communication, events in Asia are likely to have global influence; moreover, global events will have more influence in Asia. Problems such as the energy crisis, population growth, urbanization, employment and unemployment, and other related factors will be extremely important.

Beyond defining Asia geographically, there is some difficulty in conceptualizing Asia as an entity or as a system. There are many diversities among the countries within Asia, and there are countries which are not distinctly Asian, such as the United States, that are part of the Asian scene. Yet, in some areas, particularly in economic relationships, ties among the countries are increasing. The prospects for continuity and change may be viewed by conceptualizing Asia as a kind of system or by examining specific issues that are salient in the Pacific basin. Most of the discussion centered on specific issues.

One issue which generated much debate was the future role of ideology in the politics of Asian states. Some participants believed that ideology was no longer a major factor in political life, while others believed it was on the ascendancy. Most agreed that the traditional, uniquely Asian, concept of man and his existence is giving way to a new concept rooted in a kind of technocratic ethic. This is not to say that traditional ideologies or religions such as Islam are not strong in many states.

Another issue which received great attention was the Sino-Soviet dispute. This dispute has aspects of continuity, because it has been continuing for nearly 20 years and may well continue into the future. A relatively new aspect of the Sino-Soviet dispute is open conflict in Vietnam, and future Sino-Soviet relations will be affected by events in that country. What are the chances for a rapprochement between China and the Soviet Union? Some participants argued that greater accommodation between the two powers could be made because of China's desire for peace and modernization. Others argued that there is a continuing buildup along the Chinese-Soviet border and that strong feelings such as a "yellow peril" mentality in the USSR will preclude a substantial lessening of tensions.

The point was made that because the Sino-Soviet conflict may appear to be a given, we should take neither its structure nor its content for granted, but should be very cautious about making policy commitments and allocations which assume continued distance between these two powers. Indeed, changes could be in the offing which would bring the Chinese and the Soviets closer together. This new relationship would not in all probability be a return to the rapprochement of the 1950's. However, if the United States

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were not prepared to tolerate such conciliation it could produce some hysteria in US planning circles

The Vietnam situation holds great potential for conflict. The ASEAN countries, particularly Thailand, have requested US arms because of concern with Vietnam. Some participants advocated that the United States should support ASEAN against Vietnam, thereby also supporting China, in a moral and just "war." Others noted that this might well enhance the Soviet view of an anti-Soviet alliance in Asia and contribute to instability. Also, there is a question whether American public opinion would tolerate an activist US role in Vietnam. Bringing Vietnam into a cooperative relationship with ASEAN may be desirable, but would probably require exerting great pressure on the Vietnamese.

Considerable attention was devoted to the Korean situation, and here again, two opposite points of view were obvious. The majority view supported the commitment of American ground forces in South Korea, noting that South Korea's rapid economic growth gives it many advantages over North Korea, but that North Korea has a temporary advantage in military power. Thus, there is danger of a North Korean attack, even without Soviet or Chinese support. To preclude US intervention in the event of conflict, the North Koreans are currently trying to create ambiguities along the border. The North Koreans may not necessarily follow the 1950's plan of attack, but will try to blur the situation. Therefore, it is important that US military forces remain in South Korea to symbolize our commitment and to prevent the outbreak of war.

There was general agreement that Kim Il-sung has a relatively short period of time in which to preserve the illusion of military strength and power; beyond which time the contrast between North and South Korea will be quite great and, indeed, South Korea may be an economic power. The United States must expect in this transition period a particular challenge to American policy and proceed with an understanding that the South Koreans need this time to assume with confidence responsibility for their own destiny, at least within the region.

The dissenting view of some panelists held that using US ground forces as a "trip wire" only served to lessen US options in the event of military action by either the North or the South. Consequently, some argued that a continuation of withdrawal of US ground forces, as the President originally planned, would be the best course of action.

Other factors which will affect the Korean situation include the upcoming change in leadership in both countries, and the possibility of dialogue leading to a form of reunification or a "German solution" in which the country would remain permanently divided. Concern was expressed about the possibility of nuclear proliferation in South Korea if the United States were to reduce its present commitment. The point was made that South Korea probably has a better human rights record than has been suggested by the press or the administration. Finally, encouraging trade between the two Koreas might be a way of lessening tensions and promoting contacts between the two countries.

THE ECONOMIC FUTURE OF EAST ASIA

The idea was advanced that American military power in Asia is being replaced by American economic power. Yet American economic power is being influenced by a scientific and technological surge which has revolutionized communications, by the increasing power of non-American multinational corporations, and by the decreasing competitiveness of American business due to governmental regulation. One participant suggested that the primary factor affecting the future US role in the economy of Asia was the differential development between "island capitalist" Asia and "continental non-capitalist" Asia. Both are developing economically, yet in different ways, and both offer problems and prospects for US economic involvement.

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capitalist Asia. Both are developing economically, yet in different ways, and both offer problems and prospects for US economic involvement.

The economic future of Asia involves several questions. One of the most important of these is just how much of a role the American market will play in the future economic development of Asia. In one view, the American market is the chief force driving the development of Asian economies. Yet, for various reasons American business may be falling behind, because of Japanese governmental-industrial cooperation, inflation, and lack of competitiveness. However, China apparently wants the United States to be as heavily involved in China's economic development as is Japan.

Another view drew on the Okita theory of the international dynamic division of labor; this theory suggests that the Japanese economy will become too strong in relation to the US economy for structural reasons. Evidence for this can be found in the Japanese propensity to save and the American propensity to spend. To be competitive, the United States will have to have a climate of greater savings and investment. There was considerable debate over the meaning of productivity rates among countries and whether they were important for understanding the future economic development of Asia.

There is still no formal regional institutional arrangement for allocating investments in Asia. It is still relatively a free market in that sense. While there is ASEAN and the Asian Development Bank, there is no regional institutional system that might substitute for what had been in a sense dominant superpower responsibility for many of these allocations.

The possibilities for economic cooperation in Asia were discussed, but the idea of a common market was rejected because the diversities among economies were too great for such a level of integration. However, it was generally agreed that there could be complementary aspects to the economies and that they could advance simultaneously at different levels. There seemed to be general agreement that jointly advancing economies could result in mutual interdependence. Yet, at the same time, care must be exercised to encourage complementarity rather than extreme competition. China and the United States could ultimately become competitors, for example, as we assist China to develop.

There was some concern about the direction of capital investment. In a world of scarce resources, it is possible that concentrating investment in Northeast Asia will deprive Southeast Asia of capital. In one view, the ASEAN countries enjoy a trade surplus with the United States and are growing less vulnerable to our influence. In fact, some countries see our cultural values and our economic policies as being as much a threat as our military presence. Others disagreed, saying that the presence of the United States, both militarily and economically, was a symbol of reassurance to Asian leaders.

Of major interest was the future role of Japan. Japan has many economic strengths, but also weaknesses, such as an aged leadership, oil dependency, and redundant labor. At the same time, the economic strength of Japanese conglomerates is increasing. Japan will continue to rely on US agricultural imports. A major issue for the future will be whether or not Japan and the United States can resolve their economic differences. One participant suggested that Japan milks the Asian cow, while the United States holds an umbrella over the cow and the milker. If such is the case, perhaps the relationship between the two countries needs to be redefined. Others expressed concern that Presidential aspirant Connally's suggestions for dealing with the Japanese economic question are extreme, and would create more problems than they would solve.

The overall issue of the future US economic role in Asia concerns domestic politics as well. The climate of government regulation affects the competitive ability of US business. The huge amounts of capital accumulated by Japan with its favorable balance

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of trade are increasingly a source of concern. Finding ways to transfer this capital will be a complicated problem. China will continue to find difficulties with agricultural production. The United States has serious problems with energy and inflation; it was agreed that strengthening area studies and language training programs in the United States would contribute to a better understanding of these problems.

The panel addressed the issue of competition between Japanese and American business in Asia. Japan has the advantage of proximity and organization, but the United States has certain key technological items and raw materials which are competitive. Much of the future economy of the region will be influenced by multinational corporations which can make positive economic contributions, but being guided primarily by the profit motive, they can have a disruptive social impact. There is no precise consensus on the role of multinationals, although there is agreement that they will be important to the economy of the region.

THE ROLE OF CHINA IN EAST ASIA

A most interesting aspect of continuity and change in Asia involves the future of China. Americans are beginning to see China more clearly now than in the past. China apparently wants peace and stability to achieve modernization, but will this trend continue? It is possible that the failure of present policies could cause a swing of the pendulum back toward radicalism; this change would not, perhaps, be as dramatic or as destructive as the Cultural Revolution, but certainly the possibility is important enough to warrant our consideration. There are still many former students in rural areas who are dissatisfied with present policies. There are also questions of whether students returning from abroad will want more rapid change, whether the military will remain loyal and whether the rural population which is discriminated against in present policy will remain supportive of such policy. All this could produce a return to radicalism. This is also occurring during a time of leadership transition. Such an internal state of instability could invite Chinese external adventurism.

There was disagreement over whether China could achieve stability and a rapid rate of economic modernization. Some maintained that this was probable, while others believed that a return to radicalism was likely. Several asked whether it is important if China is weak or strong militarily and economically. China at present is committed to a policy that will keep it wedded to the West, but does it make any difference one way or the other if China changes course? Several felt that China was not sufficiently integrated into the Asian economic system to play a major economic role in Asia; others argued that China would increase its economic prominence and would exercise greater influence.

A crucial factor is timing. Much depends upon how quickly the Deng Xiaoping economic strategy can produce sufficient results to retain popular support, while it is true that China is moving from charismatic to bureaucratic leadership, this does not mean that the situation cannot change. Some questioned whether the new bureaucratic party and state in China can adequately plan and manage the economy, given the demographic pressures. Most participants agreed that the wave of the future was toward increased authoritarianism, not only in China but also in other Asian states, primarily because of the difficulties of economic allocations. Nevertheless, the trend toward authoritarianism might be affected by decentralization in economic planning. The two are not necessarily mutually exclusive. One participant suggested that the Chinese ability to rationally decide on retrenchment of economic projects indicates a regularized decisionmaking process that can withstand pressure.

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Events in China will affect future US-China relations. One view held that since China is committed to a pro-Western modernization policy, the United States should share technology and assist China in achieving regional and global prominence. Another view held that, because of China's many problems, the United States should be wary of expecting many benefits from a close relationship with China. Nearly all participants agreed that a US-China relationship must be based on mutual self-interest and that there was little to be gained from trying to manipulate a relationship to achieve some preferred global outcome.

The relevance of the Chinese model for the rest of Asia was also discussed. In one opinion, the Chinese cultural revolution could well serve as a model for other Asian states concerned with such problems as population growth, urbanization, and unresponsive bureaucracies. Those who opposed this view stressed that the individual nationalisms of the respective states would probably preclude a reliance on the Chinese model.

The Soviet Union is obviously still an important actor in East Asia, and an increasingly assertive one, determined to be an Asian power and determined to be involved both politically and economically in the future of the area.

The United States is still an important presence in East Asia. However, the image of the United States as an actor is affected by its declining military presence and its ambiguous economic presence. Yet, the United States maintains an informal ideological presence in the region, in the form of the large number of American businessmen who are seeking opportunities and who are assisting Asians in their efforts to progress. But the purposes of the American presence are less well understood than are the purposes of the Soviet Presence.

The point was made that the United States must be more attentive to the role of non-state actors, particularly the multinational corporations. The traditional concern for the modes of operation of the nation-state system may very much miss such facts as the point that 12 Japanese multinational corporations, in 1978, generated \$178 billion in total trade and that this mobilization of economic power is continuing.

Because of the presence of resource shortages, population growth, modernization and urbanization trends, and the dynamics of change in these societies, there was the feeling that the United States should expect increasing authoritarianism in Asia. At least, it will be a very alluring way of grappling with these issues, particularly that of economic resource allocations. Thus, as they are confronted with these problems, some Asian leaders could be attracted to the Chinese model.

A change that is perhaps most important for planners is a change in the symbols of power in Asia. During the Cold War period certainly the visible symbols of power were military symbols. The old calculus of challenge and response, of net assessment, is now much more ambiguous.

As the discussion concluded, the same issues which had marked the beginning debate were once again brought forward. Most participants argued that there would and should be a military relationship between the United States and some Asian countries. Others argued that the form of the US alliance structure might be the same, but that the substance would drain away. The latter view held that it was no longer useful or meaningful for the United States to adopt an activist or leadership policy in an environment in which great power influence would become less significant. There was a sense that Americans would be very reluctant to respond militarily to almost any challenge in Asia. Yet most participants held that it would be very important for the United States to play an active and positive role in an era of some continuity, but also of significant change.

PANEL 3 PAPER

The US-USSR-China-Japan Quadrangle in the Pacific Basin

June Dreyer

During the past year, important adjustments have taken place in the East Asian regional balance of power. First, on 1 January 1979, the United States and the People's Republic of China (PRC) established full diplomatic relations. Only a few months prior to that, Japan had signed a treaty of friendship and cooperation with China. The PRC also contracted for ambitious economic projects with Japan. Concurrently, North and South Korea agreed to resume talks on reunification. And the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) continued to make modest progress toward political and military cooperation.

These events were widely hailed as major milestones in the achievement of a stable balance of power in Asia. Yet they took place against a background of other, less benign, events. A coup d'etat in Afghanistan in the spring of 1978 resulted in a heavy increase in Soviet strength there; repercussions of the coup were felt in neighboring Iran and Pakistan. China, which shares a border with Afghanistan and close relations with the Iranian and Pakistani Governments, became more apprehensive over the possibility of encirclement by the USSR. These apprehensions were exacerbated by increasing Soviet influence in Vietnam: Vietnam became a member of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON/CMEA) and absorbed large amounts of Soviet technology and personnel. At the same time, Vietnam intensified the repressive treatment of its ethnic Chinese minority and invaded neighboring Cambodia to overthrow the Chinese-backed Pol Pot government. China, interpreting these events as part of a Soviet-Vietnamese conspiracy against the PRC, determined to "teach Vietnam a lesson" and launched what it termed a "defensive counterattack" against Vietnam, in which both sides sustained substantial casualties and damage to their plans for economic development. The Chinese people were alerted to the danger of a Soviet punitive invasion, and the PRC's State Council also formally notified the USSR that it wished to terminate the Sino-Soviet treaty of 1950.

The Soviet Union then underscored a long-standing element of tension between it and Japan by fortifying two of the southern Kurile Islands which were seized from Japan after World War II. Japan continues to claim jurisdiction over these so-called Northern Islands, and the Soviet Union's failure to return them has been a major deterrent to the improvement of relations between the two countries. Meanwhile, the two Koreas suspended reunification negotiations.

This juxtaposition of one series of events, which seem to portend a period of peace and stability in Asia, with another series of events, which seem to portend just the opposite, raises a familiar dilemma for policymakers: how to distinguish current from counter-current, and trend from aberration. It is the contention of this paper that

- The stabilizing effect of the normalization of relations between the United States and China has been much exaggerated, and the value of an alliance between the two countries as a shield against Soviet aggression has been oversold to the American public**
- There are important elements of uncertainty in each of the four major Pacific powers as they seek to redefine basic security interests**

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--Any assessment of the forces for change and destabilization in the Pacific Basin must take into consideration not only the four major powers of the area, but also the so-called minor powers and their interactions with each other and with the major powers

An amplification of these points and their implications for US strategy in maintaining peace and stability in East Asia is suggested below

EFFECTS OF NORMALIZATION ON THE INTERESTS OF THE FOUR POWERS IN THE PACIFIC

The major regional factor in the East Asian security setting is the Sino-Soviet dispute. Both ideological and nationalistic in nature, it has several times threatened to escalate into a major conflagration. Given this context, China's securing diplomatic relations with the United States on terms favorable to the PRC was clearly advantageous to Chinese interests. Recognition would facilitate the exchange of information and technology which would upgrade China's capabilities against the USSR. And US corporations could obtain government backing for loans and projects in the PRC, thus enabling the more rapid development of China's economic base.

Some apprehension existed in Japanese business circles that the US-China recognition would make it more difficult for Japanese firms to compete in the China market, but Japan's interests were not significantly affected by the formalities of recognition. The Nixon-Kissinger overtures to Peking in 1971 proved far more important than the actual recognition decision. These overtures indicated to Japan that it could move toward establishing relations with the PRC without incurring American displeasure which might affect Japan's close security relationship and economic ties with the United States.

While proponents of the normalization of relations between China and the United States have argued that it is essentially a formality establishing the same state-to-state intercourse between China and the United States as exists between the United States and the Soviet Union, it has not been so benignly interpreted by the Soviet Union. Moscow saw US-China recognition in the context of Japan's security treaty with the United States. Japan's signing of a treaty of peace and friendship with China containing an anti-hegemony clause was widely regarded as directed against the Soviet Union. Thus, the USSR perceived normalization of relations between the United States and China as bringing into existence a tripartite grouping hostile to it. In the words of Pravda correspondent Bolshakov:

As for Beijing and these militarist circles in Japan which would like to utilize the Japan-China treaty and the US rapprochement with China as a springboard for territorial expansion, let us recall an ancient Chinese saying:

"If a broom is too short, you cannot use it to remove cobwebs from the ceiling." There is an equally expressive equivalent of this proverb in Russian: "Just you try!"

Although the US-China mutual recognition has been heralded as a contribution to the stabilization of peace in Asia, the USSR's perception that an alliance hostile to it had been created thereby was a destabilizing rather than a stabilizing consequence. A second element which was destabilizing to the peace of Asia was added when, a bare 6 weeks after formal recognition took place, China invaded Vietnam. The warnings of an invasion issued by Chinese Vice-Premier Deng Xiaoping during his visit to the United States only increased Soviet fears that the United States were colluding against it.

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Soviet displeasure over recognition may be dismissed as transitory. Similarly, since the Chinese invasion of Vietnam did not draw other powers into the conflict in any major way, its consequences may also prove to be insignificant. There is, however, a more disquieting possible consequence of the recognition decision: the assumption that entente with China will be useful to the United States first, economically, and second, and more importantly, in containing Soviet aggression. Economically, there may be some marginal benefits to the United States in that normalization will facilitate trade relations. However, given the low purchasing power of the average Chinese and the PRC's current economic difficulties, significant economic benefits to the United States will be a long time in materializing.

As for the second alleged benefit of normalization, clearly it is of value to the United States to minimize hostilities between itself and China. And the idea is attractive that US advanced weapons technology complements Chinese mass manpower. However, it may also prove illusory, in that the two elements will prove difficult to marry.

It should be remembered that the United States entertained similar opinions on the value of its Chinese ally during World War II. Chinese fighting forces equipped by the United States and trained by US advisers could play an important role in defeating the Japanese. Some positive results were indeed obtained by a few intrepid souls, such as Joseph Stilwell--whose frustrations in dealing with the Chinese leadership eventually resulted in his removal from his position. But the idea of melding Chinese manpower with American expertise proved to be impractical as the concept worked its way through the various levels of the Chinese bureaucracy.

While no one could contend that either China or the Chinese leadership today is the same as existed during World War II, the Chinese bureaucracy, by the admission of official PRC media, continues to exhibit many of the less admirable characteristics of its prerevolutionary predecessors. And the Chinese leadership shows a similar, if quite understandable, reluctance to accept American guidance, as did its pre-1949 counterpart. Moreover, modern China has yet to prove its military competence. The Chinese effort in Vietnam cannot be considered a clearcut military victory, despite China's overwhelming manpower advantage. Deng Xiaoping reportedly acknowledged this to a March 1979 meeting of the PRC's Political Bureau.

Assumptions as to China's value as a military ally are predicated on its uniquely large population. However, in a contemporary military context, transforming this population into effective military power is dependent on the strength of the advanced sector of the economy. Viewed from this perspective, China may be of little value to the United States in a contest with the Soviet Union. Analysts should not be misled by the alleged success of the Chinese Communists in resisting the Japanese during World War II, or by the real success of the Vietnamese resistance to the United States. In the kind of war that would be fought against Russia, geographical and other factors will require China to fight against modern air and mechanized forces on terrain suitable for their employment. The Chinese capability for this kind of warfare is weak now and will continue to be weak as long as the country's modern industrial sector remains poorly developed. In terms of military might, China may prove to be a paper dragon.

Moreover, China may prove unwilling to join the United States in the event of a confrontation. Chinese sources have long insisted that a war between the two superpowers is inevitable, that they will destroy one another therein, and that this will spell the victory of Third World forces led by China. There are other ramifications of this sort of alliance with China. China may expect reciprocal aid from the United States in the event of an attack on it by the Soviet Union. The potential risks would not seem to be worth the possible benefits to the United States.

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In short, although the establishment of formal diplomatic relations between the United States and China was appropriate and, in fact, long overdue, its consequences have not been uniformly beneficial. While potentially useful to the Chinese and of marginal utility to Japan, recognition has exacerbated Soviet fears and aroused seriously exaggerated expectations in the United States.

CHANGING PERCEPTIONS OF INTERESTS AMONG THE FOUR POWERS

As the four major powers of the Pacific Basin attempt to redefine their interests in light of the changing security situation following normalization of US-China relations, each must deal with significant political uncertainties. The two Communist countries face succession crises, and both Japan and the United States search for a foreign policy posture which is not only compatible with their respective economic and security needs, but acceptable to domestic public opinion as well.

The Soviet Union

Future policy choices in the Soviet Union will be conditioned by the outcome of a power struggle now taking place within the Kremlin. Although Brezhnev's ill health is widely acknowledged, Sovietologists see no consensus within the Soviet elite as to his successor. One can discern certain frontrunners such as Konstantin Chernenko, head of the General Department of the Central Committee, Andre Kirilenko, Communist Party Secretary, Viktor Gushin, First Secretary of the Moscow City Party Committee, and a handful of others. But who will emerge victorious and to what interest groups he will have to appeal to achieve preeminence are not known. Obviously the answers to these unknowns will affect the policy choices of the USSR.

While the basic Soviet security requirements are to defend its territory against attack and to avoid encirclement by any hostile power or group of powers, a variety of alternative strategies exists to effect these ends. A conciliatory Soviet posture might involve rapprochement with China, perhaps beginning with some agreement on the border territories disputed between the two countries. Alternatively, Russia could seek to woo Japan away from China, perhaps by making concessions on the Northern Islands issue or offering favorable terms to Japanese firms in a joint Soviet-Japanese effort to develop the Soviet Far East, or both. Concessions to the United States are more likely to take place on issues like arms control or human rights rather than within the Asian regional context, but might involve a more circumspect Soviet use of bases in Vietnam.

On the other hand, a hard line Soviet posture might be initiated by a leadership which feared Chinese modernization plans. Feeling that time was working for China, the Soviets might launch a preemptive attack on their neighbor to the south. Western analysts who believe in the likelihood of this worst case scenario note that the extensive modernization of the Soviet armed forces in recent years has enhanced the offensive rather than the defensive capabilities of the Soviet Union. They further point out that because of the close proximity of the Trans-Siberian railroad to the Chinese border and to extended supply lines in that area, the most feasible defense of the Soviet Far East might be a preemptive offensive. A Soviet hard line might also be characterized by various harassment activities against Japan, to include the interdicting of shipping and the holding of training exercises off Hokkaido. Regarding the United States, a Soviet hard line could result in an unyielding attitude toward disarmament and human rights.

While no one can predict which course of action the new Soviet leadership will pursue, some policy choices are more likely than others. It has been noted that these

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aspiring to succeed Brezhnev almost certainly will need the support of an entrenched establishment, and that policy formulation will thus continue to reflect leadership consensus more than individual dictate. And such problems as growing consumer demands, poor economic growth rates, energy shortages, inadequate agricultural production, resurgent ethnic consciousness, and a restive intelligentsia, will continue to constrain Soviet adventurism.

Thus, the probability of a preventive war is low. But so is any striking originality of policy which would effect a fundamental realignment of the American presence in Asia, to minimize Chinese influence through a combination of hostile and conciliatory gestures, and to oppose a strengthening of Sino-American ties, Sino-Japanese ties, and any Japanese moves toward remilitarization.

China

Within China, Deng Xiaoping has emerged as the leading political figure, eclipsing the nominal powerholder, Hua Guofeng. Tough, pragmatic, and impatient, Deng is also in his seventies. By contrast, Hua is believed to be a moderate, a compromise candidate originally chosen because of his acceptability to the more conservative followers of Deng and the radical ideologues now pilloried as associates of the purged Gang of Four. Hua is in his fifties, and may regain power simply by outliving Deng.

A transformation in the Chinese leadership may come even sooner. Opposition to Deng clearly exists, and he has been twice purged from power. Nor is there any certainty that his successor will be Hua or any other moderate. Official Chinese media admit that, despite a 3-year battle against the radical Gang of Four and its followers, ideological leftism still exists. As the economic imbalances and social strains attendant on China's vigorous developmental program multiply, leftist critics of Deng's policies could gain support and a much different configuration of policy choices might emerge.

Even now, the order of priority among industrial, agricultural, and military spending is being re-thought, as are the ramifications of these domestic priorities for China's relations with foreign countries. There also appears to be a controversy over what to do with the legacy of Mao Zedong: what of his doctrine should be kept and what discarded.

The formulation of Chinese policies is characterized by extreme secrecy, and exactly what changes in foreign policy would result from a change in leadership is difficult to predict. It is known that a segment of the Chinese elite believes Deng's Vietnam policy has been embarrassingly clumsy. For example, a Chinese ship was sent to evacuate overseas Chinese from Vietnam without obtaining permission from Hanoi to do so. It subsequently became necessary to recall the ship to China—with no refugees aboard. Other Chinese leaders believe that the invasion of Vietnam was adventuristic and inglorious. Presumably, the rise to power of people with these beliefs would mean a more conciliatory posture toward Vietnam, perhaps in an attempt to wean it away from dependence on the Soviet Union. A softer-line Chinese policy might also include support for a rapprochement between the two Koreas, as opposed to China's recent staunch defense of Kim Il-sung's regime as the only legitimate government of Korea.

On the other hand, China's radicals are believed to be strongly opposed to friendly ties with capitalist countries. Their accession to power could result in a reversal of such economic and cultural ties as those established with Japan and the United States. It might also result in increased Chinese support for guerrilla movements seeking to overthrow the established governments of several Asian states such as Thailand, Burma, and Malaysia. A move to reestablish Sino-Soviet friendship might also be considered.

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As in the case of the Soviet Union, however, drastic changes in strategy are unlikely. China's billion-plus population and its near-poverty-level existence are factors with which any regime must reckon. Hence, there is little alternative to an economic development program. In this endeavor, it is probable that the technical expertise of the United States and Japan will continue to be valued. And neither radical nor conservative leaders have shown any inclination to effect a genuine rapprochement with the Soviet Union.

Japan

Successive Japanese Governments have grappled with an increasingly uncomfortable dichotomy between their country's economic might and its military weakness. Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution, which forswears the use of force in settling international disputes, has constrained, though not completely prohibited, the development of a military capability. An informal commitment to spend no more than 1 percent of the country's gross national product (GNP) on defense has long existed, and attempts to change this would be met by opposition from a vocal, well-organized minority.

Yet it is obvious that Japan's impressive economic performance could not be sustained if the country's access routes to sources of raw materials and markets were harassed or interdicted. While Japan remains committed to its security treaty with the United States, many Japanese have doubted both the willingness of the United States to come to its aid and, given the expansion of Soviet military might in Asia, the ability of the United States to defend Japan.

What to do about this perceived vulnerability is a persistent problem. The Japanese foreign policy debate has polarized around passivists, who believe that Japanese interests can best be served by low political and military profile, and activists, who favor a more ambitious foreign policy for their country, including a greater willingness to take positions independent of US wishes. However, as pointed out by a leading Japanese political analyst, the precise nature of this more independent foreign policy is uncertain and confused.¹

Officially, and despite its security treaty with the United States, Japan espouses a policy of equal treatment for all nations. In the earlier half of the 1970's, this policy went under the name "equidistance"—the promotion of peace and trade without political favoritism. It has a more specific referent as well: equidistance between Moscow and Beijing.

However, as Soviet intransigence on fisheries issues and on the Northern Islands became evident, and as the lure of the China market beckoned, Japan's professed belief in equidistance seemed increasingly out of line with its true sentiments. In a culture where symbolism is of utmost importance, change was called for. The Fukuda government, which took office in late 1976, handled this semantic challenge by substituting "omnidirectional" for "equidistance." According to its proponents, the new terminology allowed a separation of Japan's relations with China as well as a good neighbor treaty with the Soviet Union. Its critics pointed out that "omnidirectional" was

merely a convenient label for equivocation, helping to obscure the cleared priorities of national interest and political principle which Japan should now, after 30 years of blurring, be bringing into focus.²

The new Ohira government has quietly dropped the term because it wishes to give the impression of forging its own foreign policy. Yet the concept of equidistance/omnidirectional impartiality remains—a worthy sentiment which is progressively less descriptive of reality.

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Meanwhile, behind the commitment to impartiality, Japan faces some difficult policy choices. Substantial cutbacks in China's modernization program resulted in postponement of several large contracts with Japan, and China's invasion of Vietnam irritated many Japanese political leaders. Both actions contributed to tempering the euphoria which followed the signing of the Sino-Japanese treaty. Uncertainty over the future value of the China market is thus added to uncertainty over the US commitment to defend Japan.

It is, however, widely accepted that the only country now posing a significant military threat to Japan is the Soviet Union. Three principal ways exist in which Russia might seek to defeat Japan. First, Russia could curtail oil shipments to Japan by installing pro-Soviet governments in important oil-producing states. Second, it could control the sea routes to and from Japan. Third, Russia could occupy Japan or parts thereof. While there is little that Japan could do to counter the first Soviet option, there is a good deal it might do to forestall the second and third.

Most observers feel that Japanese public opinion is now more receptive to some degree of rearmament than it has been at any time since World War II. Some observers have suggested⁴ that polls indicating the Japanese people "reject militarism" are misleading in that the questions were posed in a simplistic manner.⁵

The greater tolerance of public opinion toward rearmament has been accompanied by structural changes such as the founding of two prominent security-related research institutes in 1978. And in 1979, Keidanren, the powerful Japanese Association of Manufacturers, presented the government with a plan to strengthen the financial basis of advanced weapons development.⁷ Government officials, too, have become more outspoken on the need to upgrade defenses. In July of 1978, General Hiroomi Kurisu created a controversy by declaring that in case of a surprise attack, military leaders might have to take "supra-legal actions" without prior consultation with the Prime Minister. Though the general was dismissed from office for these remarks, other high-ranking figures in the Japanese Self-Defense Forces subsequently expressed similar opinions in private.

Sentiment for rearmament was reinforced by the belligerent attitude of the Soviet Union following Japan's decision to sign the treaty with China. In mid-May of 1979 Ganri Yamashita, Director General of Japan's Defense Agency, called for substantially increasing the nation's defense budget. He clearly linked this call with Russian actions on Kunashiri and Etorofu, and with the training exercises the Soviets had recently conducted in that area.⁸ Concurrently, the US Senate Armed Services Committee issued a report urging Japan to expand its military defense efforts.⁹ China has also urged Japan to rearm.¹⁰

A credible Japanese defense would require an upgraded antisubmarine capability; a combined fighter-interceptor/antiaircraft missile system at least triple that currently contemplated; a more modern ground-radar network tied into advanced warning aircraft; and a secure, hardened command, control, and communications system. It is estimated that this would necessitate increasing the defense budget from its current 0.9 percent of the GNP to at least 2 percent by the mid-1980's.¹¹

To commit the country to such an ambitious program carries substantial domestic and international risks. Domestically, while Japan can certainly afford to spend 2 percent of its GNP on defense, there would be problems in reallocating resources and strong resistance from left-wing groups. Internationally, the Soviet Union could be expected to react sharply to Japanese rearmament and perhaps to step up its harassment activities against Japan. Should Japan choose to aid China in such a manner as to build up PRC

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military capabilities, the Soviet Union might retaliate sharply. Moreover, various Southeast Asian states, with vivid memories of Japanese atrocities during World War II, would probably also react negatively. The dilemma of whether to remain militarily weak and perhaps invite attack, or to rearm and perhaps invite attack, is a vexing one in which the Japanese could choose either alternative. One analyst has compared the country to a loose and loaded cannon on the rolling deck of East Asian international politics.

In all probability, however, the Japanese will in the near future opt for no more than a modest expansion of defense spending which may exceed the 1 percent limit, but not by a great deal. Efforts will be made to explain to both domestic and international critics that this expanded capability will be defensive only, and that it will contribute to keeping a military balance in Asia and to maintaining the stability of regional politics. For the foreseeable future, however, Japan will retain the public posture of impartial treatment of all states, while in reality remaining closer to the United States and to China than to the Soviet Union.

United States

As an aftermath of US participation in the Vietnam conflict, there is disagreement as to what proper US policy in Asia should be. The phrase "the lessons of Vietnam" has become a cliché; yet there is uncertainty over what those lessons are and how to apply them to present and future policy. Was America's failure to prevent Indochina from falling under Communist rule due to an undercommitment of arms and personnel, or would it have occurred regardless of the size of the American commitment? Did the Communist victory occur because the United States did not adequately support indigenous anti-Communist leaders, or because the United States supported the wrong leaders? Was it US intervention itself that was wrong, or did the United States simply follow the wrong strategy to achieve victory? Given the inflationary pressures and ideological dissatisfactions engendered within the United States as a result of intervention in Vietnam, and the antagonisms which became evident among various Asian Communist groups once they did not have the United States as a common enemy, should the United States have intervened at all?

There are legitimate arguments to be made on both sides of all of these questions. Obviously the arguments that prevail will have important consequences for future American policy in Asia. If, for example, it is believed that no amount of commitment within American means can decisively influence events in Asia, this will impose constraints on US policy very different from those conditioned by the belief that American intervention in Vietnam was properly conceived but improperly executed. Yet, there is agreement among most observers on at least one point: that the Vietnam experience should teach the United States to be extremely wary of becoming involved in future Asian conflicts.

Prudence should, of course, be the hallmark of any policy, regardless of what the lessons of Vietnam may be. Beyond this, there is much disagreement on what level of US involvement is prudent. Very few would advocate either total withdrawal from Asia or a massive US commitment thereto. Rather, the debates take place along a continuum ranging from advocacy of a low profile to advocacy of a high-profile US strategy in Asia.

Those who believe in a low US profile argue that for reasons of culture, economic ties, and defense, America's main interests lie in Europe and secondarily in the Middle East. Asia is a poor third in importance. Since it is beyond American means to influence events everywhere in the world, resources ought to be committed to the most important areas first.

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According to this view, Asian countries should be encouraged to bear the burden of their own defense as far as possible, and gradual troop withdrawals should take place to reduce the American commitment. This, it is argued, will actually help reduce tensions. For example, the two Koreas will be free to work out their differences, without the presence of US troops in the South creating a prop for the Park government and an irritant to the Kim regime. Asianization of Asia's problems will create a new, more stable balance of power in the area. Additionally, it will result in the Asian states developing more favorable attitudes toward a United States which no longer meddles in their affairs.

Advocates of this low-profile strategy would disagree with charges that it amounts to a callous abandoning of Asia to communism. While Soviet and Chinese efforts to achieve hegemony cannot be totally ignored, historical and cultural factors militate against the success of such ventures. Both Russia and China have shown themselves insensitive to the needs and aspirations of Asian nationalisms, and the Soviet Union in particular seems even less able than the United States to adapt its policies to local cultures.

Those in the center of the continuum advocate a somewhat higher US profile. They are less sanguine about the probability of a stable balance of power being achieved in the absence of an American commitment to the area. Generally speaking, they regard the Soviet Union as the major destabilizing force. While wary of cold-war polemics which might turn a possible Soviet threat into an actual one, they urge greater vigilance against the Kremlin's machinations.

In lieu of expensive, possibly provocative American commitments to Asian defense, the moderates advocate an entente of as many Asian states as possible against Russia, with each state bearing as much of the burden of its own defense as possible. Clearly, the United States will have to take up the slack between the need to defend and the ability to finance defense, including, if deemed necessary, military assistance to China. In order to minimize the appearance of a threat to the Soviet Union, this entente will be composed of informal understandings, working partnerships, and economic agreements, in addition to formal treaty organizations. Japanese economic ties with the PRC and ASEAN states should be encouraged, as should Chinese ties with Japan and the ASEAN states.

Those who advocate a higher US profile argue against the Europe-centered view of the low-profile strategists. They note that the world's four strongest powers abut closely on one another in Asia, giving its importance beyond that of Europe. Moreover, the United States, as well as the other major powers, has vital economic and strategic interests in the area. These interests are likely to grow in importance. Since all major powers are so intimately concerned with the area, the low-profile strategists' idea of a natural strategic balance created by Asians without American help or interference is untenable and unrealistic.

The advocates of a higher US profile believe that the security of Asia is essential to the security of the United States, and that the defense of Asia should therefore receive a share of American resources commensurate with this importance. Although the Soviet Union is perceived as most dangerous to the Asian balance, advocates of the higher profile strategy are wary of a US-China-Japan entente. First, they fear it will increase Soviet fears of encirclement and provoke hostile reaction. Second, they argue that, given the present relatively small US presence in Asia and a continuation of Japan's military weakness, such an entente may increase Chinese strength in Asia to an extent likely to curtail the independence of many smaller Asian states.¹⁵

Which strategy will ultimately win out will depend on a multitude of unpredictable factors. However, public opinion is likely to remain hostile to an active policy in Asia for some time to come. Concern with domestic issues in general, and with the availability of fuel supplies in particular, makes it improbable that popular attention will focus on Asia

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All the same, public opinion continues to distrust the Soviet Union, and to regard the ability of Asians to conduct Asian affairs in a manner satisfactory to the United States is unlikely. American foreign policymakers agree that Japan, as our most important ally, should be defended, and that South Korean independence must be safeguarded. China is likely to be courted as a counterbalance to the Soviet Union. Barring some major catastrophic event which increases perceptions of Asia's importance to American security, the present administration's middle level profile is unlikely to be changed. The issues are complex, there is uncertainty over the definition of America's vital interests, and doubts exist about America's ability to shape events, even where those interests are identified. In addition, any American President will need to bargain for domestic and congressional support for major changes in policy.

Hence, despite considerable disagreement among some quarters on what American policy in Asia should be, the outlook is for a continuation of the current policy. This policy favors China over Russia, seeks economic and political alliances with as many Asian states as possible, and is extremely wary of US intervention in Asian conflicts.

In sum, major elements of uncertainty exist within each of the four great powers of the Pacific Basin as they seek to redefine basic security interests in the aftermath of US-PRC normalization. While these ambiguities might be resolved in such a way as to fundamentally alter the Asian balance of power, each state also operates under domestic and international constraints which reduce the likelihood that such fundamental changes will occur.

Russia must cope with dissent among its intelligentsia and resurgence among its ethnic minorities, hostile Russian moves toward either of the other three great powers run the risk of more firmly uniting the three powers against it. China must contend with a precariously balanced domestic economy and the fear that aggressive foreign behavior will invite Soviet retaliation. Japan must deal with a still vocal internal pacifist minority and the realization that rearmament and a more active foreign policy may lead to further harassment and anti-Japanese sentiments among Southeast Asian nations. In the United States, public opinion is intolerant of sizable commitments to Asian states, and any American move to influence decisively the Asian balance is likely to evoke sharp reaction from the Soviet Union.

Thus, despite the potential for radical change because of ambiguities in the future policymaking environment, each of the four major powers is constrained from actively confronting the others in such a way as to fundamentally reorder the Asian balance.

INTERACTION OF MAJOR AND MINOR POWERS IN THE PACIFIC BASIN

Though largely constrained from direct confrontations against one another, the great powers of the Pacific Basin may yet pursue activities affecting the Asian balance by directing them into other arenas. Expansion of their respective spheres of influence to include smaller powers allows the great powers to play out their rivalries at lower risk to their territories and citizens.

There is, of course, an infinite variety of ways in which a great power may expand its power against a smaller one, including economic aid and ties, direct support to an elite group perceived as friendly to the great power, and indirect support to terrorist groups who seek to overthrow the established government of the smaller state. Such activities carry a lower risk to the population and inhabitants of the great power, but may nonetheless alarm other great powers. To the extent that these other powers perceive that the harm done to their interests by allowing the expansionist activities to take place outweighs the risks of becoming involved, a great power confrontation may take place.

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In the case of Asia, three major areas exist in which such machinations might invite a confrontation: Korea, Taiwan, and Mainland Southeast Asia.

Korea

The divided state of Korea causes tensions with serious potential for disrupting peace and stability in Asia. Many people on both sides of the border strongly desire reunification, though along very different political-ideological lines. Within South Korea, opposition to the authoritarian Park regime continues to grow, and could erupt into violence similar to that which occurred in Iran recently. In such a situation, the Kim Il-song government in the North would be strongly tempted to take action.

Although both the Chinese and the Soviets may wish to avoid war, they could be drawn into one nonetheless. Kim has proved difficult for either Communist power to control and has several times taken foreign policy positions different from them. This is consonant with his policy of *juch'e*, or self-reliance, which also involves the development of an impressive indigenous military production capability. This combination of independent foreign policy stances and domestic military production could be brought to bear in an attempt at reunification by force.

Kim has proved himself adept in playing off the Chinese against the Soviet Union in obtaining aid and friendship. And either China or Russia would find a unified Korea allied with the other difficult to tolerate. Even if they were unable to stay out of actual conflict, the Chinese and the Soviets might be tempted to equal or surpass each other's contributions to Kim in order to maximize their influence over a reunified postwar Korea.

While both China and Russia might be drawn into a Korean conflict, it is China which has proved most responsive to Kim Il-song's desires recently. For example, Russia has thus far refused to sell Kim any MiG-23's, which it routinely provides to other countries. It has also refused to sell oil to North Korea at below-market prices—with the Chinese quickly agreeing to do so. The Chinese have also come out unequivocally for the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) as the sole legitimate government on the Korean peninsula, whereas the Soviet Union has not recently endorsed the DPRK's claim.

An attack on South Korea from the North would be viewed with great concern by Japan, which has important economic interests to be protected. The United States has repeatedly reassured South Korea of US assistance in countering a threat from North Korea.¹⁴ Neither Japan nor the United States would find it easy to avoid becoming involved in such a confrontation.

Taiwan

Despite the diplomatic fiction that Taiwan is a part of China, it is obvious that the two entities differ in political, economic, and ideological makeup and function largely independently of one another. The People's Republic of China has repeatedly declared its intention to "liberate" Taiwan, using force if necessary. Unlike many statements by the Beijing Government which can be dismissed as mere rhetoric, the intention to return Taiwan to the ancestral land reflects a deep-seated nationalistic desire which transcends factional politics within the Chinese leadership.

The United States has given notice that it wishes to terminate its defense treaty with Taiwan. Although the People's Republic of China may presently be unable to invade Taiwan due to inadequate naval and air capabilities, it has embarked on an ambitious military modernization program which may be expected to give it these capabilities vis-a-vis Taiwan in the near future.

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Once the Chinese leadership perceives clearly its ability to annex Taiwan by force and doubts the United States will defend it, there will be a significant danger of a PRC attack on Taiwan, perhaps with little warning to the United States. Success in such an attempt would call into question the value of the US-China relationship which has developed recently, and would also undermine the credibility of US defense commitments both formal and informal. In the Asia-Pacific area this would certainly lead to a reevaluation on the part of America's principal alliance partners in Asia: Japan, the Republic of Korea, Thailand, and the Philippines.

In short, the American decision to terminate its treaty with Taiwan as a price for normalization with the People's Republic of China has placed Taiwan in an ambiguous political and defense situation. This invites PRC intervention and the attendant possibility that the United States will be called upon to defend its former ally or risk undermining its credibility in such a way as to reorder fundamentally the Asian balance in a manner inimical to American interests.

Mainland Southeast Asia

In the months since normalization of US-PRC relations, the situation in mainland Southeast Asia has been dominated by the policies of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam (SRV). These policies include direct interference in the affairs of Vietnam's neighbors through growing influence on the Laotian Government, the invasion of Cambodia, and pressures on Thailand. In addition, the SRV's international policies have created a much-publicized refugee problem, and also have been involved in the persecution of Vietnam's important ethnic Chinese minority.

All four of the great powers of the Pacific Basin have important interests in mainland Southeast Asia. The Soviet Union is deeply involved because of its recent support of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam and the Soviet interest in a warm-water port in the area. Japan because of its economic interests, the United States because of its commitment to Thailand, and China because of its geographical contiguity to the area, its support of the Khmer Rouge government in Cambodia, and its concern with the fate of ethnic Chinese minorities in Southeast Asia.

It is China's interests which are most directly affected by Vietnam's policies, certain of which Beijing views as directed against China. The combination of discontents over the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia and SRV treatment of its ethnic Chinese minority led to China's recent "defensive counterattack" against Vietnam. While the results of that confrontation are ambiguous, it at least revealed clearly the PRC's willingness to use military force to advance its foreign policy interests, in this case with seemingly little concern for regional stability.

China's initial failure to curtail Vietnamese activities in Laos and Cambodia has not meant a diminution of its attempts to alter the Southeast Asian balance in its favor. It is common knowledge that China, with the tacit consent of the Kriangsak government, is using Thai territory to transport arms and supplies to the Khmer Rouge in opposition to Vietnam. This may lead Vietnam to attack Thailand, which could in turn cause China to further escalate its activities in Thailand and to gain influence in that country proportionally. Thailand aside, scenarios involving further Chinese actions against Vietnam in the future are not only plausible, but have been threatened by the Chinese themselves.

Even though it is the small countries of the region that have the localized instabilities and the relative lack of constraints which make crisis situations more probable, it will require major power intervention to turn local crisis of this sort into serious threats to the regional balance. Our review of the current state of the four major powers

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involved, and of the principal likely small-country crisis situations, suggests that the power most apt to escalate such crisis situations is China.

The above scenarios have dwelt on destabilization of the balance of power through the use of force. It is also possible that the present balance may be changed through peaceful means. The current alignment of great and small powers is hardly unchangeable, and there are elements of fluidity in the system.

Chinese-Soviet tensions have abated somewhat, with China posthumously exonerating a former Chinese Ambassador to the Soviet Union who had been a proponent of better relations between the two countries.¹⁷ And Hong Kong magazines known to be closely associated with the PRC official line have begun both to praise the Soviet economic system and to declare that relations between the two countries have eased recently.

In April 1979, China also proposed cooperation between the Chinese Communist Party and Taiwan's Kuomintang "so as to bring about the return of Taiwan to the embrace of the motherland, its reunification and its reconstruction."¹⁸ Though done unofficially through an intermediary, a relative of a now-deceased high-ranking Kuomintang figure, the gesture obviously was sanctioned at the highest level of the People's Republic of China.

At the same time, North Korea's relations with China have shown signs of strain. Pyongyang has refused to endorse China's incursion into Vietnam, and China's *People's Daily* article on Korean Army Day omitted its traditional reference to Chinese and Koreans as "comrades in arms." It referred only to relations between the two "peoples" rather than between the "peoples and armies" of the two countries.¹⁹

Almost simultaneously, North Korea moved to ease its relations with the United States, with Kim Il-sung declaring that "the door is open at all times to a knock by the United States."²⁰ Also, the anti-US polemics of North Korean media were abruptly halted, and North Korean officials expressed willingness to seek a conversion of their country's armistice with the United States into a permanent peace treaty.²¹

Events south of the 38th parallel also showed signs of change. A high-ranking South Korean official indicated that Seoul expected to open trade relations with both Russia and China within 3 to 5 years.²² And Japan and the Soviet Union began another attempt to solve outstanding problems between them.

These indications for change through peaceful means are unlikely to have meaningful consequences for the Asian balance. China's peace initiatives to the Soviet Union probably have limited motivations: first, to separate China's problems with Vietnam from the Sino-Soviet dispute insofar as possible, and second, to reduce Sino-Soviet tensions in order to buy time for China's four modernizations program.* As stated by a Hong Kong magazine known to have close connections with the PRC:

Tensions between the two countries have lessened compared with the situation in the 1960's. To embark on modernization, China needs a peaceful international environment. Improving Sino-Soviet relations is beneficial to the creation of a peaceful environment.²³

Differences between the two countries are sufficiently deep-seated as to make a genuine rapprochement unlikely. Moreover, these gestures occur at a time when, according to the Soviet Union, infiltration by Chinese agents and spies along the border of the two countries is becoming more and more frequent.²⁴

*The four modernizations are in the areas of agriculture, industry, science, and technology, and national defense.

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China's overtures to Taiwan are most likely to have been prompted by a desire to create an image of a People's Republic of China which is peace loving and conciliatory on the issue of Taiwan—an image which was badly tarnished after the Chinese attack on Vietnam. And North Korea's peaceful gestures toward the United States have not been accompanied by any diminution in North Korean force levels or in the production of military material. The Soviet Union's intransigence on the question of the Northern Islands will preclude any genuine change in Japan's political stance.

Though the effect of these initiatives on the Asian balance may be minimal, they indicate that there is some play in the system and that the present configuration of powers is not immutable. This presents the United States with opportunities to influence the situation in ways favorable to its interests.

IMPLICATIONS FOR UNITED STATES POLICY

Clearly, US policy should strive to maximize US political and economic access to the countries of the Pacific Basin while minimizing the risks of being drawn into conflict there. As noted above, because of a combination of external and internal factors, each of the four major states of the Pacific Basin is to some extent constrained from projecting its power into the Asian system. Thus, one might conceptualize the system as a balance of weakness as much as a balance of power. The ability of elites and counterelites in smaller Asian states to manipulate the actions of major powers reinforces this perception of the limitations on actions of these powers.

Evidence presented above has argued for an Asian balance which is, at least in the short run, basically stable, though elements with potential for change are present. Japan's alignment with the United States is solidly established, and Sino-Soviet rivalries appear to be enduring. Although the Soviet Union possesses the greater ability to project its power, China appears to have the greater will to project such power as it does possess. Interestingly, it is China which is most apt to become involved in the three most likely areas for destabilization of the present balance: Korea, Taiwan, and mainland Southeast Asia.

While a certain degree of rapport between China and the United States is appropriate and desirable, the United States should avoid becoming too closely associated with the People's Republic of China. It is in the best interests of the United States to maintain better relations with China and Russia than either maintains with the other. Of course, US policy should avoid actions which might draw Moscow and Beijing more closely together. On the other hand, to try to exacerbate Chinese and Soviet differences for American benefit is attractive in the abstract but apt to be disastrous in practical terms: such actions may hinder the progress of productive relations with either country.

Leaning toward China can only antagonize the Soviet Union and may encourage the rise of Chinese hegemony in Asia. Moreover, the United States incurs risks in considering China a shield against Soviet aggression, since China may lack either the will or the capacity to aid the United States in any significant sense.

It would, of course, be equally foolish to side with the Soviet Union, which is by far the stronger of the Communist powers. Such perceived favoritism for Russia would intensify Chinese fears of a US-USSR "Holy Alliance" of the forces of conservatism against the forces of progress. Thus, the indicated policy is equidistance from China and Russia.

Beyond this, American policymakers must educate public opinion to recognize that the United States has legitimate interests in the Pacific Basin and will play a key role in the security structure of the area either by design or default. The wisdom of doing so

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through the design alternative should be emphasized. So also should the idea that the general ability of the United States to affect the balance of power in the Pacific requires the reestablishment of US credibility to act when action is indicated. Neither withdrawing from participation nor attempting to intervene in a dramatic manner is indicated.

ENDNOTES. THE US-USSR-CHINA-JAPAN QUADRANGLE

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PANEL 3 PAPER:

Regional Conflict In The Pacific: Continuity And Change

Francis T. Underhill

Regional conflict in Asia will persist at low levels in many areas and flare up occasionally in brief, larger scale outbreaks

There are at the same time forces limiting the duration and intensity of violence and encouraging regional harmony

Involvement of the major powers in regional conflict will become progressively less likely, partly because the regional powers will seek to exclude outside intervention, partly because the major powers will not see their own national interests served by intervention

Since the fall of Saigon in April 1975, the American people have turned away from regional conflict in the Pacific area. The Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia, the second fall of Phnom Penh, and the Chinese educational incursion into Vietnam have reminded us that violence continues in Southeast Asia, but none of our allies or friends were involved, and our attention has been focused on more pressing areas of conflict in the Middle East and Africa. Presidential travel is a good indication of foreign policy priorities, and after 30 months in office, President Carter's first and only Asian trip (to the Tokyo economic summit in late June of 1979) fell far short of dramatizing any serious change in these priorities.

THE PERSISTENCE OF REGIONAL CONFLICT

A recapitulation shows, however, that regional conflict persists in many parts of Asia:

- Vietnamese regular forces are fighting against the remnants of the Pol Pot regime in Cambodia and Meo tribesmen in Laos
- White flag and Red Flag Communist insurgencies persist in Burma
- Insurgency continues in north and northeast Thailand, and the Malayan Communist Party terrorists still operate along the Thai-Malaysian border
- The Marcos Regime continues to face widespread Muslim insurgency in Mindanao
- Indonesian troops are operating against insurgents in West Irian and the remnants of the Frelimo forces in Timor

There are other points of friction and unrest in the region which, with changes in regimes and the emergence of more militant, aggressive leadership, could produce serious intraregional violence.

The ebb and flow of the boundary between Malaysia and Thailand has left the southern provinces of Thailand from 95 percent to 60 percent ethnic Malay. The people are called "Thai Muslims," but they are culturally, linguistically, and religiously the same as their brothers in Kelantan, Kedah, Perak, and Perlis-- the Malaysian border states. The solidarity of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), and a range of other common interests, have kept irredentism submerged, but the sentiment for union exists on both sides of the border, and all of the emotional elements of serious border conflict exist.

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President Marcos at the ASEAN summit meeting in Kuala Lumpur in 1977 said that he would take steps to abandon formally the Philippine claim to Sabah. He has not yet done so, and the dormant Sabah issue, which produced a break in relations between Manila and Kuala Lumpur in 1968, could be revived if ASEAN should founder.

A different Malaysian regime might encourage a brief spasm of violence that would bring to power in Brunei a group asking for union with Malaysia.

A potential for serious conflict exists between Indonesia and Papua-New Guinea over the West Irian insurgency movement seeking independence from what its supporters call Indonesian colonial domination. As modernization penetrates to the remote areas on both sides of the border on this vast island, political activism could bring the two governments into progressively more intense confrontation.

The Spratly Islands in the South China Sea are claimed by the Philippines, the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, and China. The discovery of oil could make these islands the focus of a sharp and potentially violent international conflict.

The "boat people," the refugees from Vietnam that have arrived in thousands on the shores of Thailand, Malaysia, and Indonesia, raise the specter of a new kind of non-violent movement of peoples. Modern states would find such an invasion difficult to confront. Population pressures, food shortages, political oppression—all could stimulate such movements.

The structure of many of the societies in Asia encourages violence as a political act. Most of the regimes are authoritarian; many are dominated by the military. The mechanisms for peaceful change are rudimentary if they exist at all, and violence is the only recourse if the regimes over time become corrupt, oppressive, and incompetent. Long periods of "stability," or more precisely, periods without political activity, are likely to be interspersed with spasms of violence as political power changes hands.

Finally, then, is the threat to the region posed by the Socialist Republic of Vietnam. Acknowledging the revolutionary belligerence of the Hanoi leadership, and the military ability of the Vietnamese army, I believe that we have nonetheless tended to overestimate the seriousness of this threat. We may have done so in part in support of Thieu, in part because we have tended to see the Vietnamese as 10 feet tall. The overthrow of the genocidal Pol Pot regime does not confirm our worst fears. Hanoi's incursion can only have reinforced traditional Cambodian hatred of the Vietnamese, and the continued fighting, months after the capture of Phnom Penh, suggests a long and expensive struggle. Away from home, Vietnamese troops are alien invaders, and the People's Republic of China now stands as a formidable obstacle to Vietnamese ambitions. To see the Socialist Republic of Vietnam as the docile agent or proxy of the Soviet Union in Southeast Asia runs against all that we have seen in this tough, fiercely independent people.

REGIONAL COHESION

Despite the conflicts now in progress and the prospects for future conflict, there are important factors working against intraregional violence, or limiting its intensity and duration.

Perhaps the most important factor is a growing sense of regional cohesion given formal expression in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).* ASEAN is significant not as an organization (its organizational structure is vestigial), but rather as a concept, a way of thinking, a framework through which the regional powers approach common problems. In this regional context have developed a network of supplementary bilateral, trilateral, and quadrilateral links among the five nations of ASEAN that far

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transcend the formal ASEAN objectives of cultural, social, and economic cooperation. Through these links the leadership and the bureaucracies of the five countries have come to know each other, and, while differences and frictions remain, all perceive that their own national interests are well served by strengthening regional cooperation and cohesion.

An equally important impediment to conflict is the burgeoning economy of the region. Southeast Asia is now one of the most rapidly growing areas in the world, with the gross national product of the ASEAN countries growing between 6 and 11 percent per year. All of the governments are pressed economically and politically by large numbers of young people coming on the job market each year, and they must pursue every possible way to sustain this growth. These priorities have tended to bring people with technical knowledge and management skills, rather than charismatic ideologues, into positions of power.

Southeast Asian nations are governed for the most part by hardheaded, pragmatic realists, and intraregional conflict does not seem to them a useful option. First and foremost, conflict is costly. Here the United States may unwittingly have contributed to regional stability. In a quarter of a century of training Asian officers in US service schools, and providing modern military technology and skills through such groups as MAAG's (Military Assistance Advisory Groups) and others, we have indoctrinated a whole generation of Asian soldiers in the most expensive ways of going to war. Formal, organized, professional violence has therefore been almost priced out of the market.

TRADITIONAL PACIFIC STRATEGY: A CRITIQUE

What are likely to be the roles of the United States, the Soviet Union, China, and Japan in Asian regional conflict? To answer this question, we should first examine the traditional strategic policy concepts for the Pacific region.

This and previous administrations have defined this framework in more or less the following terms:

The Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China are competing for power and influence in Southeast Asia. Each is trying to limit the presence and influence of the other while seeking a significant, if not dominant, role for itself. This competition is now in a rough equilibrium, and the major role of the United States is to maintain this balance. We do not wish to dominate, but rather to prevent any other outside power from doing so. The nations of Southeast Asia are concerned about our credibility and our resolve, and if they come to believe that we are unwilling or unable to play this strategic role, they will seek accommodation with the Communist powers.

This conceptual framework seems to me unsatisfactory in many respects, and seriously out of date in others.

Southeast Asia is not today a high priority area for any of the great powers. This reduction in interest is reflected in declining military and economic assistance statistics and the infrequency of high-level visits. The relative neglect is not unwelcome in Asia, but at the same time the Southeast Asian leaders have been accustomed to seeing themselves as the center of great power competition, and they somewhat regret the reduction of bargaining leverage this slackening of interest has produced.

The idea of an equilibrium with the United States maintaining the balance is inadequate because it is one dimensional. Each of the great powers wants something from Southeast Asia, but is seeking it on different levels, and in response to different perceptions of roles and needs. The gains of one do not in most cases mean a corresponding

*ASEAN consists of Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand.

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loss to the others. There is no single equilibrium, but a relatively stable combination of discrete disequilibria.

Japan operates almost exclusively in the economic and commercial field. Both as a market for raw materials and as a supplier of consumer products, it exercises considerable influence. The gravitational pull of the Japanese economy is reflected not only in the trade statistics, but also in Asian resentment towards the Japanese, and in the illuminated advertising signs of Japanese manufacturers and trading companies that brighten the evening skies of almost every non-Communist Asian capital.

China has already won one aspect of the rivalry. Sheer size and proximity, the centuries of contact with the cultural richness of the Middle Kingdom, and the linguistic and ethnic ties of the Nanyang Chinese, have all left an impression which neither we nor the Russians nor the Japanese will ever be able to change. It is reflected in the bloodlines of the intellectual, commercial, and professional elites, in the entrepreneurial energy and atmosphere of the cities, and in the evolving multiethnic popular culture. The Japanese influence is not one which the People's Republic of China can manipulate, but it has a persistent gravitational attraction.

The Soviet Union follows more closely the traditional pattern of great power behavior in Southeast Asia. The Soviets apparently continue to believe that aid programs and development projects bring influence. They are trying harder to persuade young Asians to accept scholarships to Soviet universities. There are occasional cultural and sports programs and naval visits. The officers in Russian Embassies have learned English and the local language and are trying hard to win friends and put their country and social system in the best possible light.

The Russians, however, have a number of severe handicaps.

- Russian Communism is no longer considered an acceptable social alternative. The drab oppressiveness of the Soviet system and above all its inefficiency and its backwardness are well known. Marxism has lost its intellectual respectability and the fellow traveler has disappeared from the universities. There are, of course, still revolutionaries, but they no longer look to Moscow for inspiration and leadership.

- The relativist cultures of Southeast Asia stand in particularly sharp contrast to the rigidities, ideological absolutism, and social self-righteousness of the Soviet system. Below the level of social courtesy or technical discussion, it is difficult for the Russian to find a common ground with the Southeast Asian. The Russian must often find himself with nothing to say in his good English and excellent local language that does not either offend or mystify.

- Soviet economic leverage is negligible. ASEAN gets less than 1 percent of its imports from the Soviet Union, and sends the USSR about 2 percent of its exports.

- Except for a few students, the Russians in Asia are almost all government officials. The absence of a private sector deprives them of an important channel of contact and influence.

A major error in the traditional Asian strategic concept is that it assumes that the nations of Southeast Asia, the targets and the prize in the contest for influence, are weak, naive, politically unsophisticated, easily manipulated, and disposed to be influenced. If this were ever true, it is certainly not so today. The nations of non-Communist Asia have reached a level of political organization, economic development, and regional cohesion that make them unsusceptible to easy interference or manipulation by any outside power. They are governed by authoritarian, sophisticated, nationalistic regimes.

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alert and sensitive to such pressures. The big powers—all the big powers—are regarded with wary suspicion. A major regional objective under the Kuala Lumpur declaration of 1971 of a zone of peace, freedom, and neutrality is to make the region no longer a battleground for great power rivalry. While intraregional differences exist, ASEAN provides a framework for conciliation and cooperation. Insurgent movements are too weak and their prospects for coming to power too slim to justify the risks of direct outside support from the major powers. A regional high-pressure area is developing which does not attract or encourage foreign intervention.

A ROLE FOR THE UNITED STATES?

What role might the United States play in the emerging pattern of Asian regional conflict? Does it involve any of our central national security interests? Do we need to get involved?

Since the end of World War II, we have tended to see such conflict as an aberration, a social breakdown, and an undermining of economic and political development. We have also feared and opposed it as a mechanism of Communist expansion, a "war of national liberation," that might bring to power a government subservient to Moscow or Peking. In attempting to deal with this threat, we sought to develop a capacity to respond along "a spectrum of violence," as if violence were a single phenomenon like light, differing only in intensity.

During the 1960's, executive branch officers assigned to developing countries were required to attend an interdepartmental seminar on internal defense; embassy country teams developed internal defense programs for bewildered host governments, and our armed forces were directed to develop a capacity for low-level unconventional warfare. A closing feature of the interdepartmental seminar was a visit to Eglin Air Force Base and Fort Bragg to see what the Air Force and Army could do in these fields, and in my course before going to the Philippines in 1968, I can remember the briefing officers urging us somewhat plaintively to keep their capabilities in mind. It reminded me of the old Irish barroom ballad, "I took my harp to the party, but nobody asked me to play."

There were a number of ironies in this position. We had sided with the relatively few in the developing world who were well-fed, well-housed, and well-satisfied with the distribution of power which they intended to cling to at all costs. We abandoned, in the interests of "stability," the vast majority, ill-fed, ill-housed, with no alternative but violence to change the distribution of power. We allowed the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China to become the sponsors, counselors, and supporters of this kind of change.

All this occurred at a time when economic, technological, scientific, and cultural forces originating primarily in the United States were transforming societies in Asia far more profoundly than any Moscow-inspired revolution or "war of national liberation." We seemed also to have forgotten the American inspiration to violence in the face of intolerable oppression. Few Americans today read further than "pursuit of happiness" in the Declaration of Independence, but Jefferson's next phrases have probably inspired far more violence than the Communist Manifesto: "... deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed ... Whenever any form of government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the right of the people to alter or abolish it."

It is clear today that most of the armed violence is a normal, continuing aspect of the internal political process, not an aberration. Insurgencies are the counterparts of the opposition parties in the developed democracies, and they become a threat only as a part of a general political, economic, and social breakdown which comes from the failures and

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inadequacies of the regime in power. We need no longer prepare internal defense plans for non-Communist Asian governments because it is evident that we now cannot, if indeed we ever could, affect directly their internal policies and behavior. If these governments become rigid, oppressive, corrupt, unresponsive, and inefficient, change by some form of violence is inevitable. This violence is inherent in the politics of the area and would exist if Karl Marx had never lived.

There is no need to try to deny Southeast Asia to China, the Soviet Union, or the Socialist Republic of Vietnam. The region is too large and diverse, and nationalism is too strong to make such hegemony possible. We persist in the 19th century illusion that hegemony is desirable and profitable when it is clear that the responsibilities of modern government today make domination prohibitively expensive. Even if one of the Communist states could establish regional hegemony, its strength would be diminished, not increased, thereby.

What, then, is the role of the United States?

The non-Communist nations of Asia see their national security and the United States in a relationship more complex than the simple military balance of power terms in which we usually define it. They welcome the strategic nuclear balance which we maintain with the Soviet Union. They would be uneasy in a world in which there was no counterforce to conventional Soviet military strength. At the same time, they see the chances of a direct military threat from China or the Soviet Union as extremely remote. They know that American military power is not applicable to their problems of dissidence—that the therapy endangers the patient. Our assurances that we are a Pacific power, and that we intend to maintain a flexible military presence in the region, while welcomed as expressions of continuing interest, are seen as largely unresponsive to their more pressing needs. The nations of Asia, Communist and non-Communist, need access to our markets, our technology, our capital, and our management skills. They are looking to us for leadership in solving the central issues in the North-South economic dialogue. With economies acutely sensitive to the health of the US economy, Asian countries are watching with concern, bordering on alarm, our apparent inability to curb energy consumption and devise a national energy policy.

We exaggerate the trust the governments of Asia put in our commitments, and are mistaken and patronizing in our judgment that they will turn toward the Communist powers if this trust is dissipated. The leaders of Asia are sophisticated, perceptive observers of the American political scene, and are represented in Washington by highly skilled diplomats. They see in our open, often indecently exposed political process how our foreign policy decisions are made. They have come to recognize that we cannot make unqualified, unconditional, permanent undertakings, that there must be in the minds of the American people a living, constantly renewing sense of shared values, interests, and objectives to give substance to an undertaking to go to war in another nation's defense. Asian leaders accept these limitations and are conducting their policies accordingly.

These same leaders are equally sophisticated observers of Russian and Chinese communism. Many of them were Marxists in their younger days. They have long since decided that the Soviet model for social organization is unacceptable. Soviet military power, while understood and respected, does not at their distance from it intimidate. They are strong enough and confident enough to see no need to accommodate themselves to either China or the Soviet Union.

If we define American influence as the capacity of the American Government to affect the actions and orientations of foreign governments, American influence has

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undeniably declined in Asia. The traditional instruments of economic and military assistance programs have not been effective, and we have seen that a military presence, while it may bring other benefits, is a net consumer—not a producer—of influence. The voting patterns of the ASEAN members in the United Nations General Assembly and other international fora on matters of interest to the United States are instructive. There is little in this record to indicate which of these five countries are allies of the United States, which are protected by US troops and bases, which are recipients of grants, economic or military assistance, or both, and which are none of the above.

AMERICAN AND WESTERN INFLUENCES IN ASIA

In a larger sense, however, American influence in Asia has never been greater. It is so pervasive and widespread that we do not notice it. The politico-military dimension has over the past 30 years tended to dominate our thinking about Asia. Many of us have ignored or condescended to the cultural dimension, seeing it as a *desirable but peripheral* and dispensable embellishment to our foreign relations. Yet in these three decades the cultural impact of the United States has been profound.

The non-Communist countries of Asia have adopted to a substantial degree our mixed public-private approach to national development. The technocrats that make most of the key government decisions have been trained in our universities.

Asian business and industry are directed more and more by men trained in American management techniques at Harvard, Wharton, and Harvard's offshoot, the Asian Institute of Management in Makati, the Philippines.

The universal use of English as the language of science, business, diplomacy, and the arts links Asia to our communication system. The Asian edition of the *Wall Street Journal*, published in Hong Kong, is on the breakfast tables of the Asian government and business elites.

Our social values, and our definitions of the good life, have been widely adopted. Anyone who has sat in the rush-hour traffic in Bangkok, Manila, Kuala Lumpur, or Jakarta will question Asia's wisdom in following us in our infatuation with the motorcar, and much of the corruption in Asia has been encouraged by a desire to acquire the amenities of the American lifestyle. But for good or ill, many of the elements of our popular culture have taken firm root. Our political ideals are not widely practiced, but the governments of Asia pay tribute to them by holding elections and calling themselves democracies.

Most important of all is the economic and trade link. As we have noted above, the nations of Asia must have access to our markets, technology, and capital.

The actions of the United States Government, and its failures to act, will continue to have a profound effect on Asia. Many of its leaders are convinced that the greatest contribution we can make to regional stability is through economic, trade, and investment decisions that will encourage the growth of their economies. They are polite about our self-assigned task of stabilizing the power equilibrium, but they believe that in most respects they can handle this job themselves.

Beyond the range of government action, however, broader and more fundamental cultural influences will be acting, and these we will not be able to manipulate or change.

Panel 4
MOBILIZATION AND SURGE POTENTIAL
IN THE NUCLEAR AGE

An examination of the assumption that mobilization and surge potential in the nuclear age are irrelevant in strategic nuclear war. An examination of the contrary assumption that an assured destruction capability by the superpowers lends credence to increased threats of conventional wars and increased reliance on mobilization potential. An assessment of the importance of surge and mobilization potential to national security in the decade ahead.

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PANEL 4

Participants

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PANEL 4 SUMMARY

Mobilization And Surge Potential In The Nuclear Age

Leslie Bray

Harry Ennis

The task of Panel 4 may have been somewhat more specific than that given to the other panels, in that it was asked to examine the assumption that mobilization and surge potential in the nuclear age are largely irrelevant in strategic nuclear war.

Secondly, the panel was tasked to examine the contrary assumption that assured destruction capability by the superpowers lends credence to increased threats of conventional war and increased reliance on mobilization potential.

Finally, the panel was to assess the importance of mobilization and surge potential to national security in the decade ahead.

There was an early consensus on the answers to these specific questions. Panelists, therefore, found themselves discussing questions of somewhat more immediate interest, such as: What is the shape of our current mobilization program? What are some of the requirements that should structure the shape of the US mobilization program both now and in the decade ahead?

The initial focusing of attention on the issue of comparative mobilization potential was provided by Dr. Norman Friedman's paper, "Surge Mobilization: The United States Versus the Soviet Union." Dr. Friedman contended that each nation adheres to a mobilization policy which mirrors its national political and economic style. The Soviet Union favors a "manpower" mobilization concept, in which a steady-state and relatively high output of military equipment is maintained in peacetime. When needed, troops, previously trained for the most part, are integrated with this huge stockpile of equipment and the nation is ready for war. The United States, on the other hand, does not strive for a large peacetime stockpile of military equipment, but rather relies upon its innate industrial potential to mobilize rapidly for war.

Each of the mobilization philosophies has its weaknesses. The difficulty the USSR would have in expanding rapidly its conservative, perpetual "guns and butter" economy is often overlooked. Conversely, the threat of precipitous nuclear war vitiating the viability of the US approach to mobilization is often improperly overstated. However, the systemic differences between the two approaches suggest a strong imperative for the United States to develop and prototype a family of readily producible military equipment to provide an early, high-quantity input to the materiel inventory. The second discussion paper, on Peacetime Industrial Production Expansion, was prepared by students of the Industrial College of the Armed Forces, with the advice and guidance of Dr. John Ellison and Dr. John Eley. This paper provided a compendium of commercial industrial opinions on measures the government, in cooperation with industry, could take to enhance peacetime defense production expansion.

Despite its considerable experience, expertise, and interest in the subject of modernization and surge, the panel very early encountered a definitional problem that hampered ability to examine the issues adequately. The terms "mobilization" and "surge" meant significantly different things to different members of the panel, in terms of the level of effort, the timing requirements for expanded capacity, as well as the scenario application of these sorts of considerations.

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To some, "mobilization" implied a massive World War II-type program, consisting of all-out industrial expansion and plant construction, curtailment of civilian consumption, and conversion of civilian production facilities. Such requirements would structure the shape of our mobilization program both now and in the decade ahead. Associated with this view was the scenario of a large-scale, NATO versus Warsaw Pact conventional conflict, creating high consumption and loss rates of equipment and people and extending over a considerable period of time.

To others, "mobilization" implied Korean-type conflict, with very limited civilian sector conversion, limited manpower, and force structure increases. Still others thought of "mobilization" as those actions necessary to fully equip and sustain our military forces (Active, Guard, Reserve) to carry out the current range of contingency war plans, whether or not there was a declared mobilization or a declared national emergency.

A DEFENSE EXPANSION MATRIX

There were similar differences, although not quite so severe, on the definition and meaning of "surge." It was necessary to devise a way of examining the broad subject of defense expansion using a generally acceptable and consistent terminology. The term "defense expansion" was used illustratively to represent all types and degrees of mobilization and surge, covering all ranges of levels of effort—timing as well as scenarios. The panel considered defense expansion in this broad sense by developing a three-dimensional matrix (see Figure 1).

Percentage increases to the Department of Defense budget constituted one major variable in identifying the desired magnitude of increased capability. Obviously, this refers to budgetary increases to implement the required increases, not the yearly, normal, budget programming actions which may be necessary to attain the capability and the posture to actually implement.

The panel looked at increases in three general categories: a zero to 50 percent increase in the DOD budget, which panelists felt would approximately double the production of selected items; a 50 to 100 percent increase, which would provide from 2 to 4 times the productive capacity of our major items; and a 100 to 1,000 percent increase, representing 4 to 40 times current production levels.


The second dimension and variable of the matrix obviously concerns the time required to achieve this expansion. The time periods selected were zero to 6 months, a 6- to 18-month period, and an 18- to 48-month period.

The third dimension of the matrix reflected three general functional areas of expansion: industrial actions; manpower actions, both military and industrial; and civil assets which could be taken over and used to meet defense requirements. Using this matrix, the panel was then able to picture previous expansion programs, such as those associated with the Berlin buildup, Korean war, Vietnam conflict, and the 1973 Middle East war; the panel was also able to picture possible future scenarios which might require defense expansion.

The panel could also use this matrix to compare the features of the current DOD industrial mobilization program with some other efforts. From this type of examination, it was apparent that the scenarios or programs which fit into either of those first two levels of increased DOD budget—either up to 50 percent or a 50 to 100 percent increase—would affect primarily the Defense Department or the defense sector of the US economy. Current DOD programs, with the possible exception of some ammunition activities, would, in the opinion of Panel 4, fit very neatly within these two levels of expansion, which were generally identified as DOD surge capability.

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Figure 1
Defense Expansion Matrix



* Economic Declaration or Non-Economic Declaration of National Emergency

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The panel then looked at other scenarios and previous programs fitting into the third level of DOD budget increases— from 100 to 1,000 percent. Such programs obviously would have a major impact upon civilian production and other sectors of our economy. World War II had such an impact, and in some panelists' minds, an extended NATO conventional war scenario would probably fit to some degree in the same category.

The panel noted with interest that a previous study of mobilization and surge by the Defense Science Board recommended a two step action plan to improve current mobilization and surge capabilities. Step 1 concentrated on surge activities within the DOD which were generally consistent with the matrix the panel used to describe those first two levels of activity. The Step 2 recommendations of the Defense Science Board (which, incidentally, have not been implemented) also fit very closely within the third category of the civilian conversion characteristics.

DEFENSE EXPANSION SCENARIOS AND CANDIDATE PROGRAMS

Next, the panel examined possible scenarios and candidates for inclusion in a defense expansion program (See Table 1). The panel produced an illustrative range of plausible intervention scenarios where US forces might in the next decade have to be involved, or even US client forces and the impact of that type of scenario on mobilization and surge.

The panel also wanted to look at a "NATO-first" situation, that is, a situation in which conventional war is confined to the NATO-Europe region. Some of our panelists held the view that this would be a worst-case situation so that, if we had an adequate mobilization and planning capability to take care of a NATO-first scenario, that capability would satisfy a full and broad range of situations.

The panel also discussed a "NATO last" situation in which conventional war broke out in NATO Europe following conventional conflict in some other area of the world— perhaps the Middle East/Persian Gulf region. Some panelists felt that in such a situation, even with an expanded mobilization program, the United States would need to be expending and consuming materials at such a rate that it would find itself at a general disadvantage relative to the Soviets. The problem would be particularly acute if the Soviets were able to use proxy forces while the United States had to involve its own forces. By the time NATO activation took place in such a scenario, some argued, the United States would find itself relatively worse off with respect to Soviet industrial preparedness measures than it might conceivably be in a NATO first situation.

The panel also considered nuclear activities, although previous mobilization efforts had been highly oriented toward those requirements imposed by conventional conflict. Other scenarios considered were nuclear war without previous conventional warfare, and also nuclear requirements after a conventional war, for either an all out strike or for repeated attacks. Last in the range of illustrative scenarios, the panel looked at a crisis situation or a prewar situation in which mobilization competition between the United States and the Soviet Union might begin to occur.

Along with this range of scenarios, the panel attempted to develop an illustrative list of those sorts of candidates that would fit into this type of program. Most previous mobilization surge or planning had focused almost entirely upon conventional war requirements, such as aircraft, tanks, and guns.

The panel, somewhat unexpectedly, had reached an early consensus that planning preoccupied with a NATO first, World War II type scenario was too rigid and potentially dangerous. Since the USSR has become adept at managing multiple "small" peripheral

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Table 1. Illustrative Range of Scenarios

- Intervention or Client wars
- NATO-First (big war starts in Europe)
- NATO-Last (after other crises and/or limited wars)
- Nuclear First (war starts with nuclear exchange)
- Nuclear Later (conventional war escalates)
- Mobilization Competition (prewar or nonwar arms race)

wars, it was suggested that the wartime experience of the post-World War II era are more characteristic of the defense expansion environment in which this Nation is likely to find itself. Such "peacetime" scenarios are potentially highly erosive of our expansion advantage and require innovative contracting and procuring techniques (e.g., contractual arrangements to expand current peacetime production which include providing the wherewithal to do so). Dissenting panelists, however, argued that a single "worst case" scenario helps to focus expansion attention where it will do the most good and subsumes all lesser demanding scenarios.

Some panelists felt we ought to begin now to look at strategic forces, both offensive and defensive, in terms of the impact upon our industrial capability in the event treaties are abrogated or in the event it becomes necessary, in some sort of crash program, to attain an antiballistic missile (ABM) capability.

Closely related were those civil defense programs which might be considered. Certainly, conventional forces would continue to have a major input into a mobilization program, but obviously not just related to US forces alone. Some consideration must be given to the allied problem and the involvement in some way of our allies' intentions and ability to provide some degree of industrial support for themselves.

Manpower is certainly a factor. Military manpower has always been a factor in mobilization. Certainly, industrial manpower has not received the attention that it should.

The panel probed the question of articulated national "mobilization policy" to find that, although a policy appears to exist which fosters the defense expansion capability, the fiscal support has proved inadequate to either maintain a sufficient stockpile of equipment or to provide for the defense industrial base. In this connection, it was observed that a constituency for support of higher funding authorizations for defense expansion capability can only be won by presenting the appeals in a politically acceptable package which clearly demonstrates the payoff to be secured by the creation of such expandability. Providing standby manufacturing facilities was touted as a low-cost, high-payoff measure which could be so demonstrated.

Obviously, the panel viewed mobilization or defense expansion on a much broader basis than it has been traditionally approached. Table 2 is an illustrative list of areas and programs which the panel generally agreed a defense expansion effort should take into consideration.

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Table 2. Illustrative Defense Expansion Candidates
(Including Allied Participation)

- Political Support
- Management/Planning Organization
- Emergency Funding
- Industrial Base
- Manpower
 - Military
 - Industrial
- Conventional Forces
- Strategic Forces
- Adaption of Existing Civil Assets
- Foreign Military Sales

SOME CONCLUSIONS

Based upon our examination, our panel arrived at a consensus on the following conclusions:

First, regarding the specific assumptions to be evaluated, the panel found the assumption that mobilization and surge potential in the nuclear age are irrelevant to strategic nuclear war to be invalid and unrealistic for planning purposes. Similarly, the assumption of assured destruction capability by the superpowers lends credence to increased threats of conventional war. An increased reliance on mobilization potential is, therefore, valid and represents a realistic planning process.

The importance of mobilization and surge potential to national security has been increasing in recent years, whether we have responded to it or not, and will undoubtedly assume even greater importance in the decade ahead.

The current industrial mobilization program does not reflect the focus and emphasis of management nor of funding levels necessary for an effective program.

It is no longer clear that the US defense expansion capability is vastly superior to that of the Soviet Union in a mobilization period of less than 5 years duration.

A defense expansion program should consider a much wider range of possible candidates than simply conventional warfare. The panel felt that the program should include a broad portfolio of plausible scenarios, rather than focusing on any single scenario as the most likely or worst case.

The panel felt a need for considerable further study and investigation, to define the critical variables affecting our ability to respond to a range of scenarios; to identify the payoffs of different options and alternatives, to improve our capability to respond; and to examine the degree of foreign dependence that has crept into our industrial base and assess whether or not that industrial base is a reliable source of supply. In that regard, the panel felt that because of the function and the responsibility of the Industrial College of the Armed Forces, it would be an excellent place in which to conduct an examination of some of these issues.

Even in the limited time available to our panel, there was an intuitive judgment by the panel that significantly more attention needs to be paid to a defense expansion program and preparedness actions, and this probably will involve a significant level of effort.

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The second sort of intuitive judgment was that the results of further studies will probably indicate the need to place greater emphasis on quantity rather than quality in future defense expansion actions. For example, it may be necessary to consider designing and developing prototype equipment and systems in order to achieve the producibility necessary to have the numbers which may be required for these types of scenarios.

Simply again, the level of sophistication and complexity in our current modern weapons systems are such that you simply cannot get there from here in the time period required to respond to some of the scenarios posited.

The panel believes special attention must be paid to the arms control implications of these types of activities and consideration given to the political realities involved in establishing such a comprehensive program.

PANEL 4 RECOMMENDATIONS

Panel 4 makes the following recommendations:

1. Management support for defense expansion matters should be strengthened and focused much more sharply than they are at the present time.

2. As an issue of increasing importance in the next decade, defense expansion planning or mobilization, and particularly those preparedness actions which must be taken now to attain the posture necessary to move forward with implementing the plans, should be considered an essential element in a broad spectrum of defense planning, and not treated solely as a specialized program.

3. Additional investigations and studies should be undertaken to provide the basis for devising such an improved comprehensive defense expansion program—and again, with particular emphasis on those preparedness actions which should be programmed and budgeted in normal, peacetime budget actions, in order to attain the capability and prepare for mobilization decisions.

The panel ended deliberations with a general consensus that our primary potential adversary, the Soviet Union, has been partially mobilized for a number of years.

Further, the Soviet Union is already well ahead of us in several areas, particularly in production capacity and the ability to convert to a mobilization mode.

Finally, the time has come to initiate positive actions to redress the situation in favor of the United States.

PANEL 4 PAPER:

Surge Mobilization: The United States Versus The Soviet Union

Norman Friedman

In an important sense, the capacity to mobilize is a measure not only of total national economic strength, but also of the social and economic system underlying that strength. Thus, the comparison of US and Soviet mobilization potentials is a comparison of our relatively anarchic economic system with the Soviets' highly planned one, of our civil-based system with the Soviets' largely military-oriented production system. The common wisdom is that since the Soviet Union can already pour out a flood of tanks, military aircraft, and missiles, surely matters will only worsen in the event of a crisis triggering true mobilization. On the other hand, we seem ill able to afford even enough weapons to arm our understrength field forces. Our allies do even worse. Only rarely does anyone point out the paradox that nations with over twice the net national product of the Soviet Union appear unable to afford matching forces.

SOME GENERAL DISTINCTIONS

It is useful to begin with some distinctions. *Mobilization* is a means of rapidly altering the active military strength of the state. For example, before 1914 mobilization meant calling up reservists to fill out the ranks of cadre units; much the same process is clearly envisaged by the Soviets for their Category 2 and 3 divisions. With the increasing automation of warfare, the industrial component of mobilization becomes more and more important. For example, some modern weapons demand almost no training: in a European war, which would have the longer lead time, the training of, say, German militia or the production of their antitank guided weapons? In the sense to be used here, industrial *mobilization* is an attempt to increase military production rapidly. In the mobilized state of the economy, this increased rate is sustained. In many scenarios, mobilization may precede war and an efficient mobilization may even have such deterrent effects as to prevent a long crisis from leading to war. The question is then whether the mode to be adopted in the event war is accepted (or, for that matter, the mode to be adopted in the context of an ongoing war), is inevitable.

There is another type of mobilization, the classic one employed almost universally before 1914: *manpower mobilization*. In this form, a national manpower pool is maintained by conscription and the consequent creation of trained reserves. Military equipment is produced, not to arm merely the standing forces but rather to arm the reserves as well; a major element of national military potential, then, is the stockpile of ready equipment and munitions. The rationale for a manpower mobilization posture is the belief that there will be sufficient strategic warning to mobilize manpower; and alternatively, that warfighting requires such large forces that it is impossible to support them in peacetime. This type of mobilization strategy was largely abandoned by the United States after World War II, although it survives in skeletal form in our Reserve and National Guard forces. It seems, however, to be the basic Soviet mobilization mode, and, indeed, well accords with the strengths and weaknesses of the Soviet social and political system.

Of course, such considerations are of little moment if it is assumed that all wars begin essentially without warning and must be fought within a few hours (or days) by standing forces. However, it may be argued that such assumptions are unrealistic. Crises generally build up over a period of weeks or months, and the resolve shown by

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mobilization decisions may be extremely useful both in intra-crisis deterrence and in stiffening national morale, i.e., by showing a state's own population that there is some worthwhile action to be taken in a crisis.

The boosting of national morale may be extremely important in an extended high-intensity crisis. The current popular view of war as doomsday (and preparation, e.g., civil defense, as pointless) would seem to imply a breakdown in national order (not to mention morale!) well before a war actually began. Some mobilization effort during the crisis tends to involve the population in the national effort in a positive way, and to reassure the people that something is indeed being done. Incidentally, this is one way to read the Soviet civil defense program: as a prewar anti-panic measure.

The assumption that wars will be fought only by standing forces only encourages us to seek military economies in the form of reduced materiel stockpiles. These stockpiles cannot prove adequate when faced with emergencies other than the cardinal case for which they were designed. For example, as in the 1973 Middle East war, we may be forced to draw down those stockpiles below even the limited levels currently accepted; it follows that some limited form of industrial mobilization is necessary to regain the previously acceptable standing level of reserves within an acceptable time. One might note, too, that the rate of materiel wastage in 1973 suggests that our current estimates of stockpile levels are probably unrealistically low; mobilization preparations are a relatively inexpensive hedge against future requirements for sudden buildups in prewar crisis situations.

It is useful, therefore, to distinguish between mobilization capacities on the basis of the size of the *triggering impulse* required; clearly this is inversely proportional to the cost of mobilization in economic and political terms. The lower the cost per surge, the easier it is to avoid high nonmobilized production rates and expensive stockpiles, assuming that crisis warning is generally adequate. A side benefit of a mobilization policy is the ability to channel a larger proportion of defense funds into research and development, avoiding much premobilization production of obsolescing equipment. Clearly, such a policy can be pushed too far, into the realm of the old British "Ten Year Rule," but it can be valuable nonetheless, particularly in a period of rapid technological change. In this connection, it is important to distinguish, in industrial mobilization, between relatively small attempts to overcome deficiencies (such as the US increase in tank production after the 1973 Middle East war, or the "crash" Minuteman program) and very large-scale efforts (such as those of World War II).

THE EXAMPLE OF WORLD WAR II MOBILIZATION

Current US studies of competitive mobilization tend to focus on negative details such as very long US lead times, legislative difficulties in arranging production "pools" such as were so useful in World War II, and the economic attrition of subcontractors. The United States is coming to depend increasingly on only one or two firms in each major defense category, and such dependence seems ominous at best. At the same time, the Soviets, who traditionally think in terms of lengthy wars (in which industrial mobilization is useful) write about special efforts to ensure conversion of civilian production lines, "cold" lines held in reserve, and the like. The approach to be taken here is more macroscopic. An historical example may be instructive.

In 1941 Japan was considering the decision for war with the United States, and at the same time the United States was contemplating war with Germany and probably Japan; both states were therefore trying to estimate US industrial war potential. President Roosevelt called for 50,000 new military aircraft, and was told that it would be impossible. He called for a 70 percent increase in naval tonnage, to balance the possibility

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that Britain might be knocked out of the war, and was told that most of the ships would not be ready before 1946, if then. In fact, US military aircraft production considerably exceeded 100,000 per year by 1943, and most of the ships of the 70 percent program were in combat by 1943 or 1944.

Ironically, the Japanese estimate was far more accurate than our own. The Japanese Total War Institute based its work on the gross size and character of the US economy, and assumed a highly efficient conversion from civil to military production. An important element of the Japanese estimate was possibly the extent to which, as late as 1941, the depressed US economy was underutilizing its capacity, but it is interesting that at the same time most Americans were underestimating their own economic capacity. For example, an important element of industrial mobilization was rail transportation, and the railroads had been allowed to run down very badly during the Great Depression. However, as early as 1941 effective rail capacity considerably exceeded prewar estimates, in some cases by orders of magnitude, perhaps partly because of the large safety factors originally built into those estimates.

SOVIET MOBILIZATION CAPABILITY AND THE PLANNED ECONOMY

From a macroscopic point of view, the essential facts about Soviet military production are the character of the Soviet political-economic system and the size of the Soviet economy, about half to two-thirds the size of the US economy. For future predictions, demographics and energy seem overwhelmingly important. All of these factors favor the West.

The usual image of the Soviet political system emphasizes the dictatorship exercised by the national leadership: it appears that the Soviets can easily turn their economy in any desired direction, that they are entirely unconstrained in their political power. However, this image omits a very important constraint. Soviet politics is directed so completely from the top that national decisions are required on points a Westerner might consider relatively trivial; for example, the Politburo spends a good part of its time debating the censorship of particular books and even articles. Staff work to support the mass of Politburo decisions is at best spotty, and in particular there must be many conflicts of priorities which are never well resolved. These are the detailed conflicts which classically bedevil industrial mobilization: which is more important, the production of artillery rockets or air-to-air rockets? Tank-landing ships or infantry-landing craft? Minesweepers or subchasers? Interceptors or ground attack fighters? Which radars are most valuable? Which military computers? The list is endless, and the decisions are all difficult, as the United States learned when it mobilized in 1940-1942.

There is one mobilization measure extremely easy to order: manpower mobilization, which, after all, is the primary Soviet concept. Manpower call-up requires little in the way of priority choices, at least until the reservists are needed in combat. It has the virtue of giving the Soviet public a strong sense of participation in the crises, without frustrating delays due to the tightness of the planned Soviet economy. Moreover, unlike surge production, manpower mobilization of trained reservists has an immediate military effect: efforts at surge production do not. One might, of course, add that the flood of equipment produced by the peacetime Soviet production machine, often transferred overseas, provides the potential for foreign stockpiling awaiting the arrival of Soviet personnel. At the least such a strategy would minimize demands on a Soviet merchant fleet quite unable to operate freely in wartime. Personnel can be moved infinitely more easily than material—as we have acknowledged by our own stockpile efforts in Europe.

The Soviet leadership can resolve upon industrial mobilization, but that resolve, at least initially, will produce only a desire in every factory manager to produce military

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equipment as fast as possible. It will not resolve allocation problems among subcontractors (probably in electronics) who are already working full time on military orders. Moreover, it will not resolve the problem of just what equipment is worth producing.

In 1941 this kind of reallocation problem did not really arise, because the priorities were quite obvious to the Soviets. The main reallocation occurred when Stalin cancelled the Soviet naval shipbuilding program, and shifted the armor and specialized steel industries to tank production. There were only a few models of tanks, and not too many of military aircraft. Moreover, all models embodied technologies very close to those of the civil sector of the Soviet economy. For example, a tractor factory could be converted to tank production, as could an engine works. Soviet aircraft were wooden, and consequently could take advantage of a very widespread skill in the economy.

The "revolution in military affairs" which produced the modern Soviet military also destroyed the easy correspondence between military and civilian products which obtained in Stalin's time. Moreover, it has greatly increased the range of military products with which any Soviet mobilization planner must cope: just like the United States of 1942, the Soviet Union is confronted with a vast menu of potential mobilization production, possibly without any clear means of choosing, at least on the basis of the kind of broad directive every factory manager can easily understand. The more complex the mobilization directive, the more leeway it leaves for political in-fighting among factory managers, and the longer the interval between the mobilization directive and effective increases in production.

This kind of difficulty is symptomatic of the character of Soviet politics, in which (in peacetime) the most important decisions of all are those concerning the rate of production of various goods. In the Soviet system, perhaps the chief mass constituency is the bureaucracy, including the class of factory managers. Factory managers are rated on their performance compared to the norms set in the National Plans; it is in their interest for these norms to be well within their capacities, so that they can "overperform" and receive bonuses. Indeed, for them, it is not "guns or butter" so much as "guns and butter." A mobilization directive is, in effect, a modification of the National Plan. Each manager will want to show his efficiency in fulfilling the necessarily broad national directive, and conflicts will be inevitable. Note that in view of the ambiguity of priorities given any level of mobilization, there is no easy way to solve this problem.

The Soviet economy currently devotes about twice as large a share of its net production to the military as does our own. In fact this is somewhat misleading, as most Soviet R&D efforts are devoted to military purposes, and in many cases (such as electronics) the proportion devoted to military products is far higher than the average. Very crudely, one might say that these factors suggest the absence of enormous reserves of "fat" which can be converted in a crisis. The current situation differs markedly from 1941, for example, in that there are important technologies, most notably electronics, which do not have large civilian counterparts. On the contrary, in 1941, the important military products (such as tanks) were comparable enough to important civilian products (e.g., railroad locomotives) for plant conversion to be relatively simple. We can expect this situation to worsen as the proportion of high technology in weapons systems increases.

Perhaps a better way to express the current Soviet situation is to note that historically the Soviets have found it difficult to achieve a high degree of quality control at the shop-floor level. Quality control is currently often a matter of rejecting the great bulk of the parts produced, e.g., in electronic components. These parts are then shunted into the civilian market, where their low quality (e.g., low reliability) is presumably

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acceptable. However, such a practice implies that conversion to military production would be little more than a reduction in standards, so that more parts might be accepted for the military. Evidence of electronic shortfalls for military production suggests that, even now, this particular industry is running at full capacity.

In peacetime, for example, the Soviet economy appears to be capable of producing warship hulls (which do not require the most rigorous quality control) far more readily than the electronic systems for which those hulls were designed; it is common for Soviet naval combatants to deploy without much of their electronic warfare (EW) equipment and even, in some cases, without their big antiship or antisubmarine missiles. Such deficiencies are, of course, far more difficult to observe in the case of the flood of Soviet military aircraft, but one cannot but suspect a similar phenomenon. On the other hand, the Soviets seem to encounter no difficulties at all in producing a flood of effective tanks, or in switching truck plants between production of military and civilian trucks; in some cases, this latter conversion is little more than changing the number of powered axles and the color scheme of the emerging truck. Tanks and trucks are the types of item decisive in World War II, and essential to all postwar Soviet land tactical concepts; however, with the rise of microelectronics and "smart" weapons, such items may well become less and less important.

Of course, the Soviets have also been able to produce large numbers of anti-aircraft weapons incorporating sophisticated guidance systems, but one suspects that this kind of production essentially saturates their capacity when related back to bottleneck items such as guidance radars and missile electronics. Strategic weapons, particularly those requiring multiple, independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRV's), may present similar problems; however, the Soviets would seem to benefit greatly from the large size of their strategic weapons, which relaxes constraints on microelectronic components.

Behind the Soviet production machine is a highly planned economy controlled by a powerful bureaucracy. Such centralized control can be read two ways: first, it means that there will be no consumer protest (or at least no effective protest) in the event of a mobilization decision; factories will simply carry out their conversion plans. However, there is a second, more important meaning. Planning requires an effort to coordinate each plant with each of its suppliers, to work out in advance, for example, transportation schedules for subcomponents and finished parts. Subcontractors have no responsibility to their "customers," but only to the State Planning organization, GOSPLAN. Any shifts in an ongoing plan would have chaotic consequences, and it must be kept in mind that the First Law of Bureaucracy is "don't make waves." It follows that, first, GOSPLAN is uncomfortably aware that the first consequence of a mobilization decision will be chaos rather than increased production. Second, the Soviet bureaucracy will be relatively resistant to a limited mobilization decision.

In fact, in progressing from one Five Year Plan to the next, the bureaucracy will almost certainly prefer to retain as many features of the last Plan as possible, if only to simplify the complex task of coordination. Moreover, an important feature of bureaucratic life in the Soviet Union is that factory managers are regarded in proportion to their success in fulfilling the (numerical) targets set for them by the Plan. They resist changes either in targets or in product, and thus provide an important source of inertia, retarding major shifts in weapon system design. Not that the managers can outweigh the Politburo—far from that. Rather, in a highly centralized system such as the Soviet Union, so many decisions must be made specifically at the top that in many cases it is far easier merely to continue with a past decision than to reexamine it. The Soviet *Kashin* class destroyer and the MiG-25 fighter are examples of systems retained in production long

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after requirements had changed radically. They are, then, mute evidence of the resistance of the Soviet bureaucracy to shifts in design; it is easier for the military to accept numbers than to quibble over design details.

One might extend this kind of argument further. Again and again, in descriptions of the Soviet political system, one finds the comment that stability is to be sought above all else—stability in jobs, in the annual goals to be set, in the array of organizations, and in their size. In this sense, stability is assured by the retention in production of existing designs, using existing types of subcomponents.

One concludes, then, that from a Soviet point of view it is best not to attempt serious industrial mobilization in anything short of the most intense crisis: better to produce at a high steady rate and to stockpile materiel for a massive manpower mobilization, since the immediate effect of any mobilization decision is almost inevitably gross inefficiency and perhaps even a serious loss of production.

In fact, perceived Soviet behavior fits this conclusion. The Soviet defense industry produces a flood of materiel, so massive that military exports on a very large scale appear to present almost no cost to the Soviet economy; those exported tanks, guns, aircraft, and ships would have to be produced anyway, to keep up the rate of production and thereby keep factory managers and their superiors happy. This kind of behavior is not rational by Western standards, but one must keep in mind that the politics of industrial production are far more important to the Soviets than to Western officials, and that there is little or no counterbalancing force of public opinion in the Soviet Union demanding more consumer goods. The only real counterbalances to military production are the requirements of capital investment (both in R&D and in production plants to produce new models).

This situation may change in the near future, as demography reduces the skilled work force and as European resources, particularly those involved in energy production, are exhausted. As energy resources dwindle, the Soviets will have to turn more energetically to Siberia; but the opening of Siberian resources is heavily capital- and labor-intensive, and so must reduce total production resources available for military production, not to mention military manpower. Current Soviet tactics, for example, in a European land war, depend upon the availability of great masses of men and tanks. The tanks already exist, but the men must be replenished from a shrinking manpower pool. As this pool diminishes, the current Soviet approach of manpower mobilization may become less and less attractive, and the Soviets may be driven toward the nonmobilization concepts first advanced in the United States soon after 1945 (or, alternatively, Krushchev's radical views circa 1960) in which wars are perceived as short, sharp, nuclear exchanges.

MOBILIZATION POTENTIAL OF THE WESTERN ECONOMIES

Western economies present a sharp contrast to that of the Soviet Union. They are, on the whole, unplanned, and in effect Western nations are willing to accept considerable unemployment and economic distress at the price of flexibility and competition. This is not to make a virtue of hardship, but rather to distinguish the Western from the Soviet case. In the Soviet case, stability of the work force is sought at all levels, partly because the political status of any bureaucrat depends in large measure on the size of the work force under him. In the West, however, even those states which have government-monopolized weapons industries retain a substantial measure of competition, and are willing to expand and contract such enterprises largely on economic grounds. Moreover, the simple fact that in the West few people expect the State to provide them with jobs fosters a mobility attuned to the rapid expansion of various sectors of the

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economy, e.g., arms production. It must be admitted, however, that at present prosperous Westerners are far less willing to move great distances to defense plants than were the victims of the Depression (in the United States) in 1940-42.

The Soviet system emphasizes stability and full (if feather bedding) employment; the State controls all, guarantees all. In the West, by way of contrast, it is often tacitly believed that the smaller the government the better, particularly in terms of taxation; a Government gains popularity by reducing its expenditures, and gains relatively little by keeping an economically inefficient company in existence as a mobilization asset. The matter of avoiding unemployment as a consequence of the bankruptcy of a major firm is, of course, another matter. Thus, on the whole, in arms production, Western governments tend to emphasize the virtues of limiting expenditures: it is easy to shut down production lines, but relatively difficult to eliminate either a production line or an unproductive Design Bureau.

In particular, Congresses and Parliaments tend generally to look at a current year's production order only in terms of an announced stockpile or unit equipment goal, and most particularly not in terms of the maintenance of a national asset. In effect, foreign military sales (FMS) become the most economical means of maintaining a mobilization base, though often entangled in political problems. Americans may recall that one reason this country was able to arm so rapidly in 1941-42 was the very large production base built up since 1939 to service British and French orders. Moreover, FMS equipment not yet shipped becomes a direct mobilization resource; foreign military sales are far more important to the West than to the Soviet Union because indigenous Western military production rates are so much lower.

One might say that Western mobilization policy is almost to assume surge production is a viable alternative to the kind of steady-state production employed by the Soviets. One great incentive is the pervasive feeling in Western military establishments that production at any one time of a large stockpile (an inescapable product of the Soviet system except in wartime) would preclude new production for some considerable time; this would certainly seem to be a major lesson of World War II.

The West enjoys some substantial potential advantages. It has a very large civilian sector with the potential for conversion to military uses. In particular, there is a massive electronics industry, only a small proportion of which is currently devoted to military production. This is not to imply that conversion would be particularly simple or pleasant, but rather that the raw resource is present, to a degree not at all apparent in the Soviet Union. One might add that the average level of civilian production quality control is far better suited to military production than it is in the Soviet Union.

Moreover, at least classically, the rough-and-tumble economies of the West have been fairly amenable to sharp changes in priorities, as long as those changes can be enforced by the central government. There are the same problems of priorities as in the Soviet case, but the more decentralized governmental organizations may be far better adapted to resolving many of the issues involved, and the contractual relations between contractors and subcontractors may also greatly simplify matters. In particular, there should be fewer delays as individuals seek government rulings on minor points. Unfortunately, current Western trends suggest that this societal advantage may be slipping away rather rapidly.

In effect, Western governments should find it easier to achieve partial materiel mobilization in crises of lesser magnitude than those required to trigger Soviet mobilizations. However, the Western nations have avoided the kind of reserve manpower/stockpile policy of the Soviet Union, with the result that they may find themselves

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badly embarrassed at the outbreak of war. This subtle shift from the situation two decades ago, for example, is traceable to the decline of the massive stocks left over by the materiel mobilization of World War II. In the West, unlike the Soviet Union, military production tends to go in great spurts, and the problem is always twofold. While the products of the last spurt remain serviceable (or at least apparently serviceable), it is difficult to convince governments intent on economy or on social services to finance massive replacements. Then, when the existing stocks finally become obsolescent or wear out, the task of replacement is so massive as to be daunting, as now.

It is, for example, rather depressing to follow the fortunes of the US fleet from the mid-sixties. In 1965 the great bulk of US warships, other than the most powerful, dated from the World War II mobilization. They were wearing out, but there were so many that replacement would have consumed several years' defense budgets. For example, there were about 200 old destroyers still active. Even at its most optimistic projection, the Navy could not hope for more than about 100 replacements—and the figure of 200 did *not* count several hundred more in reserve, for mobilization in an emergency. Ultimately only the 30 *Spruances* could be built, and now we are down to a far more austere ship, the *Perry*, for further replacement hulls.

In this case, the point of obsolescence was relatively easy to fix: the ships could no longer mount modern antisubmarine warfare (ASW) weapons, particularly the LAMPS helicopter, and modernization beyond that already accomplished appeared impractical. However, in most cases the precise point of obsolescence is difficult to specify, so that replacement can often be deferred almost indefinitely. The Minuteman-MX controversy is a case in point. There is particular confusion when refurbishment, as in the B-52's, appears to be viable. These are cases when a mobilization-like response is indicated, but there is no external political crisis to justify one, only a continuing Cold War and the wearing-out of existing stocks of equipment. The lack of a sharp motivating crisis may tend to mask the relatively low mobilization threshold of some Western economies (particularly that of the United States) in this type of case.

A COMPARISON OF US AND SOVIET SURGE POTENTIALS

It would seem to follow that the Soviet Union, for all of the problems it will undoubtedly encounter, is (at present) better designed than the West to achieve mobilization in an emergency, if only by calling up large numbers of reservists for whom equipment already exists. Such a call-up, if sustained for very long, must have severe consequences for the national economy as a whole, and is not to be attempted lightly; but it may also provide sufficient manpower for a large European war. The time scale for call-up is short enough to more than overcome the much greater industrial potential of the West.

On the other hand, during a long period of tension prior to a war, the Western powers may well be in a position to impose partial industrial mobilization long before the Soviets are willing to impose any significant mobilization measures. In that case, the decisive factor may well be the ability of the West to reproduce existing prototypes in great numbers—the iron law of industrial mobilization is that only prototypes already in existence can be mass produced. Consequently, it is important that the West either make the effort to design and build specialized "mobilization weapons" beforehand in small numbers, or else accept the much smaller numbers of the high-quality designs which can be produced currently.

Such prototypes are generally unpopular within the military because they are not nearly as effective (e.g., per unit size) as more conventional systems. They are relatively inexpensive on a unit basis and therefore represent a temptation (to the civil government), an apparent means of buying defense "on the cheap." Moreover, such prototypes

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are generally inexpensive, precisely because they offer more modest performance than conventional systems; acceptance of these degraded standards brings into question the validity of the conventional ones. Consequently, austere systems designed for mobilization often suffer gold-plating; the single-purpose F-16 air superiority fighter is a good example. It is a far better fighter and fighter-bomber than anyone rightfully expected, but it is no longer the austere lightweight originally envisaged.

The A-10 and the *Perry* have encountered similar fates. In at least the *Perry*'s case, some of the austerity has been so extreme that military value has been compromised; but this was recognized by the designers, who made provision for the necessary upgrade. In such a case, alas, austerity is soon reduced to a game of budgeting, concerning when in the service life of a system it will at least be fully equipped. Thoroughgoing mobilization design should be far more than "design to price," and perhaps it should make more (and more daring) use of standard civilian products, especially electronic ones. After all, quality may be better than quantity but, unfortunately, there is a point at which quantity becomes decisive. One would hope that we and the Soviets have not yet reached that point.

This argument can be carried further. Together with the new materiel, a large number of personnel will have to be drafted and trained. As the United States learned in 1941, much of that training can be done (at first!) with simulators—in 1941, that often meant a wooden rifle, but the principle will remain the same. Large-scale simulation using computers is now a possibility, and a future Western mobilization program will have to take training into account. In addition, it may be important to be able to field some equipment as yet incomplete, such as ships without some of their sensors, in order to begin unit training despite production bottlenecks. The very flexible Western economies should be able to operate in this manner—if preparation is made in advance. If it is not, the Soviets, despite their nearly fatally inept economic and political system, will achieve overwhelming advantage, and their short-war strategy will prove successful.

Western potential in a mobilization competition is ultimately overwhelming; the question is how rapidly that potential can be reached. It would appear that the critical elements, for NATO, are a combination of the earliest possible triggering of low-level industrial mobilization, and a means of prolonging the prewar crisis period to achieve maximum developed military power before the outbreak of what may well be a very short war. Just how fast mobilization will proceed depends, in large part, on preplanning and on the existence of prototypes—neither of which is currently much in evidence.

At present, then, in principle NATO depends on its ability to carry out an industrial mobilization which makes military sense only if there is (1) considerable strategic warning (circa 6 months) or (2) standing forces sufficient to hold a Soviet thrust and stretch out the war until mobilization can tell. Unfortunately, this apparent NATO strategy is too often merely a more acceptable formulation of NATO's unwillingness to provide large peacetime manpower (and materiel) reserves. If, indeed, we must fight with forces in existence at the outbreak of war, then the Soviet doctrine of manpower mobilization will submerge us. Capacity already in place will permit Soviet plants already doing defense work to surge their production above peacetime levels, and before we can carry out serious industrial conversion, our surge capacity will only be similarly proportional to our far lower peacetime production levels. This is a recipe for a European disaster.

DEVELOPING A DETERRENT SURGE CAPABILITY

This disaster scenario assumes that the transition from peace to war is rather sudden. However, a Western ability to surge during a long period of tension should materially increase the probability that there is no escalation to war. In such a case,

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what is being presented to the Soviets is the possibility that the rapidly deployed Western materiel will prove effective enough to deny them a quick or easy victory. In effect, we are speaking to the Soviets' worst-case assumption, which is our best-case. Such a surge mobilization would emphasize the quickest possible production of numbers of systems, even though in practice it might be a considerable time before the flaws in those systems were corrected. The overall cost would be high, but the speed with which mobilization could proceed would be crucial.

Such a deterrent mobilization cannot be carried out ad hoc; it requires careful planning and, above all, a clear perception of the distinction between conventional and mobilization values in weapon design. For example, mobilization systems need not be nearly as durable—or nearly as well-optimized—as conventional ones. They are a fairly desperate measure, and make sense as a means of avoiding very heavy expenditure most of the time. The West should find this kind of mobilization far more practicable than should the Soviets, given the appropriate technical and policy preparation—and given enough standing military strength to permit mobilization to tell. Otherwise, the crisis boils over before any advantage is gained—the Soviets gain their objectives either by the terror induced by their oversized military establishment or by simple force of arms.

It should be added that a significant effective surge capability can well improve our own political backbone in a crisis. Matters may be bad at the outset, but with mobilization they will improve, and we may hope for a favorable outcome without having to impoverish ourselves by maintaining immense standing forces. Mobilization is, incidentally, probably the only politically conceivable way for NATO to build the kind of forces capable of more than just absorbing a Soviet conventional blow. We would argue that the best deterrent, in Soviet eyes, is a strong probability that a war in Europe will end in massive losses of Soviet territory, and the full or partial breakup of their empire in the East. Such a capability requires levels of manpower, as well as materiel, entirely outside the current permissible peacetime level, even with a revived draft.

Given our political and economic system, it would be impractical (and probably grossly counterproductive) to mimic Soviet practice. Better to try to ensure sufficient warning time or, far more realistically, sufficient forces to hold down an initial Soviet thrust and thus provide mobilization time. These concepts are closely related. Warning time can probably be increased by proper NATO force posturing. If the NATO posture presents to the Soviet planner a military requirement which is so ambiguous as to require a massive Soviet offensive, then the current concept of a surprise offensive launched out of a training exercise is no longer practical. This in turn must imply a NATO standing force so powerful that no Soviet attack can break through very rapidly, at least without the use of nuclear weapons—which we tend to hope we can deter by our own nuclear strength.

Clearly a NATO stockpile/manpower mobilization policy such as the one currently in force does materially improve matters when warning time is to be measured in days to weeks. The enhancement envisaged here is much larger, and the time scale is on the order of weeks.

One element not mentioned is munitions; as we come more and more to depend upon missiles, the production effort tends to shift from the launchers (classically gun tubes) to the weapons they fire. Since even early war expenditures are likely to far exceed peacetime stocks and conversion time is not likely to be available, it has been possible to maintain industrial capacity which is earmarked for munitions and highly automated to reduce requirements for new-worker training. Note, incidentally, that the actual provision of munitions is least important in the deterrent surge, if only because the Soviets in their worst case analysis cannot be sure that we will waste our ammunition, or

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that we will misallocate it. Thus, the problem surfaces only when the force built up under mobilization is actually used.

Finally, we have ignored the problem of providing, rather suddenly, the means to bring large masses of materiel to Europe during the mobilization period. Until a few years ago this would have been no problem (except for enemy counteraction in wartime) in view of the size of the US merchant fleet which had been built up in the World War II surge. However, most of those ships are now gone, so a US mobilization planner must include merchant bottoms among his programs—not to mention their protection in wartime.

The West has the kind of raw industrial strength which proved decisive in the relatively long wars of the past, a strength which can be tapped by intelligent surge mobilization policy. Such a policy must include prototyping and a complementary military strategy which makes relative materiel priorities clear. However, the success of Western arms also requires Western acceptance of, and preparation for, a relatively long European war. Otherwise, our industrial strength will either be destroyed or fall into Soviet hands, and our surge potential will do us no great good.

PANEL 4 PAPER: Peacetime Industrial Production Expansion: Problems and Approaches

The Department of Defense currently lacks a system that will facilitate the accomplishment of timely defense production increases in peacetime and/or provide for a transition from normal to wartime production. As a result, the Nation does not have the level of industrial readiness appropriate for several potential crises and conflicts.

The major objective of this paper is to develop the essentials of a peacetime industrial production expansion system (PIPES) which will facilitate the accomplishment of a timely and substantial increase in the production of selected items in response to situations short of declared national emergencies and/or full scale armed conflict. A second major objective is to develop an approach to industrial preparedness planning that will provide major new insights into the problem of defense production in today's complex environment.

The PIPES approach developed in this paper features several basic elements. One is a system that is a collection of interrelated and coordinated governmental and contractor plans. Among the most important aspects in this system are: contractor production information which estimates production capabilities under various assumptions of environmental conditions and identifies major constraints to production increases; governmental policies and actions which identify the selected military items to be produced, specify the production goals for each, and establish those actions that the government is prepared to take to facilitate production increases; and financial plans which detail the procedures designed to ensure the prompt securing of required funds to implement production plans.

Another basic element of the PIPES approach is a complex multi-state planning process. PIPES plans are to be produced through a joint effort of contractors and government agencies. The overall process features joint governmental and contractor planning on selected and prioritized military items; comprehensive and holistic planning on the problems associated with the simultaneous expansion of several items; iterative planning that identifies capabilities, production constraints, and policies, and considers their interrelationships; and interaction between the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense/Research and Engineering (OUSD/R&E) and the services, and between OUSD/R&E and other Federal agencies.

A system with these features requires realistic estimates of the production expansion capabilities of selected contractors and the constraints which impact upon these estimates, insights into the complex interrelationships between contractor capabilities and government needs, and a set of options for production increases and government actions applicable to a variety of peacetime emergencies.

In order to accomplish the desired results, DOD should develop a selective consolidated and prioritized list of military items and the necessary financial and budgetary mechanisms to fund planning and production expansions. The DOD should also provide incentives for contractor cooperation and develop the specific mechanism for implementation of the PIPES concept.

Note: This paper was prepared by a student task force of the Industrial College of the Armed Forces, under the supervision of Dr. John Ellison

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The Value of Capabilities for Peacetime Industrial Production Expansion

Introduction

In recent years, government officials have come to the realization that the United States is no longer in the commanding military position that it previously enjoyed vis-a-vis the Soviet Union. Growing Soviet strategic and conventional military power, and corresponding American difficulties in developing adequate forces in being and/or maintaining an adequate industrial and manpower mobilization base, have prompted a series of initiatives designed to increase US readiness.

Important new initiatives have been undertaken to strengthen American military forces and to increase the Nation's readiness for effective response to a variety of international crises. Programs have been directed at the modernization of forces, the enhancement of the readiness posture of the US forces committed to NATO, and improvements in the readiness of the Nation's industrial base.

A number of important and innovative programs designed to enhance industrial readiness have been initiated since 1976 in the broad area of industrial preparedness. Among these are such diverse items as the introduction of the concept of *surge*, initiation of surge production planning, introduction of data item description (DID) surge planning, and identification of several alternative approaches to surge contracting.

At the heart of all of these efforts has been the attempt to identify the obstacles to effective and timely industrial base responses for rapid increases in production to meet a range of emergencies, including the worst case of a prolonged large-scale conventional conflict in Europe. From these efforts has emerged a growing body of opinion and fact that suggest improvements in the response capabilities of the defense industrial base are both desirable and feasible.¹

This study evaluates the progress made in recent years toward the development of a more responsive US defense industrial base, and proposes a supplemental approach designed to fill a need in the current planning spectrum. It identifies and proposes solutions to key problems associated with the development of a system designed to facilitate a substantial increase in defense production, under peacetime conditions, through joint government and industry planning efforts to accelerate defense production.

Problem Definition

This paper deals with the problem of the necessity and feasibility of developing a system to facilitate the accomplishment of timely and substantial increase in defense production under peacetime conditions.

Three issues are central to this analysis and together they constitute the problem definition for the study:

1. Is the security of the United States likely to be enhanced if its defense industrial base is in a state of readiness for peacetime industrial production expansion?
2. Do the established programs of industrial preparedness of the Department of Defense result in the attainment of such a state of readiness?
3. What type of industrial preparedness system would be required if the established DOD efforts are not sufficient to produce the desired state of readiness?

The major impetus for this study was provided by the report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Industrial Readiness Plans and Programs, the 1977 Industrial College of the Armed Forces (ICAF) Defense Management Issue Analysis Study on

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Conventional readiness of US Forces, the DOD Sustainability Study, and the Petite Nugget scenario which preceded the formal play of the Nifty Nugget Mobilization exercise.

Collectively, these efforts point to four major conclusions. First, under certain conditions the readiness of the Nation's defense industrial base could make a substantial contribution to the defense of the Nation. Second, these conditions are more varied than presently recognized under present planning concepts. Third, industrial planning does not promote readiness for all of the circumstances to which it may be relevant. One of the most important of these circumstances is the need for increases in defense production in peacetime. Fourth, the failure to plan for employment of the industrial base under these conditions runs the risk of leaving the Nation unprepared to take maximum advantage of one of its primary assets, its economic and industrial strength.

National Security and Industrial Readiness

The first issue or question confronted by the study group is as follows: "Is the security of the United States likely to be enhanced if its defense industrial base is in a state of readiness for defense production under peacetime conditions?"

There are two dimensions of this problem. The first dimension relates to the relevance of the defense industrial base expansion capabilities to national security. The second relates to the value of the readiness of this base for rapid production expansion.

The contemporary relevance of the defense industrial base stems from the fact that there are international crises and conflicts which may confront the United States in the future, for which an increase in defense production would be an appropriate response. With the possible exception of the so-called worst case of short, highly intense conflict in Central Europe occurring with little or no warning, most of the international crises or conflicts, to which the United States might have to respond, have at least some characteristics that make the accomplishment of an increase in defense production an appropriate response. This is seen clearly in the following hypothetical situations:

- A sudden and significant increase in the level of hostility between the United States and the USSR sparked by Soviet violations of major international agreements;
- A significant Soviet move into a key region of the world which induces a major American military buildup;
- An international conflict involving a nation friendly to the United States to which the United States responds by supplying military items with a resulting drawdown of key stocks;
- A protracted military conflict which seriously depletes American military equipment;
- A sustained and successful embargo against the United States, which significantly reduces the flow of key resources and which the United States cannot break without the application of military force;
- A protracted period of international tension, which presages the development of a serious international crisis which could easily escalate to armed conflict; and
- A pattern of Soviet military and economic behavior from which it is possible to draw inferences of Soviet intentions to engage in armed conflict against the United States and its allies.

In each of these hypothetical instances the United States could choose a mobilization of its Armed Forces and/or a substantial increase in its level of defense production. In some of these instances, the President and/or the Congress might seek to accomplish

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the military and/or industrial expansions without resorting to the declaration of either a national emergency or war. Clearly, this was the route chosen in several past crises and conflicts, such as Vietnam, Berlin, and the Cuban Missile Crisis.

Closely related to the concept of defense production expansion in peacetime is the concept of industrial readiness. A nation is in a state of industrial readiness when its producers of military materiel are prepared to respond rapidly and completely to the demands of its armed forces.

There are several important benefits to be derived from the attainment of a high state of industrial readiness. Among the most important of these are the following:

1. Industrial readiness would increase the likelihood that industrial production could make a significant contribution to forces-in-being during transitional periods from peacetime to wartime, by impacting favorably on forces-in-being or on the size of war reserve materials (WRM).
2. Industrial readiness would enhance the prospects of industrial productions that could sustain the forces after exhaustion of WRM.
3. Industrial readiness would increase the likelihood that the Nation could take maximum advantage of any period of warning that might be available, prior to the outbreak of fighting, by providing a means for warming up the industrial base.
4. Industrial readiness would reduce the length of time required to resupply American and Allied forces in the event that current US assets were made available to hard-pressed Allies engaged in war. A good example of this was the drawdown of US tank strength as a result of the US role in the Yom Kippur War, which resulted in efforts to resupply European stocks when the conflict ended.
5. Industrial readiness would increase the range of options available to an American President attempting to deter an adversary through some action short of full mobilization, which would demonstrate national resolve.

In the first three benefits from industrial readiness are features related to the payoffs associated with armed conflict, including sustained military operations. Each of these payoffs could be increased if the Nation possessed the capability of exploiting its industrial readiness prior to the initiation of the armed conflict.

The fourth and fifth benefits from industrial readiness relate to payoffs associated with crises or situations that do not necessarily lead to armed conflict. In these cases, the value of industrial readiness is a function of the Nation's ability to increase industrial production independently of any mobilization of its military forces.

Thus, the study group arrives at the conclusion that the security of the United States would be enhanced if its defense industrial base is in a state of readiness for peacetime expansion to meet military requirements.

Adequacy of Established Programs

Industrial Preparedness Planning (IPP). Industrial preparedness planning is geared primarily to the requirements associated with a large-scale, long-duration conventional conflict occurring with or without long warning, and pursued under conditions of a declared national emergency. It is designed to enhance the ability of the defense industrial base planning producers to accelerate the production of circa 6,000 key military items. Planning is focused on the development of data on the capabilities of planning producers to accomplish rates of production and implementation of industrial preparedness measures (IPM s) to increase any perceived deficiencies in production capabilities.

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Responsibility for overall management of the program is vested in the Department of Defense. Within DOD, responsibility is shared by OUSD/R&E, OSD/MRA&L, and individual military Services.* Each Service is responsible for the selection of the essential items and for developing, with private industry, plans for producing these items in an emergency. Guidance limits the planning effort to approximately 2,000 items for each Service. This number includes about 35 major weapon systems, with the remainder being component spare parts, repair items, etc.

Planned producers of the selected items are requested by the responsible buying activity of the Services, each of which approaches its producers individually, through the cognizant Armed Services, Production Planning Officer (ASPPO), to perform planning. This effort is not directly funded, but is authorized for inclusion as an approved overhead cost. This planning consists of assessing production capabilities over some specified time period, in light of specified military requirements. If deficiencies in production capabilities (quantities and rates) are identified, the planned producer is asked to identify his recommendations for fulfilling production requirements, including specifying industrial preparedness measures and associated costs. The information on requirements, capabilities and IPM's is recorded on a DD Form 1519 for each planned item; thus, the system is commonly known as the "1519 system."

The IPP system has been the target of several far-reaching and pointed criticisms in the past several years. For example, both the Defense Science Board Task Force on Industrial Readiness Plans and Programs and the General Accounting Office have concluded that the current system is seriously deficient in many fundamental respects. Common to both critiques is the view that planning is a paper exercise that does nothing to increase readiness of the industrial base.¹

The study group made an independent analysis of the appropriateness of the IPP effort as a vehicle for enhancing industrial readiness for peacetime production expansion. Central to this analysis were extended discussions with defense contractors and government officials.

Based on these discussions, we concluded that IPP has several serious shortcomings as a planning effort, which impacted adversely on its relevance or value for promoting industrial readiness for peacetime production expansion. These shortcomings were inherent in the planning effort and could not be overcome by the introduction of the concept of expansion without a declared national emergency. These shortcomings are listed below:

1. Industry plans in a vacuum, especially with regard to government policies and priorities that may be in effect during the production surge.
2. Industry receives virtually no feedback on the data that it submits on the DD Forms 1519; in particular, industry is given no information concerning the disposition of the proposals for industrial preparedness measures.
3. Industry is never compelled to state how it will achieve the production called for on the 1519 schedule.
4. Prime contractors often plan in ignorance of the capability of subcontractors upon whom they depend.
5. Planning is attempted on too many items; consequently, one has the resources to do nothing other than a superficial analysis.

*R&E: Research and Engineering, MRA&L: Manpower, Reserve Affairs, and Logistics

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6. There is poor coordination between the Services and the ASPPO's, e.g., ASPPO's are asked to perform planning tasks for each Service relative to the same contractor, as if the other two Services had no interest in that contractor.

7. The ASPPO's employ different assumptions in the absence of consolidated guidance from OSD as transmitted from each of the Services.

8. There is no prioritization of requirements within and among the Services.

9. Planning is largely nonrecurrent in the sense that only a limited number of items in one planning cycle are "repeats" from the previous year. Thus, the data base is essentially noncurrent for many of the items, especially for repair parts.

10. There is no provision for the accomplishment of partial or limited mobilization, and no recognition of the possibility that production expansions might not always be accomplished under periods of declared national emergency.

11. Industry is asked to plan for increased production but receives no guarantee that the firm which does the planning will, in fact, be awarded the contract to do the production.

Surge Production Planning. In 1976, DOD established an IPP/Surge Working Group to develop and implement the concept of industrial production surge. Surge would apply "when an emergency situation places or threatens to place an unusual demand on the industrial base to support the military requirements of our forces, our friends and allies, or to accelerate the base in response to worsening international conditions."³ The underlying purpose of surge planning is to develop industrial readiness postures to deal with situations such as the following: the emergence of a new threat that prompts a decision to add to inventory more rapidly than authorized in the approved military procurement budget; loss of stocks due to disaster or covert action; contingencies requiring a drawdown of stocks; contingencies requiring support of allies or friends; and a transitional situation from peacetime to wartime.

Following the emergence of this concept, the Services were directed to perform an "in-depth analysis of industry's ability to surge production for certain selected weapon systems." This directive led to the completion of several surge production studies on such candidate systems as the TOW Missile, M109 Howitzer, and the F-16 Aircraft.

Surge production planning is designed to ascertain the capabilities of producers of selected weapon systems to accomplish a rapid and/or significant increase in the level of production. It assumes that these production increases could occur prior to, and/or in the absence of, the declaration of a national emergency by the President.

Based upon its extended analysis and discussions with contractors, the study group concludes there are several serious shortcomings with surge planning that severely limit its effectiveness as a solution to the problems of peacetime industrial production increases.

Surge seeks to accomplish increased production through reliance on the ability of producers to alter their rates of production through multiple shifts and related actions. The central assumption of this approach appears to be that the government ought to place primary responsibility on industry for the accomplishment of the production goals that may be established in peacetime. At the very least, there are no planning assumptions or guidance in surge which suggest that the government is prepared to take major actions to facilitate surge. Consequently, industry has to assume that it will be business-as-usual. This assumption may be adequate for fairly limited surges involving relatively few weapon systems whose production is to be increased for a short time. It appears inadequate for a simultaneous surge of several items.

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Surge planning has no vehicle for insuring the accuracy and reliability of data on the production capabilities of industry. The study group talked to many industrial officials, including several who have completed surge data forms, who feel that the surge data is no more accurate and reliable than the data contained on the 1519 Form.

Surge planning is decentralized in the sense that each Service does its own planning. This results in planning employing different assumptions from Service to Service and from contractor to contractor.

There has been movement in OUSD/R&E towards requiring the Services to prepare annual prioritized lists for surge planning. There is, however, no mechanism that will produce a consolidated priority list.

Surge planning has been discrete and highly focused. Little or no attention has been given to the problems that may be produced when several systems are surged simultaneously. For example, Hughes Aircraft in Tucson has been asked about its surge capabilities on separate systems by separate Services.

Implications. The study group's analysis of IPP and surge planning lead it to the conclusion that these two approaches to industrial readiness have not developed the plans and processes which are essential if the Nation is to develop the capability for peacetime industrial production expansion.

Elements Needed for System of Peacetime Production Expansion

The third major question of this paper is as follows: "What type of industrial preparedness system would be required in the event that the established DOD efforts are not sufficient to produce the desired state of industrial readiness for peacetime production expansion?"

The study group raised this question with a sample of defense contractors. They responded with a set of practical suggestions concerning things that the Government should do to facilitate peacetime industrial production. The Government should—

- Plan for production expansion from warm or hot bases only.
- Develop mechanisms for continuous interaction between contractors and government planners.
- Provide the contractors with statements of government policies.
- Present the contractors with a consolidated and prioritized set of demands/requirements.
- Provide contractors with feedback on their production estimates.
- Finance industrial planning through current procurement.
- Concentrate planning on a few really critical items.
- Provide prime contractors with leverage to secure data from subcontractors.
- Provide contractors with information on projected raw materials supplies.
- Develop mechanisms for the effective utilization of priorities and allocations.
- Develop procedures for the waiving of regulations that pose obstacles to production expansion.
- Adjust procurement and acquisition policies to facilitate production expansion.

These recommendations constitute one of the major inputs into the group's effort to develop a preparedness system that will facilitate the accomplishment of peacetime production expansion. These inputs were combined with the insights of the study group into

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a framework of plans, processes, organizational responsibilities, and contractual arrangements for peacetime industrial production expansion. The study group believes that the system it proposes will provide the foundation of a plan for the orderly, systematic utilization of expanded defense production capabilities in support of important national security objectives. The essentials of the recommended approach, entitled Peacetime Industrial Production Expansion System (PIPES), are outlined below; but first, a caveat is called for.

A Caveat on the Conditions of the Defense-Industrial Base and PIPES

The study group is cognizant of the fact that there are many problems confronting the defense industrial base which cannot be overcome through better industrial preparedness planning, and which will impact adversely on product expansion capabilities, even if the proposed system is adopted in total.

Among the most serious of these problems are: a shrinking defense procurement budget; increasing production lead times; growing dependency on foreign sources of supply; inadequate levels of productivity; continuing problems of raw material availability; decreasing number of defense contractors—especially at the subcontractor level; and decreasing profitability and attractiveness of defense work in comparison with commercial business.

These problems will not disappear if industrial preparedness planning is improved. Yet, their existence makes it imperative that better planning be accomplished. Otherwise, there is little reason to believe that effective, timely peacetime production expansions can be accomplished. Planning on a selective and highly focused basis may provide some opportunities for developing accurate estimates of potential accomplishments, given the conditions of the defense industrial base.

Essential Elements of a Peacetime Industrial Production Expansion System (PIPES)

The Peacetime Industrial Production Expansion System (PIPES) is an industrial production expansion system designed to facilitate the accomplishment of a timely and substantial increase in production of selected defense items, in response to situations short of national emergencies and/or full-scale armed conflict.

PIPES is also a planning system designed to accomplish several basic objectives. Among these are the development of realistic in-depth industrial production expansion plans; attainment of higher levels of understanding of the complexities of industrial expansion planning; and identification of preparedness measures that government officials who control the resource allocation process will regard as cost effective and politically feasible.

Basic PIPES Principles

Several basic principles provide the foundation upon which the PIPES approach is constructed. These basic principles are stated below.

Planning for industrial production expansions must be integrated into established procedures for weapons and materiel item acquisition. Responsibility for such planning must be vested in program/project and item managers within DOD; otherwise, it will be an appendage receiving little priority or attention. (There has been some movement in this direction in the present preparedness systems, but the proposed system goes beyond the status quo.)

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As a peacetime expansion system, PIPES must operate in a constrained environment characterized by the absence of the far-reaching government authorities that are otherwise provided by a declaration of a national emergency.

Planning for industrial expansion must be seen as a joint responsibility of government and industry. Government must provide the financial resources to support industrial planning and develop realistic plans for facilitating production. Industry for its part must develop realistic plans which present accurate estimates of its capabilities and need.

Insofar as possible, planners should develop approaches to industrial preparedness which would impact favorably upon both capabilities for peacetime expansion and ongoing weapon and item-acquisition processes. This would introduce an element of cost effectiveness lacking in most preparedness efforts and provide useful quantifiable benefits.

Within the Government, both DOD and key non-DOD agencies, such as the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), Department of Commerce, and Department of Energy, must work together to develop the resource management mechanisms and policies required by PIPES.

The planning effort must be highly selective in focus. The military hardware items to be planned must meet stringent criteria. The total list of planned items must not give the appearance, nor have the reality of being a "wish list" developed by the Services as a back-door approach to the acquisition of weapons denied through the regular budgetary process. The items must be prioritized with and among the Services.

There are important benefits from planning; for instance, deeper understanding of complex interrelationships will be realized, even if the plans themselves are never used. These benefits will be especially pronounced, given the complexity of the contemporary environment within which industrial planning operates.

Basic PIPES Elements

PIPES consists of the following basic elements: a *System of Plans*, a collection of interrelated and interdependent government and contractor plans reflecting the various dimensions of peacetime production expansion; a *Planning Process*, a process for assessing the relationships, interactions and interdependencies in the production expansion process and for developing the required plans; a *Set of Contractual Arrangements* to facilitate planning and production; and an *Organizational Infrastructure*, a defined alignment of responsible organizations, agencies, and elements to create a smooth coordination of PIPES plans and associated implementation actions.

PIPES consists of two general types of plans: contractor production plans, and government policy and action plans.

CONTRACTOR PRODUCTION PLANS

Under PIPES, prime contractors will be obligated to prepare production plans which identify production capabilities and deficiencies, and which detail all the major steps that expanded production would require.

Contractors must identify the primary constraints or obstacles to the accomplishment of the required production. They must provide data on critical manufacturing processes, especially those related to processes which are rate-limiting, the projected usage rates of needed materials (especially those available from the national strategic

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stockpile and/or difficult to obtain without priorities assistance), and the identify of principal vendors/suppliers. Detailed information on subcontractors and the sub-tier network supporting the contract end item should also be provided. This information should include their production rate potential and the constraints impacting on their production expansion capabilities. In addition, subcontractors must identify the critical materials which are in competition with the commercial sector of industry for manufacturing of defense related products.

These planning requirements are generally similar to those specified by the recently developed Data Item Description for surge planning. While this data would be helpful as a baseline for informational needs, PIPES planning must go beyond that threshold in several important areas. It must include information of a macro-planning character for the specific contractor and sub-tier network producers. It must specify the impact of expansion of a PIPE'd item on the production rate of other DOD products as well as the impact on competing PIPE'd items for which a given contractor is responsible. In this context, the various PIPE'd items will be examined in terms of total manufacturing capacity needed and available, in lieu of a nonrealistic item-by-item planning process so routine today in both DD Form 1519 and surge planning. In addition, contractors will be encouraged to identify the impact of expanded production upon non-DOD hardware, so that the full implications of PIPES implementation can be examined with an eye to products critical to other essential aspects of national security and well-being.

An essential element of these industrial production plans is a list of constraints or obstacles that the contractor anticipates to expanded production in the time frame for which the production is anticipated/planned. This list provides the impetus for the development of government action plans.

Since this constraint list will stimulate government planning, it is imperative that the list of constraints be revised carefully, to ensure that it contains only those constraints clearly beyond the capacity of the contractor to overcome.

DEVELOPMENT OF CONTRACTOR PRODUCTION PLANS

Contractor production plans are to be developed by the contractor upon receipt of direction from the producing activity. The planning process should include opportunities for industry and government to interact over time in order to produce several iterations of the industrial production plan. This open dialogue will give program creditability and realism, and will enable contractors to periodically update the plan with new constraints that inevitably will arise. It provides the government planners with real-world procurement actions, without compromising the integrity of the competitive procurement process.

These production plans should be developed by contractor officials responsible for the development of the mechanisms to expand production capabilities for selected PIPE'd items.

The contractor production plan should be developed through the following four-stage process:

1. The project/program or item manager for the planned item informs the contractor of the requirements for that item expressed in terms of quantities and delivery schedule and requests an estimate of the contractor production capabilities of those requirements.
2. The contractor estimates his production capabilities under the assumption that conditions prevailing at the time of the initial request will prevail when the production requirement will have to be met.

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3. The contract concurrently identifies the constraints in this environment to an expanded production as required.

4. Upon receipt of additional guidance from the program/project or item manager, covering such matters as government actions to facilitate production, modified requirements for quantities or delivery rates, and any other pertinent information, the contractor shall prepare new estimates of his production capabilities. (This guidance to provide the impetus for these revised contractor plans comes from government policy and action plans.)

Under these procedures, contractors would no longer plan in a policy vacuum. They would have insight into government policies and priorities during the period of the production expansion. Contractors would also receive feedback on their original and subsequent submissions. Prime contractors would develop their plans with a considerable amount of knowledge concerning their subcontractors. Contractors would be compelled to produce realistic plans on the method to accomplish the production increases.

GOVERNMENT POLICY AND ACTION PLANS

PIPES is predicated on the assumption that no peacetime industrial production expansion can be accomplished without coherent and systematic government policies and action. Accordingly, the study group believes that plans or documents should be developed that contain or provide for the following: a selective and prioritized set of military items the production of which is to be increased under peacetime conditions; a set of *production requirements for each of the items identified*; a set of preplanned policies and actions to be implemented in an attempt to facilitate industrial accomplishment of defense production increases; and mechanisms for insuring the orderly and systematic flow of decisions and actions required to accomplish both the development of required plans and their implementation under various conditions.

Let us examine each of these in greater detail.

Planned Items

PIPES includes a selective and prioritized set of military items, the production of which is to be planned for by the Services, industry, and government agencies. Because resources must be concentrated on the top priority items which have the potential of having the greatest positive impact for the capabilities of the armed forces, it is essential that great care be given to developing a reasonable, credible, and workable number of planned items. While the list can be expanded over time, selectivity and initial austerity is the key to system acceptance by both government and industry.

A rigorous set of selection criteria is needed to insure these tests of reasonability, credibility, and workability. The study group initially considered employing the criteria of the IPP system as detailed in DOD Instruction 4005.3, but concluded more stringent peacetime expansion criteria are required.

Candidate items must be on the Services Industrial Preparedness Planning List and should be limited to "war pacing" items—items critical to military operations in the initial 30-60 days of armed conflict. Also, continuing peacetime force structure requirements should exist for candidate items. In addition, candidate items must be limited, at the outset of PIPES implementation and pending system maturity, to warm base items, e.g., currently in production or items procured at least through annual procurement action. Finally, commercial items should not be included in PIPES. A system similar to the Machine Tool Trigger Order Program should be considered for commercial items.

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The study group has made an initial attempt to apply these criteria. This has produced a tentative listing of typical items that may be appropriate for detailed planning, as follows: guns/artillery; munitions; missiles (tactical); aircraft; command, control, communications and intelligence force multipliers; tanks/infantry fighting vehicles; repair parts; and trucks.

Production Requirements

PIPES objectives consist of military requirements expressed in terms of the desired quantities of military items to be produced in specified time periods. The concept basic to PIPES is that there are various levels of defense production of specific items which the President, or his designated representative, may desire to have attained by the industrial base in response to future threats or crises. Given the context in which PIPES might be implemented, it is desirable to develop plans which conceive of desired quantities and production rates of items over specified periods of time.

Process for Items and Requirements

The prioritized item list and the corresponding production requirements for each item on the list is to be produced through a process described below. The item selection and production requirement setting process moves through the following stages:

The individual Services and the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA), upon receipt of policy guidance from OUSD R&E, nominate items which meet the PIPES criteria for inclusion in the planning process; the Services and DLA estimate the production requirements (i.e., quantities) and delivery schedules for each item which they nominate, and OUSD R&E reviews the submissions and develops a consolidated and prioritized list of items to be planned, and develops an official set of production requirements for each approved item.

This process represents a significant change from the process now operative in DOD. The current procedures for IPP allow each Service to arrive at independent, uncoordinated statements of the requirements for planned items. This is widely regarded as producing unrealistic requirement schedules that have little relationship to the force structure requirements developed through a complex process of resource allocation and force structure planning.

In order to be realistic, the requirement for PIPES planning should undergo the same rigorous analysis and consolidation process that operates on the determination of current forces in-being; otherwise, the requirement will be unprioritized and represent a "wish list."

Government Plans for Production Facilitation

PIPES envisions the development of plans focusing on the actions that the government could, or will, take in the event the President orders increased defense production in peacetime.

Government actions which could increase the capabilities of the industrial base for rapid production increases fall into three broad categories. The first consists of Industrial Preparedness Measures, which are actions designed to increase the physical capacity of industrial facilities, e.g., acquisition of new equipment and facilities. Actions in this category are expensive and generally do not produce immediate results unless a single item represents a sole bottleneck to an otherwise easily accelerated commodity. These are generally comparable to the measures generated by the 1519 process.

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The second category consists of actions in the policy or regulatory area that the government can take on its own discretion, e.g., waiving of pollution abatement requirements, which may impact favorably on the production rate of the industrial facilities in question.

Defense contractors with whom we spoke identified several policy actions by the government which could facilitate production expansion. Among these are: relaxation of military specifications and testing requirements; temporary suspension of limitation on contractor discretion relative to manufacturing facility; relaxation or suspension of socio-economic constraints such as those imposed by the Equal Employment Opportunity Act, Occupational Safety and Health Act, and Environmental Protection Act; suspension or elimination of restrictions on sources of purchases by prime contractors from foreign sources; or suspension of set-aside provisions.

This is a partial list that is designed to convey the message that there are a number of possible actions the government could take to facilitate production expansion in varying degrees. The study group believes that in-depth PIPES studies might provide governmental planners with a rich menu of relatively low cost, although politically difficult, actions to facilitate production increases.

A third category of measures that may facilitate PIPES production consists of advanced procurement measures. Included in this category of procurement actions are such actions as early industrial and government acquisition and stockage of long lead time items, acquisition of special tooling, provisions for maintenance of warm bases, and advance acquisition of raw materials. Few, if any, of these actions are unique to PIPES. In fact, virtually all are equally important in the context of surge production and full mobilization efforts. The allocation of additional funds to these activities would obviously enhance the readiness of the defense industrial base for production acceleration of various levels and duration.

PIPES envisions a set of plans covering a range of actions in both general categories the government could take to facilitate the accomplishment of production expansions in the face of specific contingencies. It is possible to identify a range or mix of actions in the categories which have the effect of removing some of the major obstacles to production expansion.

There is no simple formula that can be employed in the development of plans for government actions to facilitate production expansion. Each PIPE'd item will present both unique and common problems. These plans, therefore, should reflect acknowledgment of this complexity.

The three general types of actions may be taken by the government either prior to, or concurrently with, the activation of the production plans. In the pre-implementation stage, the government may decide to fund industrial preparedness measures, to authorize advanced procurement, and/or secure the authority to waive regulations that impede production efforts. Actions in any of these categories will impact on contractor capabilities, and their implementation should lead directly to the development of new production capability estimates.

Government actions in this list should be classified into three additional categories on the basis of their place in the sequence of the expansion planning or production expansion processes. These actions are: those to be taken prior to the activation of a production plan, via the exercise of discretionary authority by the President or the Secretary of Defense; those to be taken prior to the activation of a production plan, but which cannot be taken until appropriate authorization is obtained from Congress; and those to be taken by the Government only after the decision to activate production plans, but which

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cannot be taken successfully without adequate preplanning, including, perhaps, pre-authorization from Congress.

One of the primary functions of OUSD R&E under this approach is to mobilize the required support so that the necessary actions are taken at the appropriate time. One of the most important actions in this regard is the advocacy of legislative changes to increase the scope of the discretionary actions available to the government. Communication of these information plans to contractors will provide them with important insights into the conditions under which they will be expected to increase production.

Process for Developing Government Action Plans

The OUSD R&E, in conjunction with other Federal agencies, develops a set of policies and actions that it believes appropriate to facilitate production. This step is a complex process involving several sub steps.

The contractors will develop a list of the constraints or obstacles that they anticipate encountering if asked to increase production of selected items, and will suggest government actions that would overcome or remove the obstacles to production expansion.

The project program and/or item managers will consult with the contractor and identify those government actions which are most appropriate. The project program and/or item managers will also submit a report identifying constraints and corresponding actions to OUSD R&E.

The OUSD R&E will consult with the appropriate Federal agencies, especially Commerce and FEMA, informing them of the identified constraints and will work with them to identify government actions designed to remove the constraints. The OUSD R&E will then prepare a consolidated set of plans that identify the actions that it deems most appropriate for the facilitation of production expansion in peacetime.

In this staged or phased process, agencies will be required to identify the range of options available to remove obstacles to expanded production, to assess their likely costs and consequences, and to determine the interrelationships between various courses of action and various policies. It is in this process that Federal agencies other than DOD become important actors.

Many of the problems and solutions fall within the purview of other Federal agencies, as indicated. For example, raw material problems are under the purview of Bureau of Mines in the Department of the Interior. Priorities and allocations are currently under the operational control of the Department of Commerce, and the allocation of energy to industrial plants falls within the purview of the Department of Energy.

The study group believes that two major benefits would flow from the development of those plans. First, the relationship between production capabilities and constraints to production on the one hand, and governmental policies to remove or lessen the impact of the constraints on the other hand, would be more explicitly known than it is currently. Government planners should develop a much greater understanding of the range of payoffs that are associated with taking various actions that are designed to facilitate production expansion. Second, government planners should acquire greater understanding of the interrelationships among all those policies and actions that impact directly or indirectly on the production capabilities of the defense contractors. This is particularly important in light of the widespread conviction that government agencies often work at cross purposes relative to the industrial base.

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Financial Plans

Implementation of PIPES production plans may require the expenditure of additional appropriated funds and/or a diversion of funds from other program elements' accounts in both DOD and other Federal agencies. While DOD has some limited authority for reprogramming of funds, the overwhelming consensus of the study group is that PIPES must incorporate provisions for supplemental appropriations from Congress. There is considerable uncertainty concerning the rapidity with which a request for supplemental findings for peacetime production expansion could be formulated in DOD, approved by the Office of Management and Budget and the President, and enacted by Congress.

The study group believes that additional examination must be given to the development of procedures for streamlining the supplemental funding process. One possibility that should be explored is the very viable alternative of increasing the Presidential authorities for reprogramming of Federal funds without the declaration of national emergency. While this is, no doubt, a highly controversial concept at a time when Congress is ill disposed to increase the discretionary powers of the President, little value will be gained from PIPES unless funding can be expedited or some arrangement reached to engage the expansion process while debate over precise funding is ongoing.

One approach that deserves serious attention is the development of proposed supplementals which would be designed to provide both the President and the appropriate Congressional committees with opportunities to review "budgets" for peacetime expansion in normal planning process. This would entail much greater levels of consultation with Congress than is presently the case in industrial preparedness. This arrangement could save considerable time and allow for a more rapid flow of funds.

Activation and Control Plan

The basic production expansion process must be carefully managed by the Government if its objectives are to be accomplished in an orderly and effective manner. Management of the process would be greatly facilitated by the development of an activation and control plan.

The PIPES Activation and Control Plan establishes the procedures for managing the production expansion effort. There are several conceptually distinct actions associated with the management of this type of effort. In sequential order, they are: issuance of the basic directive by the President or his delegated agent to implement PIPES actions; formulation of a funding package, assumed to be in the form of an emergency supplemental, designed to fund the required production expansion; appropriation of funds by Congress and release of appropriated funds to the Services and DLA. Movement of funding authority through the various funding elements should be expedited in order to facilitate the award of PIPES contracts.

Continuing these management actions are as follows: finalization of contractual arrangements and placing of orders with contractors; implementation of preplanned actions by the government in the regulatory and policy areas; and finally, management of resources by government agencies to facilitate the flow of required materials to PIPES contractors and subcontractors.

Data Base Requirements for Plans

The diverse planning efforts discussed herein could be pulled together effectively through a PIPES data base. CUSO R&I should be responsible for compiling all of the significant data on production capabilities, production goals, constraints to production

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government policies, cost of such policies, and the costs of expanded production into a comprehensive data base.

Once compiled, this data base would be useful in the continuing and iterative planning process. It could be useful in identifying the most pressing problems confronting contractors who might be asked to increase production. It could also be a handy reference source for planners seeking policies and actions to facilitate production.

CONTRACTUAL ARRANGEMENTS FOR PIPES

An interface between the government and the contractor is necessary in planning as well as implementing PIPES. The planning interface must be by contract with the specific provisions, depending upon the planning approach selected for the item or system. The implementation phase will also require contractual actions confirming the quantities to be produced.

The planning approach selected for individual items or systems will greatly influence the contracting alternatives available should PIPES be implemented. Various PIPES planning approaches and implementation alternatives will be addressed below. It must be recognized, however, that the quantities and required delivery schedules must be determined before meaningful discussions can be held with the contractor.

One of the primary means by which PIPES may facilitate production expansion is the reduction of the procurement lead time for critical requirements. Total lead time is composed of two segments: administrative lead time and production lead time. Administrative lead time covers the period from identification of the requirement until contract award, and production lead time covers the period from contract award to delivery of production hardware. While administrative lead time is largely within the control of the government and can be reduced through effective planning, significant reductions in production lead time may require industrial preparedness measures, advanced procurement action, or significant changes in government regulations.

Planning

A variety of planning approaches are possible, and the best approach for any given system or item will depend upon its individual characteristics and the nature of the industry involved. When reviewing these alternatives, one must keep in mind that in order to be included in PIPES, a major weapon system must be in production, and equipment items or spare parts have annual peacetime buys.

There are several alternative approaches for PIPES planning:

1. One approach is to handle PIPES planning separately from the peacetime buy. This approach will require a separate contractual action for planning. Industrial preparedness measures or other actions to improve production capability must be initiated as appropriate. Under this approach, PIPES implementation will necessitate the award of a new contract to cover the production of the required hardware.

2. A second approach is to include the CUSD R&E Data Item Description (DID) in the solicitation contract for peacetime buy. The DID could be separately priced or the cost could be included in the price of the hardware to be delivered under the contract. As in the previous approach, a new contract would need to be awarded upon PIPES implementation.

3. A third approach would be to include an option for governmental activation of PIPES production in the contract for the peacetime buy. Contractors would be committed to meet PIPES requirements as set forth in the contract option and constraints identified

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by the contractor would have to be detailed prior to the award of the contract for the peacetime buy. Thus, prior identification of governmental policies to remove the constraints would precede contract option award.

4. In addition to the PIPES production option addressed in the third approach above, a separate PIPES option could be established for long lead components. Disposition plans for the long lead material would be required to cover the situation where the long lead option exercised by PIPES production was not required and the items were not needed for current peacetime production. Two possible alternatives would be to place the items in storage for future use, or to provide the items as government furnished material for the next peacetime buy of the applicable end items.

For new weapon systems, PIPES application must be decided in the acquisition process. Required production ranges, lead time impact, and associated costs must be identified and made a part of the Defense Systems Acquisition Review Council (DSARC) III approval.

The first two alternatives above involve a two step process, which would satisfy planning objectives but would not facilitate contracting actions upon PIPES activation. The last two alternatives not only satisfy planning objectives, but would also reduce PIPES administrative lead time, and could be used with whatever type contract is most appropriate for the peacetime buy. Multiyear contracts should be seriously considered if the latter two alternatives are used. This would probably increase contractor interest in PIPES and would also offset, in part, the increased administrative lead time required for the initial contract award.

Contract Options

As indicated earlier, the PIPES planning approach selected will determine the contracting alternatives available upon PIPES plans activation. Under the first two planning alternatives, it will be necessary to award a new contract in order to implement PIPES. A thorough planning effort will facilitate this process, however, in most cases a letter contract will be required to expedite contract award. Even when expedited, the administrative lead time for this approach will be much longer than that required to exercise an option. Since the new contract award would be made to the planned producer of the item, it may be possible to complete preliminary actions with the contractor in advance, in order to further expedite the process.

Under the last two planning approaches, the contract option can be exercised as soon as funds are available. However, the quantities to be purchased must be consistent with the provisions of the option. Since the contractor has a current contract for the item and has his sub-tier suppliers in place, PIPES production objectives should be achieved.

ORGANIZATIONAL INFRASTRUCTURE

In the foregoing analysis we have touched on the roles of several of the entities essential for PIPES. A review of the basic responsibilities of each entity provides a useful device for summarizing much of the material on PIPES processes.

Responsibility and Roles of the Participants: DOD Agencies

Within DOD four major entities or components must perform key tasks relative to PIPES, namely, OSD, OUSD R&E, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the respective Services.

The OUSD R&E will be responsible for developing and updating criteria for PIPES items, reviewing and approving or rejecting Service nominations for PIPES items, and

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developing a consolidated prioritized list of requirements, developing an inventory of government actions that could be taken to remove key production constraints, developing an inventory of costs of identified policy actions, managing the budgetary aspects of the system, and developing and maintaining the PIPES data base

The military Services will be responsible for a variety of tasks. Responsibility for their performance will be divided among the major staffs and the program project and item managers. Among the key Service tasks are: nomination of items to be included in PIPES planning—initial nomination by managers and approval by staff, determination of requirements for planned items; identification (with contractor assistance) of constraints on production capabilities and transmission of data on these to OUSD R&E; interaction with contractors to produce realistic plans; and negotiations of contracts for PIPES planning and production expansion of PIPES items.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff JCS will be responsible for analysis of the item nominations by the Services.

Non-DOD Agencies

The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) shall serve as the primary liaison office between DOD and the civilian resource agencies of the Federal Government, e.g., Transportation and Energy, in the development of the required inventory of governmental actions designed to facilitate increased defense production. Performance of this role would entail the development of policy planning guidance and the coordination of planning activities, as appropriate and consistent with established responsibilities.

Within the Department of Commerce (DOC), the Office of Industrial Mobilization shall administer the Defense Materials and Defense Priorities Systems in support of PIPES, and conduct industry evaluation studies as required for PIPES studies.

Other Non-DOD agencies, e.g., Transportation, Energy, and Interior, shall follow guidance from FEMA and provide the necessary assistance to planners in DOD.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Conclusions

This paper has presented a system designed to facilitate the completion of a highly selective expansion of defense production in peacetime in response to Presidential directive. This system features:

- Joint governmental and contractor planning on selective and prioritized military items
- Comprehensive and holistic planning on the problems associated with the simultaneous expansion of several items
- Iterative planning that identifies capabilities, production constraints, and policies and considers their interrelationships
- Interaction between OUSD/R&E and the Services and between OUSD R&E and other Federal agencies

A system with these features would provide

- Realistic estimates of the production expansion capabilities of selected contractors, and the constraints which impact upon these estimates

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- Governmental policy and action plans keyed to specific constraints which can be implemented as appropriate.
- Insights into the complex interrelationships between contractor capabilities and governmental policies.
- A set of options for production increases and governmental actions applicable to a variety of peacetime emergencies.

In order to accomplish these results, DOD must make a firm commitment to the incorporation of industrial preparedness into weapon and item acquisition processes; develop a selective consolidation and prioritized DOD list of planned items; vigorously pursue the development of an inventory of appropriate government policies keyed to identified constraints; develop the necessary financial and budgetary mechanisms to fund planning and production expansion; and provide incentives for contractor cooperation.

Recommendations

The Department of Defense should apply the PIPES principles via the completion of pilot studies/plans on a highly selective list of war pacing items.

Under the assumption that these studies *will demonstrate the usefulness of the PIPES approach*, the Department of Defense should incorporate these principles into its ongoing programs.

ENDNOTES: PEACETIME INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION EXPANSION

1. See, for example, the following: US Department of Defense, Defense Science Board Task Force, *Industrial Readiness Plans and Programs* (Washington, DC, 1976); Henry A. Miley, Jr., "Future Industrial Mobilization," *National Defense* 63 (July-August 1978): 54-57; and Norman R. Augustine, "America's Secret Weapon," *National Defense* 62 (May-June 1978): 558-560, 565.

2. See Defense Science Board Task Force, *Industrial Readiness Plans and Programs*, and US General Accounting Office, *Restructuring Needed of Department of Defense Programs for Planning with Private Industry for Mobilization Production Requirements* (Washington, DC, May 1977).

3. Floyd H. Trogdon, "Department of Defense Initiatives in Industrial Planning," paper presented at the 1978 Annual Meeting of the American Defense Preparedness Association, Industrial Base Planning Division.

Panel 5

**THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE IN A DECADE OF
CHANGE**

An assessment of the interests of the United States at stake in Latin American and the Caribbean. The examination of the strategic, cultural, economic, and social factors inimical to those interests. An analysis of the appropriateness of current policies and suggested revisions which can strengthen prospects for stability and security in the decade ahead.

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PANEL 5 Participants

CHAIRMAN: Dr. Lincoln Gordon, Resources for the Future, Inc.

RAPPORTEUR: LTC Michael V. Vasilik, USAF, Decision Systems Directorate, National Defense University

AUTHORS: Dr. Sidney Weintraub, The Brookings Institution; Dr. Abraham Lowenthal, Woodrow Wilson Center, Smithsonian Institution

PANELISTS: LTG Randal T. Adams, USAF, Chairman, Inter-American Defense Board; RADM Lucien Capone, United States Navy (Retired); Dr. Elba de Kybal, Economic Integration Advisor, *Organization of American States*; Dr. John J. Finan, Director, Latin American Studies, the American University; Mr. John Ford, Special Assistant to the Secretary General, *Organization of American States*; Dr. Rose Hayden, Deputy Director for Latin America and Caribbean Operations, US Peace Corps; Ambassador John J. Jova, Meridian House International; Dr. Nora Scott Kinzer, Visiting Professor, Industrial College of the Armed Forces; Dr. Johanna Mendelson, Assistant Director, Center for Defense Information; Dr. Riordan Roett, The Johns Hopkins University; Mr. Howard Salzman, Director of Personnel, *Organization of American States*; RADM Gordon Schuller, USN, Director, Inter-American Region, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA); Mr. Harvey Summ, Director, Latin American Studies Program, Georgetown University.

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PANEL 5 SUMMARY

The Western Hemisphere In A Decade Of Change

Lincoln Gordon

Michael Vasilik

As a basis for discussion, Dr. Weintraub summarized his paper on "The Importance of Nearness: US Policy Toward Mexico and the Caribbean," the purpose of which being to ask whether there should be a predisposition in US policy to differentiate between near and distant nations. The central thesis was that Mexico and other nearby countries have a special importance to the United States, and this requires a shift in the policy formulation process from one which starts with the assumption that policies must be global, to one which asks how policies can be differentiated in dealing with neighboring countries.

The panel considered some areas where US policy can be differentiated to favor nearby countries, without prejudice to US interests elsewhere. These areas include migration control and immigration quotas; bilateral US aid, including technical assistance; joint research programs and development loans; balance-of-payments assistance; and certain aspects of trade policy, including *de facto* relaxation of the most-favored-nation (MFN) principle.

It was concluded that:

- Proximity makes a difference in US relations with other countries
- Particular attention should be paid to events in nearby countries
- Some very important issues require unusual policies, but some issues permit limited, differentiated treatment of special categories of neighboring countries, without prejudicing broader US interests
- The United States should advance mutual interests, whenever possible
- US policymakers should not exclude actions which favor nearby countries, even if such actions are not generally applicable to all countries and regions

An opposing view was advanced by a panelist who felt that the central question is, perhaps, whether US policy can be significantly, constructively, and publicly differentiated for dealing with neighbors, without prejudicing US interests elsewhere, and without producing counterproductive fears, resentments, or disappointments in the neighboring countries.

In discussing this issue, the following points were made:

- Proximity is an important dimension, but usually it is not the most important one
- It is possible to overestimate the kinds, and significance, of the favorably differentiated actions that can be taken to affect neighbors and the favorably differentiated impacts that are possible within a universal policy framework
- Exaggerating opportunities for advancing mutual interests runs the risk of building disappointment, should rhetoric exceed implementation, which has been the pattern of US-Latin American relations
- Latin Americans understandably reject talk of special treatment, which means in practice their countries will be singled out for special rhetorical or interventionist attention

The opposing argument concluded that in many cases, consistently applied US policies, such as those regarding trade, aid, finance, and migration, may have their

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greatest, favorable impact precisely on the countries which are most completely integrated with the United States, economically and demographically. A sensitively and intelligently administered "globalist" approach would, therefore, not only enhance the capacity of the United States to relate successfully to the economies of Mexico and the Caribbean, but would also be, politically, a much more acceptable approach than one based on "nearness."

RENEWED IMPORTANCE OF LATIN AMERICA

The panel noted with enthusiasm that the importance of Latin America to national security had been recognized in the format of the Sixth National Security Affairs Conference, in contrast to its neglect in earlier such conferences. At the same time, it was emphasized that the renewed importance of this region in the array of US strategic interests and concerns is based not on obsolete concepts of hemispheric isolationism, sentimental Pan-Americanism, or effective US continental hegemonism. It is, rather, based on Latin America's increasingly heightened role within the framework of global security considerations. This interweaving of regional and global concerns emerges in each of the areas of US interest identified in the course of the panel's discussions. They can be summarized as follows:

- To prevent hostile powers from obtaining significant military vantage points in areas close to the United States or to US major sea lanes.** This part of the US interest is focused in the Caribbean basin and is sharpened by Cuba's links with the Soviet Union. The key concern here, however, is the external political and military affiliation rather than the ideology of the particular regime or its internal social and economic arrangements.
- To maintain US access to important regional resources and markets.** This interest is focused mainly on the larger countries, such as Mexico, Venezuela, and Brazil. In some scenarios of prolonged, subnuclear, global conflict this interest would take on special importance, because of the possible cutoff of more remote sources of supply; it might also imply the desirability of cooperative defense arrangements in selected areas, especially antisubmarine warfare.
- To enlist Latin American support in strengthening worldwide international economic arrangements for trade and finance and in contributing to major sectoral needs in such fields as food and energy.** Here again the relevant countries, for the most part, would be the larger ones. With respect to general economic arrangements, it is noteworthy that along with the so-called "New Japans of East Asia" (Korea, for example), it is, currently, Brazil, Mexico, and Venezuela, and, potentially, Argentina, Peru, and Colombia which constitute the now rather widely recognized grouping of so-called "newly industrializing countries." (The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) refers to these countries as the "NIC's"). These countries are an important element of dynamism in a generally stagnating world economy.
- To secure Latin America political cooperation in promoting fundamental, American-shared values in the world environment.** The norms of constitutional democracy and human rights continue to exercise a great attractive force in most of Latin America, notwithstanding the dramatic fluctuations in regard to political and civil liberties.

The next major point has to do with differences, a point made by Mr. McGiffert in the opening session. The panel emphasized the major differences in the security issues affecting various subregions and the consequent need to discard the habit of formulating

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policies for Latin America as if the region were homogeneous. In some respects each country is a special case, but three substantially different subregions stand out as follows:

First, Mexico. Mexico poses unique issues for the United States in view of the long common frontier; the large-scale migration, both legal and extralegal; the intensity of trade and investment relations; Mexico's hydrocarbon resources; and the growing influence of Mexican-Spanish culture within the United States. Therefore, some kind of bilateral special relationship is inescapable. The potential of that relationship includes both challenges and opportunities.

Second, Central America, in the Caribbean basin. This is a subregion composed mainly of political units which are far too small and too poor to become viable, autonomous nation-states. Whatever the formalities of sovereignty, they are bound to have *de facto* client relations with more powerful nations—traditionally the United States, Britain, France, and Holland; and more recently the Soviet Union, in the Cuban case, and possibly Venezuela or Mexico as things evolve. With limited economic prospects, endemic poverty and unemployment, and, in some cases, archaic social structures, these countries offer fertile ground for charismatic revolutionaries.

Third, the larger countries of South America. These countries, for the most part, have the potential for economic prosperity and ultimate maturation into stable self-government and full participation in the so-called "First World," as equals of the older middle-sized industrial states. With these countries, as with Mexico, the hegemonic aspects of traditional Pan-Americanism are clearly obsolete.

POLICY ISSUES

As to the policy issues, the most urgent current concerns are focused on Central America and the Caribbean, dramatized by the overturn in Nicaragua. In this region, most of the panel believe it essential to define the goal of political stability in dynamic terms, rather than in terms of intransigent defense of narrowly based autocracies. With the advantage of hindsight, it was argued that sufficient pressure for broadening the Nicaraguan regime 3 or 4 years ago might have replaced Somoza with a moderate coalition and avoided both the destructive civil war and the current danger of extremist left-wing control. Plainly, it was advocated that such action should be currently applied in El Salvador, and that simultaneously, the groundwork should be laid for promoting moderate change in Honduras and Guatemala. Some panel members were pessimistic concerning the possibilities of finding genuine moderates to support; and, the definition of "moderate" was recognized as being ambiguous. But there was unanimous agreement that a much more intensive effort is needed to develop political intelligence and the capacity to influence events in this region, through nongovernmental and official channels.

Additionally, connections with the United States are so extensive that some degree of political intervention is inescapable, because, in this region, even taking no action constitutes a kind of intervention. However, sensitivity on this score suggests the desirability of enlisting the collaboration of sympathetic Latin American governments, perhaps building on the recent experience with the Andean Group and in the lesser Antilles; European governments might also be persuaded to assume a corresponding role. In some circumstances more formal multilateral action through the Organization of American States (OAS) may be in order.

As for the larger South American countries, the indicated course of action would include constructive international economic policies to provide a global trading and monetary framework conducive to rapid economic development, and bilateral or regional negotiation of special issues, such as drug control or nuclear nonproliferation.

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It was recommended that the US posture toward the larger South American countries should be similar to relations maintained with the smaller European countries, rather than to developing countries as a group.

The panel felt that the larger South Atlantic countries, notably Brazil and Argentina, could contribute to the enhanced security of the sea lanes by more actively cooperating with the United States in antisubmarine warfare; this sharing of naval responsibilities would directly benefit the United States. To that end, rigid legislative constraints on arms shipments should be repealed, including limitations on coproduction. When more stable conditions of self-government are achieved (note it is "when" and not "if") in those countries, it might be appropriate to consider some more formal type of alliance organization based on the Treaty of Rio.

With respect to multilateral arrangements, the panel's finding was that although the traditional institutions of Pan-American cooperation have declined substantially from their apogee in the 1960's, they continue to have an important constructive potential which merits active US support. That is especially the case with the role of the OAS in arbitrating disputes between Latin American countries and coordinating movements for economic integration, notably among groups of mini-states, such as those in Central America and the eastern Caribbean Islands.

In addressing the Nicaraguan situation, the panel strongly urged that the United States act quickly to provide relief supplies and establish a humanitarian presence, and be a factor in economic reconstruction, both directly and through international organizations. To await clarification of the Nicaraguan political future might be to sacrifice a unique opportunity to influence that future.

The dilemma of US policy toward Cuba was discussed briefly, but without achieving a clear sense of direction. Some panel members argued for a deeper engagement through revocation of the trade embargo and promotion of cultural exchanges, as a means of gaining leverage and securing Cuban restraint in becoming involved in foreign intrigues. Others felt that greater Cuban self-restraint should be a prior condition to a more active relationship. Agreement emerged only on the need to continue searching for relevant incentives and for including Cuban external activities on the agenda for bargaining with the Soviet Union.

Finally, in spite of some good-humored mutual recrimination between the academic Latin Americanists on the panel and the civilian and military officials who were a part of the panel, there was general agreement that this kind of dialogue has real utility for policymakers. Therefore, it was suggested that it be institutionalized, not only as a regular feature of the annual National Security Affairs Conferences, but also on a more frequent, periodic basis, beginning in the fall of 1979. The panel commends the suggestion to the authorities of the National Defense University.

PANEL 5 PAPER:**The Importance of Nearness: US Policy
Toward Mexico and the Caribbean****Sidney Weintraub**

The purpose of this essay is to ask if there should be a predisposition in US policy to differentiate between nearby and other nations. It concludes that self-interest requires differentiation and examines how this can be accomplished without damaging the global policies the United States must pursue.

Current conventional wisdom is that a "special relationship" between the United States and all or some Latin American countries is dead—and good riddance.¹

Yet, common sense tells us that what happens in Mexico is apt to affect the United States more than what happens in more distant places, for instance, Africa or Bangladesh. Events in Jamaica are more likely to affect the United States than what happens in Sri Lanka. Nearness, or nearness carried to its limit of contiguity, makes a self-evident difference in relations among countries. Trade, investment, migration, cultural interchange, and potentially national security, all are influenced by geography. Those who argue against a special relationship must go through intellectual contortions to explain this away.

The words "special relationship" trigger a stereotyped emotional reaction in the minds of many of those familiar with the history of US-Latin American economic and political relations. If one were to play a game of word association and ask a person who objects to any form of "special relationship" with Latin America what word comes immediately to mind when these words are spoken, the response is likely to be "hegemony" (or "dependency" if the person being asked is a Latin American).² For this reason, the phrase "special relationship" probably should be jettisoned as a relic of the past in order to disassociate slogan from current substance.

The objective conditions of US-Latin American relations have changed substantially since the end of World War II. An Alliance for Progress would not be appropriate today. The cumulative growth of Latin America gross national product (GNP) was 5.8 percent a year from 1960 to 1977.³ By 1974, Latin America's economies had surpassed the level reached by Western Europe in 1950.⁴ The threat to terminate aid on the grounds of uncompensated expropriation (the Hickenlooper amendment) not only never was invoked in Latin America, but is now generally seen as an anachronism. Uncompensated expropriations which might give rise to invoking the Hickenlooper amendment have hardly occurred in Latin American countries in recent years. Latin American oil exporters do not cringe and then sell oil to the United States at less than the going world price, as, for example, Chile sold copper exports in 1966 when pressed.⁵

There obviously remains an asymmetry in economic and political power between the United States and individual Latin American countries, or even Latin America taken as a whole, but it is of different proportions from that of one or two decades ago. More significantly, the exercise of that degree of hegemony which still exists takes a different form compared to that of the past. Governments are not powerless in their dealings with multinational corporations. It is hard to conceive of the use of US troops today the way they were used in the Dominican Republic in 1965. For all these reasons, the stereotype that associates special relationship and hegemony is so simplistic as to be invalid.

Generals are often accused of re-fighting the last war. The generation that determined the nature of US involvement in Vietnam grew up with the experience of Munich and

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of the cold war very much in its psyche. Is current US policy of evenhanded globalism akin to fighting the last war out of fear that policies favoring nearby countries must inevitably lead to US domination of these countries?

If nearness should matter in the determination of US policy, then this should affect actions toward Mexico and Canada primarily, but also toward the Caribbean and perhaps Central America. The central thesis of this essay is that Mexico and other nearby countries are something special for the United States, and that this requires a shift in the policy formulation process from that which starts with the assumption that policies must be global, to one which asks how policies can be differentiated in dealing with neighbors. The suggestion is hardly radical; the United States has made exceptions to global policies to fit the US-Canadian situation.⁶ Policy obviously cannot be determined just by nearness or distance, but geography is a factor.

SOME CONSEQUENCES OF PROXIMITY

Some consequences of proximity can be sketched in, but there is no need to belabor them since they are instinctively apparent.

The most significant of these consequences is the migration, legal and illegal, from nearby countries into the United States. The US-Mexican situation is unique with respect to migration because there is both a large disparity of income⁷ plus a long, contiguous border, which means that Mexicans have the incentive to enter, and do enter, the United States without documentation in large numbers. Many migrants from Central America and the northern coast of South America apparently also enter the United States overland, without documents, coming through Mexico. Migrants from other countries normally have valid visas since they arrive at ports of entry. They may overstay their permitted time, but entry for them is different in that documents generally are necessary. In recent years, more than 95 percent of the aliens expelled from the United States have been Mexicans, followed by Salvadorans, Guatemalans; and Columbians; that is, those who generally enter the United States without inspection. Table 1 gives data on aliens either deported or required to depart from the United States by country of destination.

Some caution must be exercised in interpreting the numbers in this table. Some persons are expelled more than once in any given year and other persons are never caught, so that the figures do not represent actual numbers of aliens who enter the United States illegally or who overstay their permitted time. The percentage of Mexicans who are expelled is probably higher than the proportion of Mexicans in the total illegal alien population, because the Immigration and Naturalization Service tends to concentrate its surveillance on the Mexican border and inland cities where Mexicans concentrate. The US Government has estimated that about 60 percent of the illegal aliens in the United States are Mexicans.⁸ Considering the relatively small population of the Caribbean compared to Mexico, plus the fact that aliens from the Caribbean have no direct overland route for entering the United States, the number expelled is high.

What Table 1 demonstrates is that illegal migration into the United States by country and region is highly positively correlated to distance from the United States. Growth rates, poverty, the degree of income inequality, rates of population increase, unemployment and underemployment, and the ability to absorb new entrants into the labor force—that is, the central issues of development—in nearby countries affect the United States through immigration. Whether one believes this effect to be good or bad on the US economy and polity, it makes developments in these countries qualitatively different for the United States from comparable developments in more distant areas.

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**Table 1. Aliens Expelled from the United States,
by Country of Destination, 1970-1977
Annual Averages**

	1970-1974	1975-1977
All Countries	489,477	779,551
Of Which		
Mexico	452,897	746,654
All other countries	36,580	32,897
Of Which		
Industrial countries	12,691	7,149
Non industrial countries	23,889	25,748
Of Which		
Latin America and the Caribbean	16,634	19,882
Of Which		
Central America	4,635	9,765
South America	6,428	6,273
Caribbean	5,571	3,844

Source: Brookings Institution, study in progress. Based on data from the Immigration and Naturalization Service.

In addition to the illegal aliens, the number of persons who cross into the United States legally each year from Mexico is staggering. In the year ended 30 September 1977, there were more than 100 million entries of aliens across the Mexican border, plus 56 million by US citizen.²

All other things affecting trade (such as the size of the economy, raw material availability, complementarity of output with that of the United States) being equal, the United States tends to trade more with contiguous than with other countries. US foreign direct investment is related positively to contiguity. The tendencies can be seen from the data in Tables 2 and 3.

Another way of showing the tendency to trade more with contiguous than with more distant countries is by examining the relationships between US trade and the gross national products of US trading partners. These relationships can be seen in Tables 4 and 5. The level of trade obviously depends on more than GNP, but GNP certainly is a major determinant. As can be seen, US exports to and imports from Canada and Mexico as a percentage of GNP are substantially higher than for other leading trading partners of the United States, save for oil exporting countries. As Mexico increasingly becomes an oil exporter, trade with the United States, in both directions, can be expected to grow.

One reason for the excitement in the United States over the apparently large Mexican oil and gas finds is that they are close. The natural gas can enter the US pipeline system directly and not have to be transported in liquid form. The flow of Mexican oil is much less difficult to disrupt through hostile action at a time of crisis than would the oil from the Persian Gulf. The United States was prepared to risk nuclear war to prevent Soviet missiles in Cuba. The listing of elements of interaction

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Table 2. US Trade with Contiguous Countries, 1977

Canada	
Exports — million of dollars	25,788
Percent of total exports	21
Next largest market	Japan
Value in millions	10,529
Imports — millions of dollars	23,599
Percent of total imports	20
Next largest source	Japan
Value in millions of dollars	13,550
Mexico	
Exports — millions of dollars	4,822
Percent of exports to developing countries	11
Next largest developing country market	Venezuela
Value in millions of dollars	3,172
Imports — millions of dollars	4,694
Percent of imports from developing country sources	7
Largest developing country source	Saudi Arabia
Value in millions of dollars	6,347
Next largest non-oil developing country source	South Korea
Value in millions of dollars	2,923

Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, *United States Trade with Mexico during the years 1971-76* (Overseas Business Report 78-49) (Washington, DC, December 1978), p. 3; United Nations, *Yearbook of the Statistical Yearbook 1977* (Vol. 1) (Geneva, 1978), p. 964.

Table 3. US Direct Investment in Contiguous Countries, Year-End 1977

Canada	
All industries — millions of dollars	26,908
Percent of total	24
Next largest country of investment	United Kingdom
Value in millions of dollars	17,420
Mexico	
All industries — millions of dollars	3,175
Percent of total in developing countries	9
Developing country with greater US investment	Brazil
Value in millions of dollars	5,956
Next largest after Mexico	Panama
Value in millions of dollars	2,215

Source: *Survey of Current Business*, August 1978, p. 29.

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influenced by proximity could be extended, but does not seem necessary. Modern methods of transportation and communications have reduced the significance of geography, but have not eliminated it. When refugees stream out of Burma, they do not come to the United States. When they stream out of Haiti, they do. While many refugees do come to the United States from Southeast Asia, imagine what the impact would be on the United States if the present oppression and conflict in Cambodia were occurring instead in Mexico. What if Vietnam had been in the Caribbean or Central America?

What can be shown is that, other things being equal, nearby instability is apt to affect US trade more than growth in distant countries. Nearby economic growth is likely to affect US trade more than growth in distant countries. Income disparities in nearby countries affect the United States more than similar disparities in distant countries. Pollution and disease are more readily transmitted from neighbors than from distant countries. This much is evident. What is in dispute is whether US policy can be differentiated sufficiently to favorably affect economic and political outcomes in nearby places without prejudicing US interests elsewhere.

SOME RELEVANT POLICY AREAS

The central direction of US foreign economic policy since World War II has been global. This is epitomized by the unconditional most-favored-nation (MFN) principle in trade policy. This sense of globalism is enshrined in the charters of the most important international economic organizations established following World War II, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the World Bank. While permitting some derogations in practice, such as not forcing each GATT member to grant MFN tariff treatment to all others, or providing for various types of differential treatment in the IMF (such as a Trust Fund for the poorest member countries to permit providing assistance to them from the profit from gold sales), the basic principle of these institutions is that there should not be differentiation among nations; or when differentiation has been forced by the press of history (as in nonreciprocity clauses in the GATT, or tariff preferences for developing countries), a country should differentiate generally on behalf of *all* developing countries.

Stated US policy was to oppose regional spheres of influence which might involve special treatment of Africa by Western Europe, of Asia by Japan, and of Latin America by the United States.¹⁰ This policy was inspired by what were seen to be the global US interests in trade, investment, and national security. Globalism, as opposed to regionalism, also was inspired by history, by the desire not to repeat European colonialism in Africa, Japan's co-prosperity sphere in Asia, and US hegemony in Latin America. The policy inspiration thus flowed from two sources: the US desire for the kind of world system it would like to see develop in which global interests would take precedence over special or geographic interests; and the desire to avoid repetition of a colonial-paternal-hegemonic past.

To be sure, there were exceptions to globalism. The United States did not grant MFN trade treatment to Communist countries. The United States supported regionalism in Western Europe even though this involved special preferences among the member countries of the European Economic Community, on what was deemed to be the overriding political purpose of minimizing prospects for European conflict. The Alliance for Progress was an expression of US concern for its particular interest in Latin America, as was the establishment of the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) in advance of any other regional development bank. However, none of these derogations negated the general policy. While aid to Latin America was given a special place and more funds per

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Table 4. Ten Leading Markets for US Exports, 1977

	US Exports (\$ millions)	GNP (\$ millions)	US Exports as % of GNP
Canada	25,788	196,990	13.1
Japan	10,529	642,200	1.6
West Germany	5,989	500,930	1.2
United Kingdom	5,951	247,170	2.4
Mexico	4,822	71,010	6.8
Saudi Arabia	3,575	46,100	7.7
France	3,503	387,060	0.9
Venezuela	3,172	35,940	8.8
Belgium-Luxembourg	3,138	77,116	4.1
Italy	2,790	194,520	1.4

Source: GNP data: 1978 *World Bank Atlas*; trade data: US Department of Commerce, *US Trade with Major Trading Partners*, 1977, 1977, December 1977.

Table 5. Ten Leading Sources for US Imports, 1977

	US Imports (\$ millions)	GNP (\$ millions)	US Imports as % of GNP
Canada	29,599	196,990	15.0
Japan	18,550	642,200	2.9
West Germany	7,238	500,930	1.4
Saudi Arabia	6,347	46,110	13.8
United Kingdom	5,141	247,170	2.1
Mexico	4,694	71,010	6.6
Venezuela	4,084	35,940	11.4
Italy	3,037	194,520	1.6
France	3,032	387,060	0.8
Iran	2,807	75,100	3.7

Source: GNP data: 1978 *World Bank Atlas*; trade data: US Department of Commerce, *US Trade with Major Trading Partners*, 1977, 1977, December 1977.

capita than other regional development assistance programs.¹¹ US aid programs continued elsewhere. An Asian Development Bank was later supported by the United States (although with a lower US percentage contribution than to the IDB).

What has conspired to call into question the validity of undifferentiated globalism has been the realization that events next door in Mexico, or political instability and economic fragility in the Caribbean¹² and Central America, pose particular problems for the United States not shared by other industrial countries. The discovery of what appear to be substantial energy resources by Mexico has cleared the US mind about the importance of Mexico's nearness in a way that no abstract analysis could have accomplished.

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There are functional areas in which the central direction of US policy must inevitably be global. Trade is such an area. US trading relations are too complex to permit a wholesale return to conditional MFN, under which each tariff or trade barrier must be negotiated separately with each country rather than be extended generally; but even in this most clearcut of all areas some conditionality is returning to US policy.¹³ US foreign investment interests are too vast to permit country-by-country differentiation without harming US interests in many countries, although even here some particular derogations are possible if this were desired. There are other areas, however, where policies can be bent more easily in favor of nearby countries without prejudice to US interests in more distant countries. What are some of these?

Migration

There is no logical imperative for limiting the Mexican immigration quota to 20,000 just because the immigration quotas of other countries are so limited. Contiguity and its consequences, such as undocumented migration, would argue for a Mexican quota larger than that of other countries. How much larger can be debated, but it is hard to believe that other US foreign interests would be damaged if the Mexican immigration quota were larger than all other quotas (or if an enlarged joint Mexican-Canadian quota were enacted).

This is not the place to analyze the benefits and costs of legalizing the entry of undocumented workers from Mexico, and of illegal immigrants from other nearby countries, by a guest worker system comparable to those practiced in Europe. The main argument in favor of this proposal is that the people are coming anyway, and it may be possible to marginally improve the treatment they get if their entry and stay in the United States have some supervision. The main argument against this proposal is that temporary contract workers do not necessarily go home after completing their contracts, so that the United States would in practice be encouraging second-class residents, as is the case in many European countries;¹⁴ and also, that by legalizing entry of some foreign workers, this would not by itself prevent illegal entry of others. Dealing with illegal migration clearly lends itself to differential treatment for nearby as opposed to distant countries. It also provides a justification for special US economic help to nearby countries to seek to minimize the push factors impelling persons to migrate to the United States.

Aid

The bilateral US aid program always has been justified on at least two grounds—as an instrument of furthering US political interests, and as a humanitarian gesture of helping the poor majority in the poorest countries. The two prongs do not always coincide. US political interests are greater in Latin America (at least in the nearby countries) than generally in Africa or South Asia, yet most of the world's poorest people are in the latter areas. The divergence between aid motives is not easily resolved, and when resolved, the resolution is unlikely to be durable.¹⁵ As with migration, the subject is too complex for analysis in this brief paper. Concessional aid is a scarce resource, and by definition choices must be made among recipients. One viable choice is to favor nearby countries which need external concessional aid even if this reduces the levels going to more distant countries. Given its probable oil revenue, Mexico will not need concessional assistance (nor has it wanted aid given bilaterally), but most of the Caribbean and Central American countries will. Distribution of bilateral aid, particularly on a per capita basis, now does favor these nearby countries.

Without getting into the question of whether the aid is wisely used and whether its distribution is to the right countries, this also is a departure from globalism that can be

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taken without prejudice to other US interests overseas. Indeed, if the US bilateral program did not practice some type of discrimination among recipients based on perceived US interests, it is hard to see any justification for its continuance alongside the multilateral aid programs.

Aid, or cooperation, need not be concessional. It can involve reimbursable technical assistance, joint programs of research, and lending at commercial terms. Mexico, despite its rejection of bilateral concessional assistance, has benefited extensively through loans from the Inter-American Development Bank and the World Bank on market-related terms. Assuming it comes into existence, the Institute for Scientific and Technological Cooperation proposed by President Carter in the reorganization of US development assistance activities¹⁷ can devote attention to problems of nearby countries, particularly Mexico, without prejudice to other US interests.

Balance-of-Payments Assistance

One significant example of US discrimination in favor of Mexico over other developing countries is the arrangement to provide Mexico with short-term balance-of-payments support, similar to the swap network which exists with the developed countries of the Group of 10 and Switzerland. At a time of financial crisis at the end of 1976, Mexico was able to borrow up to \$900 million under this arrangement pending conclusion of a stabilization agreement permitting Mexico to draw on the IMF. Other developing countries may wish to have a similar arrangement with the United States, and this may even be justifiable in some cases, but this discrimination in favor of Mexico cannot be said to damage other US interests.

Trade

As has been stated, the policy of globalism is best exemplified by the principle of nondiscrimination in trade policy; this principle holds that a country, when forced to discriminate because of political pressure, should do so in favor of developing countries generally rather than by country or by region. Since US trading interests are so extensive, a radical departure from the global system in favor of a few nearby countries probably would not be without cost.¹⁸ However, even for trade it may be possible to favor nearby countries, particularly Mexico, without departing from the MFN principle. The justification for such favoritism is that it might slightly reduce pressure to emigrate by providing more jobs at home.

Concessions that Mexico has sought in the trade field and that might be granted under this kind of favoritism are: to be as generous as possible to Mexico (and other nearby countries) in the quotas permitted in bilateral agreements which limit textile and apparel imports into the United States (which, to a certain extent, seems to have been done); to expand the list of items of interest to Mexico eligible for preferential treatment by the United States under the general system of preferences; or to reduce US tariffs on an MFN basis for products for which one or more nearby countries would be the dominant beneficiaries.¹⁹

It would be unwise to exaggerate. None of these steps, nor all of them jointly, would significantly affect Mexican or Caribbean employment compared to the number of persons now emigrating to find temporary or permanent employment in the United States. The employment effect of these measures might be in the thousands, compared with immigration in the hundreds of thousands or millions. The important employment payoff in Mexico or other nearby countries from expanded exports must come from improved competitiveness and not from special measures by the United States at the edges of the MFN principle.

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Another conceivable departure from globalism in US-Mexican trade is to conclude bilateral understandings on particular aspects of trade, say for trade in energy. Negotiations are in progress at present between the US and Mexican Governments on the price at which natural gas from Mexico could enter the US pipeline system. It is conceivable that a bilateral agreement might be considered in the future for oil. While this might lead to objections from other buyers of oil, there is a natural geographic relationship between the United States and Mexico that would make such an agreement defensible. This issue is not a pressing one because Mexico is still a small factor in total world trade in oil, but it is another area of potential future differentiation in US-Mexican trade as compared with US trade with more distant countries.

A more drastic derogation from the global MFN system would be the promulgation of preferential free trade between the United States and other countries in North America, particularly Canada, but potentially Mexico. Such agreements might be in specific sectors, as now exists in the automotive sector between Canada and the United States; or they might be more general, to come into being gradually over a specified time period. Whether or not such free-trade agreements would be desirable should not logically be based on globalism, since the Europeans already have departed from globalism in the formation and enlargement of the European Economic Community, but on the distribution of economic benefits that might ensue if there were such a preferential area.¹⁹ If the benefits were likely to be one-sided in favor of the United States, this would be a rational ground on which Mexico should reject such a proposal; but it is not inevitable that this would be the outcome. These comments are not intended to advocate preferential trade arrangements with Mexico, but rather to stress that the idea should not be rejected simply because it departs from globalism in trading relations or because it reminds some people of hegemonic US efforts in the 19th century to form a preferential hemispheric market.²⁰

CONCLUSIONS

The listing of actions that the United States might consider which would differentiate in favor of nearby countries is intended to be illustrative and not all-inclusive. Nor should the listing necessarily be considered as advocacy of each of the actions suggested. Some actions, like US Government assistance for collaborative scientific and technical research with Mexico, should not be controversial. Others, such as reducing US tariffs for Mexican winter fruits and vegetables or enlarging the quotas for nearby countries in bilateral textile agreements, would be controversial. Some may or may not be good ideas, such as considering bilateral agreements for the purchase of Mexican oil or setting up a free-trade arrangement with Mexico, but they should not be unthinkable. While the listing is precise, its purpose is more general; namely, to argue that patterns of policy thought need to be enlarged from semiautomatic advocacy of globalism to consideration of departures from globalism that would particularly benefit nearby countries without doing undue damage to other US foreign policy interests.

The official thought pattern now is that the best way to benefit nearby countries is by seeking out those inherently desirable global actions that would trickle down to these countries. Thus, the second Linowitz Commission report emphasized the need for a capital increase in the World Bank and a global reduction of trade barriers. These are useful steps. However, what is being argued here is that it is not necessary to put all US actions on a global basis since the United States does have only a small impact. Others may be more significant. Enlarging Mexico's immigration quota exemplifies both these results. Adding 20,000 or 30,000 places to Mexico's quota will hardly make a dent in reducing the potential number of Mexicans who will wish to come to the United States.

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without documentation, but it would be significant for those who obtain valid visas, and it would be particularly valuable as a gesture of US understanding for a neighbor. Moreover, it is a measure which can be taken unilaterally. Other actions would require bilateral agreements; instituting a system of guest workers or reducing US seasonal tariffs on fruits and vegetables are examples.

One of the arguments made against differentiated policy toward nearby countries is that this will inevitably involve some reciprocity (even if not equivalence) for favors granted.²¹ It may, particularly in the trade field; or it may not, such as in the provision of concessional aid (unless asking the recipient country to take action to make good use of the aid provided is deemed to be reciprocity). However, this concern may be a throwback to earlier US practices of hegemony rather than a reasoned statement of the current limits of US power.²² Nearby countries can reciprocate in some manner for benefits received, or not, but is it still necessary to prohibit them the choice? It is also worth repeating that many benefits would not require reciprocity. Many others would be in the nature of bilateral bargains; for example, Mexican gas for a negotiated price.

To sum up, the main arguments of this essay are the following:

1. Proximity does make a difference in US relations with other countries. This is why the idea of a "special relationship" came into being in the first instance. Modern transportation and communications have "reduced" distance, but not eliminated them.
2. Since, all other things being equal, the United States is affected more by developments in nearby places, particularly Mexico, the Caribbean, Canada, and perhaps Central America, than in distant places, there is a self-interest logic that the United States pay particular attention to events in nearby countries.
3. Some policies, by their nature and because of the extensive US international interests, must be pursued on a global, generally undifferentiated basis among countries, but other issues permit differentiation in country treatment without prejudice to broader US interests.
4. To the extent that US practice can so differentiate in favor of nearby countries, in a way that would favorably affect the United States as well, it should seek to do so.
5. What is most important is that a pattern of thought be instilled in those making foreign policy that global US responsibilities need not preclude actions which favor mainly nearby countries, even if these actions are not generalized to all countries.

ENDNOTES: THE IMPORTANCE OF NEARNESS

1 This statement is easy to document. When the United States instituted its general system of preference in 1976, special preferences for Latin America were explicitly rejected. Mexico and the Maldives are treated alike for immigration purposes: each is allowed a maximum of 20,000 immigrant visas a year. Or, to cite some writings

The Commission [the Linowitz Commission] believes that the new Administration [the Carter administration] should begin by resisting the temptation to speak of "regional community" or "special relationship," which inevitably means that we expect special behavior from the countries of the hemisphere in exchange for the special obligations we pledge.

The United States and Latin America: Next Steps. A Second Report by the Commission on United States Latin American Relations (New York: The Center for Inter-American Relations, 20 December 1976).

A special relationship between the United States and Latin America—or even a substantial special relationship with Mexico alone, in the sense of an exclusive and preferential arrangement—is an idea whose time has passed.

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Abraham F. Lowenthal and Albert Fishlow, *Latin America's Emergence: Toward a US Response*. Headline Series 243 (New York: The Foreign Policy Association, February 1979), p. 50; and finally,

I would reject the special relationship" approach. . . I doubt that Latin America really desires the closer functional linkages with the United States that the successful implementation of such a policy might entail. . . the US promise of a special relationship in the economic realm would, I fear, prove to be so misleading and so incapable of implementation that the end product would be another and far deeper disillusionment regarding the United States and its motives throughout Latin America.

Roger D. Hansen, *US-Latin American Economic Policy: Bilateral, Regional, or Global?* Development Paper 18 (Washington, DC: Overseas Development Council, January 1975), pp. 65-66. Hansen does advocate some tilting towards Latin America short of a special relationship, and he excepts Mexico and the Caribbean from his generalities about Latin America.

2. Lowenthal and Fishlow, *Latin America's Emergence*, use the phrase "hegemonic presumption."

3. Inter-American Development Bank, *Economic and Social Progress in Latin America—1977 Report* (Washington, DC, 1977), p. 4.

4. Enrique Iglesias, *Latin America: The New Regional and World Setting* (Santiago, Chile: Caudernos de la Cepal, 1975), p. 18.

5. *New York Times*, 15 April 1966, p. 51.

6. For example, the interest equalization tax did not apply to Canada, and an automotive agreement involving preferential trade in automobiles and parts was signed.

7. According to the *1978 World Bank Atlas*, per capita GNP in the United States in 1977 was almost eight times that of Mexico.

8. Office of the Attorney General, "Illegal Immigration: President's Program," February 1978, p. 2 (Mimeographed).

9. From Immigration and Naturalization Service report on aliens and citizens admitted at US ports of entry. Each entry, even of the same person, is counted separately. There were about 50 million entries of aliens plus 36 million by US citizens over the Canadian border during the same year.

10. See speech by George W. Ball, Under Secretary of State, on "The Open System in North-South Relations," at Chapel Hill, North Carolina, 9 April 1964. (State Department press release 156, 9 April 1964)

11. The words "development assistance" were chosen to exclude security supporting assistance programs in Vietnam and the Middle East where assistance levels flow from actual or potential warfare.

12. A recent comprehensive article on Caribbean instability is W. Raymond Duncan, "Caribbean Leftism," *Problems of Communism* 27 (May-June 1978): 33-57. A more complete economic analysis of the English-speaking Caribbean can be found in Sidney E. Chernick *et al.*, *The Commonwealth Caribbean: The Integration Exercise* (Baltimore, Md.: John Hopkins University Press for the World Bank, 1978).

13. I have in mind the proposed codes agreed to in the multilateral trade negotiations. For example, in both the subsidies/countervailing duty code and that on government procurement, MFN status need be provided only to those countries joining the code.

14. US Congress, Joint Economic Committee, "Guestworker Programs: Lessons From Europe," draft report by Philip L. Martin for the Joint Economic Committee, 96th Cong., 1st sess., 28 February 1979.

15. For example, the Subcommittee on Inter-American Affairs of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, in its hearings on the US fiscal year 1979 bilateral assistance program, called on the Agency for International Development to review its development objectives toward middle-income countries, particularly in Latin America, presumably to give more stress to the political than the humanitarian motive of aid. Also, see statement before the subcommittee by Abelardo L. Valdez, Assistant Administrator for Latin America and the Caribbean, Agency for International Development, 14 February 1979, especially pp. 22ff (Mimeographed).

16. See message from the President of the United States, *Reorganization Plan No. 2 of 1979* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1979).

17. The one departure from the MFN system which now exists is the US-Canada automotive agreement. Even though this is a unique case because of patterns of production by the same companies in close proximity on either side of the border, it has stimulated speculation about preferential free trade generally between Canada and the United States or more broadly in North America, including Mexico.

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18 For example, Mexico supplies close to 100 percent of US tomato imports, on which seasonal duties are high. Mexico also would be the main beneficiary if US seasonal duties were reduced on winter fruits and vegetables. It would obviously not be easy for the United States to reduce these duties since they exist to protect US producers.

19 The opposition in Canada and Mexico to a free-trade area among Canada, Mexico, and the United States would be as much or more political as it would be economic. Lowenthal and Fishlow (*Latin America's Emergence*, p. 50) argue against such an arrangement between the United States and Mexico mainly on the ground that it would increase Mexican dependence on the United States by diverting Mexico's attention away from other markets. It probably would. However, it is not self-evident why a US-Mexican preferential area need limit Mexico's access to other countries, assuming greater Mexican competitiveness, any more than adherence to the EEC has limited Germany's ability to export to nonmember countries.

20 The United States proposed a Pan-American customs union or free trade area at the first Inter-American conference in 1889-90. See Samuel Flagg Bemis, *A Diplomatic History of the United States*, 4th ed. (New York: Rinehart and Winston, 1955), p. 732. Jorge Castaneda, in *Mexico and the United Nations* (New York: Manhattan Publishing Co., 1958), cites this US effort as background in his rejections of the idea of any special relationship between Mexico and the United States (p. 170).

21 This is stated explicitly in the second report of the Linowitz Commission, *The United States and Latin America: Next Steps*, p. 4.

22 For example, Lowenthal and Fishlow, *Latin America's Emergence*, make much of the US insistence following World War II to obtain raw materials from Latin America at less than world prices, and US advocacy of private investment as the cure-all for Latin America's development problems, as kinds of undesirable actions that result from a special relationship. These examples clearly are throwbacks which may be useful in explaining past resentments but not as a guide to future policy. Indeed, a good argument can be made that Mexico has managed to resist most pressures for reciprocity by remaining a free rider in the international trading system by getting MFN benefits without joining GATT.

PANEL 5 PAPER:

Changing Patterns in Inter-American Relations*

Abraham Lowenthal

On 28 April 1965 US Marines landed at Santo Domingo in the Dominican Republic, having been unilaterally ordered to deploy by President Lyndon B. Johnson. The military intervention had been "requested" in a communique—drafted in English with the help of a US attache—which arrived at the American Embassy hours after the Marines had landed. The hastily assembled military junta which called for the US forces had been put together with active help from US officials. Its enforceable writ at the time called for US troops to be extended no farther than the San Isidro Air Base.

Having sent in troops—ostensibly to protect American lives and property, but actually to prevent what US officials perceived as a possible "second Cuba" in the Americas—the US Government turned next to the Organization of American States (OAS), seeking to gain international legitimacy for its action. Within a day or two, the desired fig-leaf (however transparent) was provided by an ever-obliging OAS. The requisite two-thirds vote was secured to support the formation of an "Inter-American Peace Force," into which the considerable US contingent could be incorporated. The fact that the crucial final vote necessary to reach the required two-thirds vote was provided by the delegate from the Dominican Government, whose legitimacy was the precise issue in Santo Domingo, caused neither delay nor noticeable embarrassment. Nor did the fact that the OAS-endorsed force was eventually commanded by a Brazilian general alter in any way the essential issue: for the third time in this century US troops were occupying downtown Santo Domingo, during the 20th century US troops had been an occupying force a dozen or more times in Central America and the Caribbean.

On 21 June 1979, the Foreign Ministers of the OAS met again, this time to consider the crisis in Nicaragua. Secretary of State Cyrus Vance personally presented the US position. He called not only for collective repudiation of the Somoza regime but for agreed upon measures to translate the regional will into effect—the creation of an OAS mission to help negotiate a political transition in Managua and of a "peace-keeping force" to restore order to the beleaguered country.

The operative parts of the US proposal got a cold reception from the Latin American and Caribbean representatives to the OAS. Delegate after delegate couched denunciations of Somoza with equally vehement rejections of foreign (read US) intervention. Secretary Vance's proposal got exactly nowhere. By 23 June, US authorities were relieved to support an alternative resolution—proposed by several Andean and Caribbean nations—calling for an end to the Somoza regime, but without providing any collective means for bringing about this aim. Rumors which had begun to circulate in Washington that the Marines were being readied for Nicaragua died down quickly in the face of the overwhelming Latin American resistance to even a collectively sanctioned military role by the United States. In any case, within a few weeks, Somoza had fallen. In the regime's latter moments, it was revealed that a US troop carrier was offshore, but that it had no Marines on board, and only 19 soldiers.

It is not clear whether any serious consideration was given in Washington to the possibility of US military intervention in Nicaragua, unilateral or collective. Nor is it ob-

*This paper is a revised version of one which was presented on 10 July 1979 at the Annual Conference on "Changing Patterns in International Relations" of the Leonard Davis Institute of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem.

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vious whether the Vance proposal was offered primarily to accomplish its purported intent, or whether it had other motives; e.g., to help forge a regional consensus against Somoza, to protect the Carter administration against eventual charges that it "lost" Nicaragua by failing to act, or even conceivably (though not probably) to provide the background for a possible eventual unilateral American action.

What is clear, however—or at least so it seems—is what has not happened. The Marines have not landed in Nicaragua. A historic pattern of inter-American relations—or at least of US relations with Central America and the Caribbean—seems to have changed. A turning point appears to have occurred.

INTER-AMERICAN ISSUES

Consider, on the other hand, the issues which have been preoccupying US officials working on inter-American relations during the past 2 or 3 years: Mexican natural resources and migration; US access to the Panama Canal; Nicaraguan—and more generally Central American and Caribbean—instability, nationalism, and revolution. Sudden political changes in even a postage-stamp sized island like Grenada engage the interest of the highest US officials. Fear of expanded extra-continental influence in this border region continues to concern top US officials working on inter-American relations. Events in the same Caribbean basin which dominated the agenda of US policymakers 60 years ago are still attracting high-level attention.

"The more things change," as the saying goes, "the more they remain the same," or seem to. A historic pattern of inter-American relations—primary concern by the US Government with Mexico, Central America, and the Caribbean—appears to be strongly imprinted again.

Each of these first two points—that inter-American relations may have passed a turning point and that a historic pattern of regional relations is still (or again) strong—is correct, even though they appear to be in contradiction. Each of them can be conveniently illustrated by the case of Nicaragua, which is today very much in the news. But each of them, to be properly understood, must be set in a much broader context.

CHANGING HEMISPHERIC PATTERNS

Like shifting configurations of desert sand which can be fully appreciated only from some distance in space, changing patterns in international affairs often require some distance in time to make themselves perceived. In the case of the Western Hemisphere, it is convenient to contrast today's pattern with that of the early 1960's, when President Kennedy proclaimed (unilaterally, it might be added) the "Alliance for Progress" and crystallized a powerful image of inter-American relations.

The early 1960's marked the apogee of US involvement and influence in the Western Hemisphere as a whole, from the Rio Grande to Tierra del Fuego. Patterns of US involvement which before World War II had been confined to Central America, the Caribbean, and Mexico were extended throughout most of the region by the 1960's. The United States dominated Latin America's trade, taking 45 percent of the region's exports and supplying a similar share of Latin America's imports. United States investment had increased fivefold in the first 25 years after World War II. United States investors displaced other foreign investors in country after country, even in those—like Argentina and Chile—where British investment had once been dominant.

Politically, too, the United States Government was deeply engaged throughout Latin America and the Caribbean. Sometimes this engagement reached tragicomic

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dimensions. Philip Agee reports credibly (in a not always believable volume) that in the early 1960's over half the members of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ecuador were CIA agents or informers. Covert intervention in Chile's politics, documented in detail by the US Senate's Select Committee on Intelligence, reached massive proportions; more money was spent per capita by the CIA on influencing the Chilean elections than was spent in the most lavishly funded Presidential campaign in US history, that of Richard Nixon in 1972. Overt military intervention occurred only once, in Santo Domingo, but intense US efforts to influence domestic politics took place across the region through other instruments: "aid" offers and withdrawals; involvement with the planning and implementation of development programs; trade union organizing; cultural projects; and, overt and covert campaigns to influence the media.

United States involvement in the Western Hemisphere at the end of the 1970's is much less pervasive and intense. Private direct investment by the United States in the region is still significant, but the US share of that investment has been declining relative to that of other investors from Western Europe, Japan, and—at least incipiently—from the OPEC countries. Expropriations and nationalizations have reduced the US presence not only in Cuba, where nothing remains, but in Chile, Peru, and even Venezuela.

The US share of Latin America's trade has been declining steadily as South American countries expand and fortify their links with countries outside their hemisphere. Less than one-third of total Latin America exports went to the United States in 1975 and only one-fourth of Latin America's imports came from this country, and the decline of US trade dominance continues. Peru, for example, has about as much commerce with the European Economic Community (EEC) and with the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON) countries, respectively, as with the United States. Japan's trade with Brazil, negligible in 1960, had reached \$1.8 billion a year by 1975, and is expected to reach \$12 billion by 1985. West Germany, the Soviet Union, even China, are becoming significant economic partners for various Latin American nations.

Political involvement by the United States in Latin America is drastically less intense than it was in the 1960's. The United States Government is more distant from Latin American governments than it was in the 1960's, and the US diplomatic, technical, and political presence is sharply curtailed. Internationally, several Latin American governments play significant roles in various fora: in the North-South dialogue, in the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development and the "Group of 77," in OPEC, and elsewhere. No longer do all significant international initiatives from North America pass through Washington.

Both politically and economically, US interests in the Western Hemisphere are much more clustered or concentrated than they seemed to be in 1960. Only a few countries—Mexico, Brazil, and Venezuela primarily—account for most US investment and trade in the region. Political interest is still expressed in the traditional US "sphere of influence" in the region—in Central America and the Caribbean—but perhaps more for axiomatic reasons than from recent analysis.

In no sphere is the contrast between the early 1960's and the late 1970's (and the prospective 1980's) more striking than in the realm of security. Throughout the 1960's the United States was intensively and extensively involved in programs of security cooperation with the military and police establishments of almost every country of the hemisphere. Thousands of Latin American officers were trained in the United States or in US facilities. Millions of dollars worth of American arms and equipment were provided. Cooperation between Latin America and the US defense establishment reached its height with the founding of the Inter-American Force in Santo Domingo, in which units from five Latin American countries patrolled the streets jointly with US forces.

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Eight hundred US specialists in security matters were assigned to Latin America and the Caribbean in 1968; less than 100 were so assigned in 1979. The United States is by now an almost insignificant source of arms for Latin American countries; France, Germany, Russia, and Israel are more important suppliers. Military and police training programs have been sharply curtailed, and have been cut off entirely in several countries adjudged by the State Department to have permitted gross and systematic violations of fundamental human rights. Although the armies of Latin America and the United States are unlikely to clash on a field of battle, they are by now far from being closely cooperating.

The major issues of inter-American relations in the 1960's were aid, anticommunism, expropriation, and nonintervention. Bilateral assistance was a very significant component of national budgets in several Latin American and Caribbean countries, and was of some importance in almost all such countries. Expropriations—or more generally the role of US investment—were major issues in the bilateral agenda in several cases. Peru, where the International Petroleum Company controversy seethed for close to a decade, was the classic example. Anticommunism and nonintervention were two sides, in a sense, of the same coin: the shared desire across the region to keep foreign influence out of the Western Hemisphere, but not to stimulate US intervention in its stead.

By 1979, the central issues in hemispheric relations have changed, and will change even more clearly through the 1980's. The dominant issues are access to markets, capital, resources, and technology, together with—in a few cases—migration. Bilateral aid is insignificant in most countries, marginal at best in a few. Foreign private investment from the United States or elsewhere is no longer so controversial, nor so central, in the region's development strategy. Anticommunism and nonintervention are still background issues in the region, evoked to the foreground in cases like Nicaragua, but neither question is a central one.

The main issues of the 1960's which evoked importantly unified responses across Latin America and the Caribbean were institutionalized in the Consensus of Vina del Mar and presented to President Nixon by Latin American's Foreign Ministers in 1969. By 1979, considerable diversity characterized Latin American and Caribbean positions on the major issues. The interests of Mexico and Brazil, for example, may be much more closely related to those of Nicaragua and Paraguay, when it comes to problems like access to capital, markets, and technology. The nature and dynamics of Western Hemisphere relations, consequently, have been changing.

During the early 1960's both the United States and most of the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean favored the expansion and strengthening of inter-American programs and institutions. The Organization of American States, established in 1948, gained expanded budgets and missions in 1960's. The Inter-American Development Bank, set up in 1959, rapidly multiplied its staff and resources. Both North and South Americans felt generally comfortable with the notion of a regional "special relationship," an idea which achieved its most explicit and articulate exposition in Nelson Rockefeller's 1969 report on *The Quality of Life in the Americas*.

By 1979, inter-American programs and institutions are in retreat, if not in atrophy. The Inter-American Development Bank has maintained its importance, but just barely, in terms of real resources, while the World Bank and various regional institutions (e.g., the Caribbean Development Bank) have expanded their roles. The OAS has been forced to cut back its functions, staff, and budgets, and to concentrate more carefully on defining and limiting its mission; a recent study of the organization concludes it has a future mainly because it has a past, rather than because of compelling current or prospective need. The long-touted "special relationship" between the United States and Latin America has declined both in fact and in rhetoric. Latin Americans no longer respond positively to a

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concept and lingo which have often been used to justify singling out Latin America for special rhetorical treatment or interventionist alteration, but for little else.

BRAZIL, CUBA, AND THE UNITED STATES

A vivid way to illustrate the changing patterns of inter-American relations might be to concentrate on a couple of specific countries. Brazil in the mid-1960's, for example, was a paramount and intimate ally of the United States, and cooperated closely with Washington in many spheres. Brazil's active participation in the aforementioned Inter-American Peace Force was only one example; concerted action at the United Nations and in regional institutions, and parallel policies toward many other issues filled out the pattern. Cuba, to take the opposite extreme, was seen by Washington as its mortal enemy, and as a significant threat to United States interests. During the 1960's, the US Government went to extraordinary lengths—including the abortive Bay of Pigs invasion and the unconsummated CIA attempts to assassinate Fidel Castro—to reverse Cuba's revolution.

As the 1980's approach, however, inter-American patterns of cooperation are shifting. Brazil and the United States are unlikely to become open enemies, but tensions between Brazil and the United States are unquestionably mounting, and will undoubtedly persist and deepen. Conflicts between the two countries are not limited to exceptional instances such as Brazil's vote for the UN resolution equating Zionism with "racism" or the publication of a US congressional report citing human rights violations by Brazil's military government. On the contrary, Brazil-US tensions are grounded in more fundamental and objective clashes of interest; the United States will increasingly be seen by Brazil as its principal obstacle on issues such as trade and tariff restrictions, energy policy and nuclear proliferation, access to capital and technology, monetary policy, and trade competition in third markets. The United States is likely to have more reasons in the 1980's to conflict with capitalist Brazil than with Communist China.

Cuba and the United States, on the other hand, seem already well advanced toward an eventual rapprochement. Cuba's current international role—its repeated instances of military cooperation with the Soviet Union—still prevent any significant further improvement of bilateral Cuban-American relations, but the two countries already have diplomatic representation in each other's capitals, along with expanding cultural exchanges and even the beginning of a renewed tourist trade. It seems entirely possible, if not necessarily probable, that the United States and Cuba will normalize their relationship even further in the 1980's. Once a foreign revolution has proved itself irreversible, the United States has been able historically not only to accommodate itself to this fact, but also to find mutual profit in fostering better relations with the new regime. It would not be an overwhelming surprise, if the changing patterns of inter-American relations in the 1980's were to include the return of Coca-Cola to Havana and of Cuban cigars to Wall Street.

DECLINE OF HEGEMONIC PRESUMPTION

The historic patterns of inter-American relations have been changing, and changing importantly. United States dominance of the region and Washington's "hegemonic presumption" have been on the decline. Latin American nations have been emerging as actors in the international arena by playing the role of middle powers internationally and exerting a limited but not inconsequential influence on the international economy and on international politics. Many of the countries of the region, particularly of South America,

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have been increasingly engaged—politically, commercially, and financially—with nations of Europe and Asia, and are less intensely involved in their relations with the United States.

Mexico and the smaller states of Central America and the Caribbean, on the other hand, have become even more completely linked with the United States. Commercially, financially, and especially demographically, these countries are inextricably intertwined with the United States. Mexico, with millions of its citizens crossing back and forth into the United States each year, and with \$12.8 billion worth of bilateral trade annually, obviously constitutes a special case. The small, poor, perhaps inherently dependent countries of the Caribbean and of Central America—many of which have been, historically, satellites in search of an orbit—present another unique set of issues for the United States. Uninvolvement in this border area is not really a possibility for the United States; the question is how the United States will relate to, and affect, this nearby region.

The emerging pattern of inter-American relations as the 1980's approach resembles the pattern of the 1920's. Then, the United States was a dominant, but a domineering, power in South America. Then, the United States had significant, but not exclusive, influence in the Americas; Germany, the United Kingdom, and other powers also had interests and engagements. Then, a few of the Latin American nations ranked as middle powers on the world scene, comparable in economic and political terms to all but the 7 or 8 major nations. Then, the United States confined its intense involvement in regional domestic affairs to its immediate border area, to the Central American isthmus, and to the Caribbean islands.

Whether the United States will in the 1980's revert in the Caribbean and Central America to its military interventionist practices of the 1920's is a good question. I am inclined to think not; lessons have been learned by the United States, in this hemisphere and elsewhere, which should help inhibit a return to interventionism. Pressures to intervene may well arise, however, and the changed pattern of inter-American relations may be severely tested in the years ahead.

CLOSING REMARKS

Honorable David E. McGiffert

Last year when I wrapped up this conference, I spoke about three issues which I thought needed attention, from the point of view of the practical problems I was working on in the office: theater nuclear forces, limited contingency scenarios and forces, and the problem of China.

The first two of those you have dwelt on at some length. I would make a comment about your deliberations, and it is a comment, not a criticism, because the mandate of the panels was purposely oriented to the military and arms control aspects of the issues. But I thought, in listening to the commentary, that we were missing, to some degree, important political dimensions.

It is all very well to seek intellectual tidiness with respect to the doctrinal approach to theater nuclear forces, and to wish that we could arrive thereby at a basis to develop military requirements on which most people would agree. But I would agree with the comment of one of the panelists that, while that may be a fine objective, at least in the short term, it is impractical simply because of the nature of our Alliance and its political attitudes, and the internal tension between the conduct of a war on European soil and the conduct of a war that goes over the heads of the Europeans. That tension necessarily produces, I think, the ambiguity with which we live doctrinally.

What we forget, I think, is that these issues of arms control for theater nuclear forces and, indeed, the content of the modernization of theater nuclear forces have very difficult political questions associated with them in a very near-term, real manner. The British and the Dutch, for example, are very far apart in what they see as an appropriate arms control approach or component to accompany any theater nuclear force modernization. The very issue of theater nuclear force modernization in terms of basing, participation, and so forth raises a great opportunity politically and also a great risk, because if it is dealt with properly, it can bind the Alliance together; if it isn't, it can be very divisive indeed.

These are the questions which we are immediately facing in the next 2 or 3 months that are not at all easy to resolve.

Similarly, in the Middle East and Persian Gulf, we quite properly look at various contingencies which might involve or potentially involve the need for a military response. Let us not forget that probably the most likely course of events which would be adverse to our interests in that area is a destabilization, a radicalization of moderate Arab states by various internal events which do not obviously lend themselves to a military response. It is here, perhaps, that the whole question of perceptions to which several of you referred, in the context of the Caribbean and in the context of the Middle East, becomes particularly important. Although there are some scenarios to which a military response may not seem very appropriate, obviously the sense of people about America's capability and its will nevertheless has a major political implication.

I thought indeed that perhaps Bob Gard might like to look at a topic for a future conference which would focus on the question of perceptions taken broadly in terms of not only force planning but how we deploy our forces, and also what we say about their purpose.

Keyed into that is another issue which is implicit in the conclusions apparently reached by the panel on the Middle East and Persian Gulf. If I understood it correctly, there was a sense that the United States should, in various ways, although modestly, increase its military presence in that area. Even if that is done modestly, it nevertheless has

implications for our posture in the rest of the world. If we do that, from where do those forces come? They have to come from somewhere in the short term, and, obviously, they are going to come from either Asia or Europe or both.

I think we need to understand and begin to consider a little more thoroughly the appropriate extent to which we need to reorder our priorities, particularly in terms of our declaratory policy and our force deployments, in order to recognize our interests in the Persian Gulf area and the fact that both the Japanese and the Europeans have as deep, if not a deeper, interest than we do in oil.

Finally, let me come back to China. I thought it was very intriguing to be told (which I suppose is self-evident) that we can't count on the Soviet-Chinese relationship remaining in its present posture. That still leaves open the whole fascinating topic of how our policy toward China ought to evolve over the next few years, in order to maximize the chance that the Chinese relationship with the Soviet Union will be of the type of most interest to the United States.

I don't pretend to have any answers to that. I do advocate the issue, as I did last year. We now have a somewhat different context since we have normalized. But when you realize that the Soviets clearly plan, program, and budget on the basis of two wars in the sense of a war against two adversaries, whereas we plan, program, and budget on the basis of one major war in the sense of a war against only one adversary (even though it may be on two fronts), I believe the importance of the question I posed becomes self-evident.

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GLOSSARY OF ABBREVIATIONS

ABM	antiballistic missile
ACDA	Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
AEI	American Enterprise Institute
AID	Agency for International Development
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
ASPPO	Armed Services Production Planning Officer
ASW	antisubmarine warfare
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CNI	communicating NATO's intentions
COMECON	
CMEA	Council for Mutual Economic Assistance
CSCE	Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
CTB	comprehensive test ban
DCT	detection, classification, and targeting
DID	data item description
DLA	Defense Logistics Agency
DOC	Department of Commerce
DOD	Department of Defense
DPRK	Democratic People's Republic of Korea
DSARC	Defense Systems Acquisition Review Council
EEC	European Economic Community
ERW	enhanced radiation weapon
EW	electronic warfare
FBS	forward based system
FEMA	Federal Emergency Management Agency
FMS	foreign military sales
FRG	Federal Republic of Germany
GATT	general agreement on tariffs and trade
GNP	gross national product
GOSPLAN	Soviet State Planning Organization
HLG	high level group
ICAF	Industrial College of the Armed Forces
ICBM	intercontinental ballistic missile
IDB	Inter-American Development Bank
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IOC	initial operational capability
IPM	industrial preparedness measures
IPP	industrial preparedness planning
JCS	Joint Chiefs of Staff
LCF	limited contingency force
LOC	lines of communication
MAAG	Military Assistance Advisory Group
MBFR	mutual and balanced force reduction
MFN	most favored nation
MIRV	multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle
MPLA	People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola
MPS	multiple protective structure
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NIC	newly industrialized country

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NPG	nuclear planning group
NSC	National Security Council
NSDM	national security decision memorandum
NUWEP	Secretary of Defense Policy Guidance for the Employment of Nuclear Weapons
OAPEC	Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries
OAS	Organization of American States
OAU	Organization of African Unity
OECD	Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
OMB	Office of Management and Budget
OPEC	Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries
OSD	Office of the Secretary of Defense
OSD MRA&L	Office of the Secretary of Defense Manpower, Reserve Affairs and Logistics
OTH	over the horizon
OUSD R&E	Office of the Under Secretary of Defense Research and Engineering
PIPES	peacetime industrial production expansion system
PRC	People's Republic of China
R&D	research and development
SACEUR	Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (NATO)
SALT	strategic arms limitation talks
SAM	surface-to-air missile
SEP	selective employment plan
SHAPE	Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers Europe (NATO)
SIOP	single integrated operational plan
SLBM	sea, space, or submarine-launched ballistic missile
SLCM	sea-launched cruise missile; surface launch cruise missile
SLOC	sea lines of communication
SPD	Social Democratic Party (West Germany)
SRV	Socialist Republic of Vietnam
SSBN	fleet ballistic missile submarine
TAL	tactical arms limitations
TNF	theater nuclear forces
UAE	Union of Arab Emirates
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
WRM	war reserve materials
ZAPU	Zimbabwe African People's Union